Avodah Mailing List

Volume 04 : Number 349

Wednesday, February 9 2000

• Fish and Meat (was Re: smoking ban)
• Re: Smoking ban
• Re: Science and halachah
• Re: Gezel Akum
• Gezel Akum, Seridei Esh and the Suppression of Historical Evidence
• Fw: Was Re: Gezel Akum, Now Re SE
• Re: SE and historical bias
• Halakhah and Contemporary Reality
• re: Gezel Akum
• Gezel Akum
• Re: Fish and Meat (was Re: smoking ban)
• re:science and halacha
• Re[2]: Gaw'al Yisrael
• Mitzva HaBaa b'Aveira (was Re: Gezel Akum, Seridei Esh and the Suppression of Historical Evidence)

In v4n339, Aviva Fee <aviva613@hotmail.com> writes:
: While nature may have changed, and no one in the medical field seems to 
: indicate that the consumption of fish and meat together is a danger, no 
: posek would ever suggest the consumption of fish and meat together is mutor 
: today.

First, I'm not so sure no posek would suggest it. You could be someich on
the Rambam or his son.

Second, the "medical threat" named in the gemara is tzora'as. As tzora'as
isn't quite a typical medical condition, we may be dealing with an issue
that's more than medical.

Third, I wouldn't assume a comparison between not removing an issur (fish
and meat) and creating a new issur (assuming smoking weren't a pesak). I
also wouldn't assume that refusal to be meikil do to changes in science
implies refusal to be machmir (although neither are the case here) -- as R'
Kook requires keeping and creating chumros, but not kulos.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  2-Feb-00: Revi'i, Mishpatim
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Pisachim 108b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Melachim-II 15

May I amke a distinction?

1) A LOR/Poseik can prohibit smoking either cigaretes or marijuana

2) The "issue" that was hotly contested was  - afaik - the issuing of a general 
ban, a bezeiro or a cherem.

Therefore, imho, cigarette smoking, while maybe not as "halachically prohibited 
as treif", nevertheless IS subject to psak - *on a case by case basis* - as 
opposed to a sweeping global basis.

Lemoshol, marijuana has been shown to be helpful in prenting nasuea in cancer 
patients who are being treate with chemotherapy.  discounting the dina 
demalchusa aspects, I would say a rav certainly could see his way to matir 
marijuana in such dire circumstances.  

Making general bans removes a level of flexibility that I for one would not like
to see surrendered.  Personally, I would recommend that people be informed and 
aware and consult their LOR and their medical professionals, etc.

Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com

______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Subject: Smoking ban 
Author:  <avodah@aishdas.org> at tcpgate
Date:    2/9/2000 9:05 AM


I have a simple question:
    If our gedolim cannot paskin that cigarette smoking is assur, then what 
about smoking marijuana? Let's leave aside dina d'malchusa problems, as in 
many jurisdictions the personal use of marijuana has been downgraded to the 
status of a motor vehicle violation, such as speeding, and I'm sure that many 
on this list routinely violate the dina d'malchusa of speeding. So is smoking 
marijuana assur? What about using cocaine, crack, heroin? Just where does the 
halacha draw the line? When does something become so detrimental to health 
that it is assur?
    David I. Cohen

In v4n344, David Eisenman <eisenman@umich.edu> wrote:
: The eight categories of animal treifos which are a halacha l'mosheh
: m'sinai, were extended by chazal to include 70 specific instances. ...
:       We are no longer interested in establishing the fact of inevitable
: death, only verification of one of the 70/72.

I have a language quibble: David's terminology, and I assume this was not his
intent, implies an evolution of a halchah that chazal call "liMosheh miSinai".
Rather, the concept of t'reifah by animals was defined as a set of medical
conditions from day one (actually, from "yom hashishi", as per Rashi on Ber 2,
or even before day one if you speak of "histakeil bi'oraisa uborei alma").
T'reifa WRT humans is a homonym, having to do with fatal medical conditions.

