Avodah Mailing List

Volume 05 : Number 055

Wednesday, May 31 2000

• Re: marranos
• Re: Chesed, Din, Emes
• Re: misayea
• Ta'am and taste
• Re: misayea
• Re: Ta'am and taste
• Re: Ta'am and taste
• Re: Responsa by Rav Ya'akov Ari'el Shalit"a
• Re: Responsa by Rav Ya'akov Ari'el Shalit"a
• Re[2]: Responsa by Rav Ya'akov Ari'el Shalit"a
• Re: Re[2]: Responsa by Rav Ya'akov Ari'el Shalit"a
• hechsher
• Ameylim BaTorah
• Re: Chesed, Din, Emes

RE Turkel wrote:

>>If a jewish family because xtain/moslem etc. (r"l) what is the status of their
>>children after several generations (through the daughters).

There is a machlokes tannaim whether the ten tribes will return.  R. Chaim 
Soloveitchik, as quoted by R. Menachem Genack from RYBS, explains that the 
machlokes is whether a child born to an apostate who never knew that s/he was 
Jewish is considered al pi halachah to be Jewish.  RCS leaves the question open 
but I believe his son answers it.

The Brisker Rav (I believe in parshas VaYechi) explains the pasuk "Uva'u 
ha'ovdim me'eretz Ashur" to refer to those of the ten tribes who are mixed in 
among the other nations, i.e. lost ("ovdim"), who at the beginning of yemos 
hamashiach will find out that they are descended matrilinearly from Jews and 
return to the Jewish people.  This is how all of the tribes will be 
reconstructed.

Clearly the Brisker Rav assumes that someone whose ancestors for hundreds of 
generations thought they were gentile is still Jewish.

Although, there is a din (either derabbanan or minhag) to undergo tevilah.  
Also, without the help of nevu'ah it is exceedingly difficult to prove Jewish 
ancestry going that far back.

Gil Student
gil.student@citicorp.com

On Tue, May 30, 2000 at 02:26:32PM -0500, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
:> Chezkas kashrus is a chiyuv in birur. Hevei dan kol adam appears to be be
:> not only a chiyuv (assuming all else applies) but an assei. Perishah min
:> hatzibbur is a chiyuv but a lav. All could a apply.

: Hevei Dan is not applicable when there are raglayim la'davar, necessarily.

Are we assuming a case of raglaim bidavar?

: But, you are making a mistake in Hevei Dan. Hevei Dan is a "din" in your
: internal shatzing up of yenem. It has no halachic ramifications...

One down, two to go: You don't explain why chezkas kashrus or lo sisgodidu
(let me recant on perishah min hatzibbur) wouldn't apply.

:> In any case, one is being called to act, not to hold back. I therefore see it
:> in terms of chessed, not gevurah.

: You are called to eat the questionable hechsher?

Questionable hechsher? Again, I think you're confusing your debates. Mine is
weighing chumros -- in particular, it was about 2nd guessing a mumcheh who is
a yarei shamayim about glatt. I ventured that the Ch"S was not clearly stating
a perferance for one over the other.

I am equally not comfortable with statements that are stronger than
that. Bimchilas kavod Toras amram.

:>: I invite you to make chillukim.

:> An easy one: I'm constructing a case of chumrah vs chumrah. You reply with one
:> of chumrah vs ikkar hadin. Also, known mechallelei Shabbos have no chezkas
:> kashrus, and that pasuk of acharei rabim has a seifa.
: 
: Aw, c'mon Micha - I just picked non-subtle ones - I can easily give you
: subtle ones:

Your examples are based on the assumption that I lump together risking an
issur with chumros. I therefore don't have too many non-subtle cases where
I am unsure whether to choose ne'emanus or the bain adam laMakom.

: Using a doubtful eruv to be machzik the communal Rav.

If the eiruv is truly doubtful, the question is a risk of being oveir hotza'ah
diRabbanan. If it's a case of not wanting to be someich on a commonly accepted
shitah, one is being machmir in eiruv by being meikil in kavod harav --
and I would again question which chumrah one ought to choose.

When I say question, I mean so literally. I don't want to take a position
so much as raise questions about the one we all follow. Remember, I had
suggested that perhaps the answer lay in which middah one was aspiring to
perfect.