Either way, I agree with his maskana that if "tereifah" is used here to
refer to 70(+2) possible conditions, the evolution of medical knowledge
is irrelevent.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  2-Feb-00: Revi'i, Mishpatim
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Pisachim 108b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Melachim-II 15

RMS Dratch wrote: >>See, however, R. Yehezkel Landau's preface to Resp. Noda 
be-Yehudah, in which he writes, "It is already known and publicized in all of 
the places I have been, that I admonish in most of my public lectures that we 
are to be very vigilant in the respect of the nations of our times, in whose 
lands and countries we find refuge.  We must pray for the welfare of the kings, 
officers and their soldiers, and pray for the welfare of the state and its 
inhabitants.  God forbid, that we should be ungrateful, for they do good for us 
and give us food and respite in the land.>>
     
Don't we see this kind of disclaimer on almost every sefer?  They can't all be 
meant seriously.  I've even seen a sefer with this disclaimer who inside the 
sefer says clearly that the disclaimer is false.  Have you seen the Aruch 
HaShulchan's introduction to Choshen Mishpat and his unending praise to the 
czar?  Can we take that seriously given what we know about the Russian czars?  
Maybe I'm being overly skeptical but I think it is clear that these types of 
disclaimers are a reaction to the medieval Talmud trials and the attempt to 
disingenuously avoid such trials and pogroms due to contemporary halachic 
literature. 
     
     
>>I also constantly warn against robbery and theft, and announce that there is 
no difference at all in the prohibitions of robbery and theft between Jewish 
money and non-Jewish money, [they are both] prohibited by "Thou shalt not rob." 
So, too, the prohibition of "You shall not steal" includes the money of a 
non-Jew.  And so it is [codified] in Rambam, chapter one of Hil. Geneivah, 
"Anyone who steals property worth at least a perutah violates a prohibition, as 
it says, "You shall not steal,"  etc. [This prohibition applies to both] one who
steals the property of a Jew and one who steals the property of a non-Jew.  And 
so he wrote in chapter one of Hil. Gezeilah, par. 2, "It is prohibited to rob 
any amount, according to Torah law, [it is] even prohibited to rob or extort a 
non-Jew.  If he does rob or steal from him, he must return it."  And so did the 
Tur codify the law in Hoshen Mishpat, ch. 348, in Hil. Geneivah, and in ch. 359 
in Hil. Gezeilah.  And so did the Shulhan Arukh codify the law in Hil. Geneivah 
and in Hil. Gezeilah.>>
     
The Noda BiYehudah also discusses this in a teshuvah in M"K Y"D 81 in which he 
paskens based on halachic sources (and not apologetic sources) that gezel and 
geneivas akum are assur min haTorah.  However, that makes the following 
difficult.
     
>>Behold, it is explained that it is prohibited to rob or to steal from a 
non-Jew, a fortiori [from] the contemporary nations amongst whom we dwell, 
because they believe in the fundamentals of religion, in the creation of the 
world, in the prophecy of the prophets, and all the miracles and wonders written
in the Torah and the books of the prophets.>>
     
Why should that matter? Leshitaso, it is forbidden to steal even from a buddhist
or some other pagan who doesn't believe in the Torah and the prophets.
     
Gil Student
gil.student@citicorp.com

It is ironic that an innocent post on gezel akum has spawned a
controversial thread on history, halakhah and hashkafah.  It reminds me
of the early days of Avodah, and I relish the turn toward substance and
way from chat.

Let us note, at the outset, that the citation of R. Weinberg's letters
in R. Dratch's post seemed to come from left field.  The original
question requested halakhic sources and the letters are not.  Their
citation reflects, I think, R. Dratch's personal attitude toward gezel
akum, as do his frequent references to Meiri.  (The Meiri's approach is
intriguing, but its value as halakhic precedent pales incomparison to
that of the Bet Yosef.  As people are no doubt aware, Meiri's Bet
ha-Behirah was unavailable to halakhists for most of the last 600
years.)  I think that one should also admit that statements like that of
the Noda Bi-Yehudah may well have been motivated far more by genuine
fear of evah than a kind of univeralistic and humanistic morality.

But RYGB seems less concerned about R. Dratch's agenda than that of the
Torah u-Madda Journal.  So let us turn quickly to the Seridei Esh
controversy.  I agree that we should not rehash the halakhic question of
issur, on which I disagree strongly with RYGB.  Let us turn instead to
Reb David Finch's questions, which mirrored my own: "I don't understand
why [RYGB] objects to R'Dratch's use of the SE letters."

In other words, granting for the sake of argument, that the letters were
published be-issur, what is the problem with quoting them?

RYGB answers: "The concept of mitzva ha'ab'a b'aveira comes to mind. A
positive use does
not justify an ill-gotten gain."