: Eating meat under what even you would be modeh is truly questionable
: hashgocho to avoid divisiveness.

Well... R' Dovid Lifshitz told me I could eat meat of brand XYZ when served it
by my mother-in-law but not in any other context. But even without inyanim
of kibud eim (for my wife, certainly di'Oraisa)... I would ask what the
question is. Risking eating tarfus, certainly not. Keeping one's personal
chumros by insulting a host, I'm not as sure.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 30-May-00: Shelishi, Bamidbar
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 14a
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

The following is from an article by R. Tzvi Shpitz, translated by R. Aaron 
Tendler as part of Project Genesis's weekly Business Halachah class.  I only 
copied the question and answer.  A detailed discussion of the sources is 
available at the URL.  The usual preface that this is only for learning purposes
and not halachah lema'aseh applies.

Gil Student
gil.student@citicorp.com


http://www.torah.org/advanced/business-halacha/5757/vol1no33.html

Business-Halacha - Hilchos Choshen Mishpat

Volume I : Number 33 - Purchasing Stolen Goods 


Question:

Is it permitted to purchase items from a pawn shop that is suspected of being a 
front for stolen goods? If you are approached on a street corner and are offered
the option of purchasing items at a very low price, are you allowed to do so? 

Answer:

A. It is forbidden to assist a thief in any way, whether in the actual act of 
stealing, transporting the stolen item, or helping to dispose of it. (Of course,
it is permitted to help him transport it to return it to the original owner.) 

Therefore, it is forbidden to purchase an item that is known to be stolen, or 
even an item that was probably stolen. 

We should therefore refrain from purchasing items on street corners, or at pawn 
shops that have a shady reputation. We should also be aware that if the price is
too good to be true, the item being sold may have been stolen, and should be 
checked out. 

We should especially be careful when purchasing Tashmishei Kedusha, i.e. Sifrei 
Torah (Torah Scrolls), Tefillen, Mezuzos, and Seforim, even if new, to buy only 
from reputable people and not from someone unknown, even if he seems to have a 
valid story as to how he ended up with these items.

B. Despite all of the above, if an item has already been purchased at one of the
above mentioned places, the probability is that the original owner has given up 
hope of ever seeing it again. Therefore, the sale is effective and the article 
belongs to the buyer. 

I like this scj post, it touches on my recent ramblings about kiruv
and existentialism, so I chose to share it with the chevrah.

Your corrections are invited, so that I can clean up any misimpressions I
may have left behind.

The context is a discussion of glassware and nosein ta'am, which was presented
by a former Avodah reader, IOW someone with a frum perspective, and redefined
as below.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 30-May-00: Shelishi, Bamidbar
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 14a
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         


:>> Flavor *is* composed of small particles that are released later; the
:>> same way scent consists of small particles which are inhaled.

:> Flavor", as Moshe was using it, is a technical halchic term....

: I know. I differ from the halakha on this because the jargon seems to
: me to be made up of words with no meaning and no purpose. I correspond
: them to actuality as closely as I can, instead, and follow that.

This touches on something that has become a pet topic of mine in the past few
months: rampant empiricism.

In this case, the assumption is that the correctness of a behavior toward an
object should be entirely determined by the empirical state of the object.
Ad absurdum, a swatztika drawn by a teenager in '00 should be treated no
differently than any of his other doodles.

What my exagerated case ought to demonstrate is that things have emotional
and ethical content beyond their physics. They have associated noumena,
which need also underly one's decisions.

IOW, if this dish is mentally, emotionally or existentially associated with
dairy, one can relate to using it with meat as though one were mixing meat and
milk. The physical presence of milk isn't necessary. Similarly, if a surface
physically has milk, but in a way that we no longer associate it with dairy,
perhaps we should allow using it with meat. Therefore, kashuring should be
okay because it's a disasociating ritual, regadless of whether molecules of
dairy proteins are entirely removed.

I therefore would define "ta'am" in this context to mean "experiential
association". Which is related to the concept of sensory taste as much
as defining it to include particles that cause no sensation.

I'm intentionally trying to avoid metaphysics, as our postulates differ too
greatly in that domain to make dialogue meaningful. However, even in the
realm of experience, I think the jargon's sense does work.

-mi

On 30 May 2000, at 9:33, Gil.Student@citicorp.com wrote:

> The following is from an article by R. Tzvi Shpitz, translated by R.
> Aaron Tendler as part of Project Genesis's weekly Business Halachah
> class.  I only copied the question and answer.  A detailed discussion
> of the sources is available at the URL.  The usual preface that this
> is only for learning purposes and not halachah lema'aseh applies.

This is interesting because I was referring to a different answer of 
R. Shpitz's - 2:25 - when I responded to RJR. Thanks for posting.

-- Carl


Carl M. Sherer, Adv.
Silber, Schottenfels, Gerber & Sherer
Telephone 972-2-625-7751
Fax 972-2-625-0461
mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

IOW, there is a machlokes rishonim whether bitul beshishim is lechumra or 
lekula.  If a ta'am is batel in only 1/40th some rishonim hold it is batel while
Rashi (and the Ramban in some cases) would still require 1/60th even though the 
ta'am is already batel.

You are trying to explain shitas Rashi that the bitul is not a din in the 
metzius of ta'am but rather the "experiential association" of ta'am.  Even if 
there is no ta'am at 1/40th there is still this "experiential association".

I think that dissociating kashrus from empiricism is a big chidush.  It is also 
probably better to use the example of an issur being batel instead of chalav 
being batel.  With chalav, it could be that there is no issur with less than 
1/60th.

Gil Student
gil.student@citicorp.com

On Tue, May 30, 2000 at 04:34:55PM -0400, Gil.Student@citicorp.com wrote:
:         If a ta'am is batel in only 1/40th some rishonim hold it is batel
: while Rashi (and the Ramban in some cases) would still require 1/60th even
: though the ta'am is already batel.

: You are trying to explain shitas Rashi that the bitul is not a din in the 
: metzius of ta'am but rather the "experiential association" of ta'am.

Well, I'm trying to say that even without a metzi'us of ta'am, one can still
"experientially associate" (EA) the item with basar or chalav. One doesn't
have an EA of ta'am; EA is my proposed definition of ta'am. Think ta'am in
the sense of "ta'am hamitzvah".

The discussion was about whether glass requires anything more than washing,
so the concept of ta'am that I was thinking about was WRT keilim. A steak
knife that went through the washer has no taste of meat on it, yet it's still
a fleishig knife. I'm suggesting that what makes it fleishig in part is the
EA of knowing it was used with steak. The knowledge, or the fact that you
ought to have that knowledge (which is only lima'aseh once you found out
after the fact), is the ta'am in question.

It's very much a RSRH "symbolism" kind of approach. Explaining mitzvos by
what they make you think about; reducing metaphysical ideas to rational,
experiential ones. Since I didn't want to start by trying to convince the
person of frum metaphysics, I tried to keep things to that part of the
reason. Perhaps that's why RSRH did as well. Dayan Grunfeld seems to say
as much.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 30-May-00: Shelishi, Bamidbar
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 14a
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

(Moderator's note: I recant my decision to move this thread to Areivim.
I'm still learning as I go. -mi)

From: "R' Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
> Except for the gelatin issue, I think we all agree with RAY - note carefully
> his reponses. For example:

>> (b) In every place where there is Hashgacha, Terumot and Ma'aserot are
>> taken Ka'Halacha.

> Yes, where there is Hashgocho, i.e., a Mashgiach Temidi, there is no doubt
> that if the Mashgiach says so, one can rely on him that TuM were taken
> k'Halocho. The problem is, say, your generic felafel stand where the
> proprietor is not Shomer Shabbos and their is no Mashgiach "tzamud".

The halachic issue that is the basis for ALL Hashgachot, in Israel and
abroad, OU, OK, Rabbanut, EC is the same:
"Yotzei VeNichnas".  That is the proprietor, whether Shomer Shabbat or
not has no idea when the Mashgiach will walk in.  If you claim that
the Mashgiach notifies the owner that he will come only between
14:00-16:00  (for instance) then what you say may have some merit.

But as  all the Hashgachot, worldwide rely on the same Halachic
concept -- the proprietor is risking everything by trying to pull some
shtick -- b/c the Mashgiach may walk in at that moment and he will
immediately lose his certificate, therefore your explanation to Rav
Ariel's responsa is not correct.

> As to the gelatin issue, it certainly is true that there are mattirim. The
> question over the years with gelatin has not, so much, been the theory, but
> the practice: I.e., the rigor of Hashgocho on the gelatin producers (In
> Europe) to insure that only bones and other inedible material was used  to
> produce the gelatin.

And we're back to saying unsubstantiated Lashon Har'a about rabbanim
and mashigichim.  The point is that the rabbi _will not_ sign his name
to the certificate if the parameters demanded by the halacha are not
kept.


Shoshana L. Boublil

All work that is done, should be done out of love.
Then it ceases to be difficult, or boring, or embarrassing.
Even a cup or a plate can be washed with devotion until they shine,
out of aspiration for  perfection and completion.
                    Rav A.Y. HaCohen Kook

From: Shoshana L. Boublil <toramada@zahav.net.il>
> And we're back to saying unsubstantiated Lashon Har'a about rabbanim
> and mashigichim.  The point is that the rabbi _will not_ sign his name
> to the certificate if the parameters demanded by the halacha are not
> kept.

Since when is yotzei v'nichnas enough by non-Shomer Shabbos?

It certainly does not suffice by meat (basar she'nis'alem min ha'ayin).

I  think it suffices by milchig only where ingredients and processes are
absolutely standardized and completely trackable - I fail to see how that
can be applied to a local falafel stand. Cucumbers can come from anywhere
and are not particularly identifiable.

I am beginning to resent the paragraph below - I do not think I am speaking
LH, and will not continue the discussion under that accusation.

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila    ygb@aishdas.org

> Since when is yotzei v'nichnas enough by non-Shomer Shabbos?

> It certainly does not suffice by meat (basar she'nis'alem min ha'ayin).

> I  think it suffices by milchig only where ingredients and processes are 
> absolutely standardized and completely trackable -

Aiui this is correct.  wrt to nonfrum yotzei nichnas is for non-meat only.
Meat requires mahgiach temidi

I am not sure about gevina hane'lam etc.

Rich wolpoe

On 30 May 00, at 21:33, richard_wolpoe@ibi.com wrote:
> Aiui this is correct.  wrt to nonfrum yotzei nichnas is for non-meat
> only. Meat requires mahgiach temidi

> I am not sure about gevina hane'lam etc.

IIRC there was a story about Gvina ha'Ne'elemes and a certain 
community in South Central New Jersey some years ago. The 
Rabbonim discovered it totally by accident. Makes you want to 
know about whether the owner is ehrlicher before you sit down to 
eat, let alone the Mashgiach.

B"H out and out trief meat and cheese from non-Kosher animals is 
still relatively hard to come by (albeit not impossible R"L) in these 
parts.

-- Carl


Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

Carl and Adina Sherer
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

> On 29 May 2000, at 21:30, Shoshana L. Boublil wrote:
> 
> > (3)  I heard from a relative that I can't eat at a certain hotel (5
> > stars, Kashrut Mehadrin of the Rabbanut) as it is known that the
> > Mashgiach "bothered" the owners, and therefore they bought him a free
> > pass to a video store so he can watch videos and not "bother" them
> > anymore.
> > 
> > My conclusion:  Neither I nor my people can eat at hotels under
> > Hashgacha of the Rabbanut, even Mehadrin.
> 
Sorry to say almost every hechsher today has had it share of scandals.
If one does not eat from any hecssher that has had problems then one
better be prepared to do everthing oneself from scratch.

Eli Turkel

Theoretical question regarding a theoretical 1920's-era maskil in a European
Yeshiva who learns gemara 17 hours a day, including Shabbos, and smokes
cigarettes 7 days a week, including on Shabbos: Is he to be counted amongst
those who are ameylim baTorah, albeit one who is also a ba'al aveira?



David Hojda
Kiryat Sefer

----- Original Message -----
From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
To: Avodah - High Level Torah Discussion Group <avodah@aishdas.org>
Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2000 2:59 PM
Subject: Re: Chesed, Din, Emes

> Are we assuming a case of raglaim bidavar?
>

As I said, not necessarily.

> One down, two to go: You don't explain why chezkas kashrus or lo sisgodidu
> (let me recant on perishah min hatzibbur) wouldn't apply.
>

Based on your next paragraph, the former certainly can be a factor, although
the latter is obviously not - is a Nazir oveir on Lo Tisgodedu?

> Questionable hechsher? Again, I think you're confusing your debates. Mine
is
> weighing chumros -- in particular, it was about 2nd guessing a mumcheh who
is
> a yarei shamayim about glatt. I ventured that the Ch"S was not clearly
stating
> a perferance for one over the other.
>
> Your examples are based on the assumption that I lump together risking an
> issur with chumros. I therefore don't have too many non-subtle cases where
> I am unsure whether to choose ne'emanus or the bain adam laMakom.
>

Define which chumrah you are referring to!

As a helpful guide (sans footnotes):
______________________________________

Good Chumros?: Rabbi Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer

The Big Question

Do you merit a greater portion in the World to Come if you always reads the
Shma before the Magen Avrohom's deadline? Do you generate more nachas ru'ach
for HaKadosh Baruch Hu if you keep your refrigerator on a Shabbos clock? If
the answer to these questions is an unqualified "yes," then why are we not
machmir every conceivable chumra possible?

Before we continue, let us clarify that the converse of a chumra is not a
kulla. Halacha recognizes many instances in which kullos are justified:
"hefsed merubeh," "she'as hadechak," "kavod Shabbos," etc. However, these
are not, for our purposes here, the alternatives to chumros. The alternative
is "baseline" halachic observance. While the definition of such a standard
is iffy, let us say that it consists of a standard of halachic behavior
endorsed by: a) many great Poskim who have weighed in on the issue; and, b)
prevalent practice among many observant Jews.

Are there Unwarranted Chumros?

Of course, chumros must be warranted. Chazal warn us not to prohibit things
or activities arbitrarily:

Rabbi Eliezer said: Just as allowing that which is prohibited is forbidden,
so prohibiting that which is allowed is also forbidden. (Yerushalmi Terumos
5:3).

Many writers have attempted to identify sociological reasons why, in their
perception, our generation has a more stringent attitude toward Halacha - is
more machmir - than our parents' and grandparents' generations. Their
various theories may or may not constitute insightful analyses of
contemporary conditions. They do nothing, however, to answer the questions
that we posed at the outset. Some chumros may be sociologically motivated.
Some people may be machmir unthinkingly. These may not be the "right"
motivations for adopting a chumra. We, however, want to understand what a
"right" motivation might be, and, will a chumra adopted as a result truly
enhance one's Avodas Hashem?

Chumros for the Thinking Person

In broad terms, we can identify four categories of chumros:
1. Based on halachic issues.
2. Based on ahavas Hashem.
3. Based on yiras Hashem.
4. Based on separation from gashmiyus.

The first category is halachic in nature: A great Posek reviews an issue in
depth and comes to the conclusion that Halacha definitively follows the
stringent opinion in a certain area.

For example, for centuries most of Ashkenazic Jewry was lenient concerning
yoshon and chodosh. When Rabbi Chaim and Rabbi Velvel Soloveitchik zt"l
revisited the issue, however, their analysis led them to conclude that the
prevailing practice was incorrect, and that following the stringent opinion
in this area was necessary. A chumra arrived at by this process is
inescapable. But very few of us are equipped to engage in this process. It
is one reserved for Gedolei Torah at the highest echelon. Often, Poskim who
have engaged in such comprehensive reviews and analyses are loath to impose
the standards implicated by their conclusions on the masses of Am Yisroel.
Their reasons may be based on the principle of eilu va'eilu divrei Elokim
chayim. They may, however, advise their talmidim and followers of their
conclusions, and direct them to adhere to these rulings.

As these talmidim and followers would then be bound to follow the stringent
opinion of their Posek, to be perfectly precise, for them this mode of
behavior is no longer a "chumra." If your halachic authority has ruled in
accordance with the more stringent opinion in an issue, this becomes for you
normative Halacha. To many beyond your circle, however, this mode of
behavior will still be an apparent chumra, as their halachic authority may
not accept the more stringent opinion.

(We should note that rabbinic authorities, even to the present day, may
issue guidelines and enactments - takkanos - that are not properly
classified as chumros. The Chazon Ish zt"l (Orach Chaim 52:6) understood the
prohibition to use an umbrella on Shabbos as a modern day rabbinic
enactment, based on their mandate to preserve the public aura of Shabbos.)
The next two categories of chumros are best understood by introducing and
exploring them together. They are "chumros me'yirah" and "chumros me'
hava" - chumros adopted out of fear (of Hashem or the defiling qualities of
the sin itself) or love (of Hashem or Am Yisroel).

The Shelah HaKadosh zt"l (vol. 1, Bais Dovid, Bais Chochma) attempts to
explain the phenomenon of ever-more chumros. He writes that as time goes by
there are many more enticements. The power of the yetzer hara becomes ever
greater. Society "devolves," and spiritual danger increases. It becomes
imperative, therefore, to introduce more safeguards. Halacha may not even
mandate these chumros. Any boundary, however, may be positive. The Nesivos
Shalom (Kovetz Sichos p. 16), in the name of the Toras Avos, cites the verse
regarding Bila'am and his donkey, which found itself standing in the path
among the vineyards bound in narrow confines by a "gader mizeh v'gader
mizeh" - a fence on either side - that pressed the leg of Bil'am. The
Nesivos Shalom interprets the pasuk as an allusion to the necessity to
impose gedarim on oneself to keep on the straight and narrow path:
For when there are boundaries and limitations on all sides they press and
wear away the habits ["hergel' - a play on the Hebrew word "regel" - leg] of
Bil'am. He [the Toras Avos] explains, that there are boundaries and
limitations meant so that one who learns Torah remains free of inclinations
and negative thoughts, and that there are others meant so that one who
involves himself in matters of this world should not become too
materialistic ["megusham"]. The boundaries and limitations in the vein of
"gader mizeh v'gader mizeh" that surround each step direct the individual in
the proper path.

The Maharal (Be'er HaGolah 1:4, d.h. HaRevi'i) explains the Gemara that
states that rabbinic enactments are more precious before Hashem than Torah
laws. He notes that the hallmark of love is the quest to give to one's
beloved. The Michtav Me'Eliyahu (vol. 5, p. 234) cites the pesukim in
Yeshaya (58:13-14) that admonish the Jewish people to keep Shabbos properly.
The stress in those pesukim is on Kavod Shabbos. Rabbi Dessler asks the
obvious question: Surely, were it up to us, we would stress the prohibitions
of Shabbos and their fortification - not the honor of Shabbos? We must
preface Rabbi Dessler's answer with the comment of the Rambam (Peirush
HaMishnayos) on the well-known mishna at the end of Makkos:

Rabbi Chananya ben Akashya said: Hashem wanted to enhance the merit of the
Jewish people. It is for that reason that he granted them many mitzvos.

A "conventional" understanding might be that Hashem wants to reward us as
much as possible, and that is why he gave us so many opportunities to
fulfill mitzvos. The Rambam, however, says that to qualify for "entry" to
the World to Come a "candidate" must have fulfilled at least one mitzva
lishma during his or her lifetime. This is a very difficult task, as lishma
is not a simple matter to attain. Rabbi Chananya ben Akashya's meaning is
that it was to make that difficult task more feasible that Hashem gave us so
many opportunities to complete it successfully, by giving us so many mitzva
opportunities.

Rabbi Dessler explains that lishma is a critical prerequisite for Olam HaBa
because the World to Come is, by its very nature, a world of lishma. The
characteristic of Olam HaBa is "l'hisa'neg al ziv ha'Shechina" - to enjoy
the transcendent radiance of the Shechina. Only if that is meaningful to an
individual is there a point to that individual's presence in the World to
Come. It is, says Rabbi Dessler, the Oneg Shabbos - that is one sixtieth of
the World to Come - that is the lishma that is the barometer of one's
Shabbos.

Rabbi Dessler goes on to explain the concept of hiddur mitzva in this vein:
If you buy a more expensive esrog to take pride in it Sukkos morning that is
not a valid reason for hiddur mitzva. However, if you spend more on an esrog
as an expression of your love for Hashem that is a "chumra me'ahava":

This is also the definition of "hiddur mitzva." A hiddur mitzva does not
mean "a little more mitzva." It is, rather, a higher level in one's
appreciation of a mitzva in one's heart. If we have not reached such a level
internally, of what benefit is our hiddur?

A noteworthy example of "chumra me'ahava" based behavior may be found in the
regulations set by the Ramchal zt"l for his group of disciples. Among the
seven enactments were:

All the reward for all of their mitzvos and good deeds was to be given as a
gift to all Klal Yisroel, with the intent to be "gomel chesed" (so to speak)
to the Shechina.

Any mitzva performed by any one of the group was as if done in the name of
the entire group. They accepted upon themselves to conduct themselves with
great love toward each other and to accept rebukes from each other with
total love and no anger at all.

No chumra nor minhag b'Yisroel was to be disregarded.

There are dangers in both kinds of chumros. Rabbi Yeruchom Levovitz zt"l (Da
'as Torah, Bereishis p. 19) reminds us of the exchange between the nachash
and Chava in Gan Eden. Chava embellished the command of Hashem not to eat
from the Tree of Knowledge with a prohibition to touch the tree. The Avos d'
Rabbi Nosson attributes this "chumra" to Adam and says that from here we see
the danger in adding on stringencies where not essential. The Chovos
HaLevovos explains that one should not take upon oneself excessive
restrictions. They are apt to become a burden and a nuisance, and may
eventually tempt a person to cast the yoke of much more than the chumra off
his or her shoulders. This is the danger inherent in chumros me'yirah.

The danger in a chumra me'ahava is manifest in a story I heard from one of
my Rabbeim zt"l. An impetus for Rabbi Yisroel Salanter zt"l to found the
Mussar movement was an experience he once had on one of the Yomim Nora'im in
Vilna. He had forgotten to bring a Machzor to Shul. He found himself
standing next to an illustrious scholar and motioned a request to be allowed
to look into his neighbor's Machzor. The scholar's "response" was a shove.
This scholar stressed his chumra of davening to Hashem with the utmost
kavana - which we need not doubt that he did. Yet there is in this stress an
inherent haughtiness that may lead one to improper leniency in other areas -
here, in one's bein adam l'chaveiro. Even worse, says Rabbi Dessler (Michtav
Me'Eliyahu vol. 3, p. 294), is overt conceit - the sin of ga'avah that
outweighs any advantage accrued by the chumra. He says therefore, that it is
proper:

...To be machmir and meticulous in primary areas, such as Bittul Torah,
Lashon Hara, etc., [but not other areas], to avoid the danger that by
peripheral meticulousness to an exaggerated extent one may, chas ve'shalom,
lose sight of the primary areas in which, to our regret, so many fail . . .

The Yerushalmi (Berachos 9:5) captures these pitfalls in its caution:

Do [mitzvos] both out of love and out of fear. Do out of love, for even if
you are prone to hate you will not, because one who loves does not hate. Do
out of fear, for one who has fear does not reject.

A fourth type of chumra is that alluded to by the Nesivos Shalom cited above
and described by him elsewhere in greater detail: Excessive Gashmiyus in and
of itself is a negative thing - it is a barrier between oneself and Hashem.

This type of chumra runs into significant conflict with our contemporary
milieu. Baruch Hashem, our generation enjoys affluence to a degree unknown,
even unimagined, by our forbears, even a few short years ago. The American
"dream" and "upward mobility" have a very real impact on our society as
well. Yet, one need only recall the Ramban on Kedoshim Tee'heyu and the
Mesillas Yesharim Sha'ar Ha'Perishus to realize the value placed in Yahadus
on refraining from material pleasure - even permissible pleasure - and
histapkus b'mu'at. Over-involvement in the pursuit of material possesions
and pleasures - pursuit of "chomer" - may prove a distraction from the quest
for ruchniyus.

There is a value in even artificial disdain for the material - lest it exert
a deleterious effect. An echo of this may be found in the Piascezner zt"l's
remark that a necktie is a "kesher resha'im" ("Toldos Ha'Mechaber" by Rabbi
Aharon Surasky, Chap. 11, printed in the back of several of the Piascezner's
seforim). (While this application does not resonate with a community that
has grown to appreciate fine neckwear as a hallmark of dignified appearance,
we may identify other manifestations closer to home.)
Ba'al Nefesh

A subcategory of the first and last categories is the advice found often in
halachic works: "Ba'al Nefesh yachmir" - "a righteous (Rashi Chullin 6a) -
or pious (Rashi Pesachim 40a) - person shold be stringent."

In the Gemara (ibid., and Nidda 16b and 65b) and Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim
240:9, Yoreh De'ah 116:7 and several other places) they usually give this
advice in cases where a certain mode of conduct may, technically be
permissible, but skirts the boundaries of a prohibited act. To engage in
such behavior may not be legally proscribed, but, nevertheless, suggests a
proclivity toward indulgence and pleasure not befitting a person at higher
levels of divine service. (The Ran in Nedarim 91b seems to use "latzeis
yedei shomayim" in the same way.)

The Mishna Berura employs this dictum in cases of major contention, where a
significant opinion - perhaps only a few Poskim - tends toward a stringent
approach although another equally valid opinion - perhaps even most Poskim -
is inclined to be lenient. If neither opinion is manifestly definitve, then
the Mishna Berura may give the advice of "Ba'al Nefesh yachmir." This means,
that the weight of the sources allowing leniency grants that standard
halachic legitimacy. Nevertheless, the weight of the Poskim on the other
side of the equation led the Chofetz Chaim zt"l to conclude that those who
are yere'ei cheit (fear sin) should incline toward chumra.

(This is similar to Rabbi Shimon Shkop zt"l's (Sha'arei Yosher 1:2)
explanation of safek d'oraysa l'kulla according to the Rambam. Reb Shimon
interprets this as follows: The Torah distinguishes between a definite
prohibition, that one may definitely not transgress, and cases of doubt,
where one is entitled to take chances. If, however, you ultimately discover
that the case in doubt in fact entailed a definite prohibition, you have
committed a transgression and teshuva is mandated. Just as yir'as cheit led
Chazal, from the Rambam's perspective, to mandate chumra in cases of safek d
'oraysa, so too the Mishna Berura advises a Ba'al Nefesh to be machmir in
cases he perceives as questionable.)

The Decisive Answer to the Big Question

To return to our opening questions: The answer (you knew this was coming)
is: It depends! If one of the four legitimate reasons for chumros motivates
one always to read Shma before the Magen Avraham's deadline, one's Avodas
Hashem is enhanced. Not necessarily because one has always said Shma earlier
than others. After all, when one comes after 120 years to the Beis Din shel
Ma'alah, one will have fine, solid halachic foundations - the Gr"a and Ba'al
Ha'Tanya, among others - upon which to justify a later reading of Shma.
Rather, because one followed one's Posek, manifested Yiras Hashem or Ahavas
Hashem, or dissociated oneself from the material and mundane by that chumra.

A simple example of the importance of assessing the advisability may be
found in Hilchos Sukkah. The Rama (Orach Chaim 639:7) says: "Anone who is
exempt from [the mitzva] of Sukkha [bec rain is falling, etc.] yet does not
leave it, receives no reward for his activity . . . " The Bi'ur Halacha
there comments: "This principle applies specifically to a scenario where an
aspect of transgression, such as anguish ["mitzta'er], is involved, which is
Chillul Yom Tov . . . " We see here an elementary illustration of a chumra
not thought out, that ends up being detrimental to one's Avodas Hashem.

But . . . It is possible that one may diminish one's Avodas Hashem by strict
adherence to the Magen Avraham's time frame - if it led one to haughtiness,
fractious behavior toward others, or another negative byproduct. And, there
are scenarios in which following the later time frame of the Gr"a or Ba'al
Ha'Tanya's time frame may enhance one's Avodas Hashem - if more sleep truly
enriched one or one's family's Oneg Shabbos!

If nothing else, what should we take away from our discussion? That the
motivations for our behavior are critical and that we must carefully analyze
them. Then, in consultation with our mentors, we must carefully consider and
plan how in every area of our Avodas Hashem we can attain higher levels of
accomplishment and lishma.
_____________________________________

> : Using a doubtful eruv to be machzik the communal Rav.
>
> If the eiruv is truly doubtful, the question is a risk of being oveir
hotza'ah
> diRabbanan. If it's a case of not wanting to be someich on a commonly
accepted
> shitah, one is being machmir in eiruv by being meikil in kavod harav --
> and I would again question which chumrah one ought to choose.
>

You need to tell me: Why is this person normally machmir in this prat of
eruvin?

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila    ygb@aishdas.org

********************


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