Those familiar with US constitutional law will recognize that RYGB is
proposing something analogous to the exclusionary rule (i.e., US courts
exclude evidence acquired illegally by the police).  However, those
familiar with the principle of mitzvah ha-ba'ah be-averah will be
confused; what does this principle have to do with the topic under
discussion?

Firstly, there are of course a range of opinions in the Rishonim
defining mitzvah ha-ba'ah be-averah.  But I think all agree that the
principle simply forecloses the fulfillment of a mitzvah; it does not
transmute the attempted mitzvah itself into an averah.  To illustrate:
If I steal money and donate it to tzedakah, I have not fulfilled a
mitzvah.  But my donation does not constitute a further averah.  (Of
course, if I stole a hefetz rather than money, the act of gezel is
ongoing.  But this kind of gezel does not apply to the content of one's
letters.  Indeed, the posekim have generally rejected the notion that
one has ownership over ideas or words, except in physical form.)

Moreover, the "ill-gotten gain" that RYGB refers to is unclear to me.
Who gained from the publication of R. Weinberg's letters?  (The TuM
Journal is generally distributed free of charge; neither the editor nor
the contributors receive monetary compensation.)  And even if you say
that the author of the article or the editor of the journal gained in
some illicit way, why should a third party, like R. Dratch, not be
allowed to make use of the information?

RYGB then goes on to question the agenda of the historians involved and
to make some sweeping pronouncements in the name of Yahdaut:

>In this regard, the choice of venue for publishing these letters is
>fascinating, as the TuM journal is not an objective historical journal, but
>one whose very name belies an overt agenda. The publication (and,
>occasionally, the citation) of these letters, was not bias-free "history"
>(if there is such a thing) but very much agenda driven (prohibition aside).
>Yahadus, as formalized by Cherem d'Rabbeinu Gershom, dictates a specific
>level of privacy in defining the contours of a person's theological or
>philosophical persona: Unpublished material not authorized for distribution
>is seen as rumination and speculation, which may admittedly be frivolous,
>half-baked or even inane - certainly private and priveleged - and precisely
>for that reason its admission as testimony in the historical record is more
>harmful - either to the person, the persona, or theology and philosophy in
>general - than good.

Well now.  Let us grant, again for the sake of argument, that the TuM
journal and all of its varied contributors (of whom I am one) all
somehow share a single agenda, whatever that may be.  Let us also
assume, again for the sake of argument, that we therefore cannot trust
the interpretation of the letters by the historian in question.  Does
that mean we cannot trust our own eyes?  Do the letters not speak for
themselves?  I submit that the "agenda" issue is a red herring.

I think RYGB sensed this too, so he followed with an eloquent statement
about the Jewish concept of privacy.  If someone has not authorized
something for publication, then we who come after respect that decision
and refrain from publishing it, on the assumption that the author did
not wish his umpublished writings to become part of his theological or
philosophical persona.

The problem is this statement is false.  R. Hayyim Brisker did not
publish his hiddushim or authorize their publication.  Should his hibbur
therefore be kept secret -- merely speculative as it was?  How about the
most recent helek of the Iggerot Moshe -- these were all teshuvot that
R. Moshe affirmatively chose not to publish in his lifetime.  These, of
course, are examples of halakhic literature, not letters.  But one can
argue that the bar should be higher for the former than the latter.
After all, if I write a hiddush in my notebook, I may or may not feel it
is complete or fit to be published.  I may write it down simply for my
own benefit; to help me organize my thoughts or remember them.  In
contrast, a letter was clearly intended to be read at least one other
person, if not the whole world.

Regarding the herem of R. Gershom, it is not at all clear that the herem
extends after a person's death.  It is a ruling regarding the privacy of
the living, not the memory of the dead.  It was certainly not written
with an eye to preserving the mythic image of Gedolim from the predation
of historians.

Kol tuv,

Eli Clark

I am availing myself of RCS's permission below.

I cannot speak to the Igros Moshe case. While it is generally assumed that
the posthumous teshuvos are less authoritative, since they were published by
the two grandchildren to which  R' Moshe entrusted editing during his
lifetime, I would tend to believe that precisely what has happened was R'
Moshe's expectation: that the teshuvos should be published and regarded as
less authoritative than earlier volumes.

When I was in Sha'alvim I heard, but never verified, that the Chazon ish had
notebooks that were marked: "Lo l'pirsum, shelo b'Iyun Maspik". After his
petira, publishers are said to have published these works with a heading as
above. Lore had it that they suffered in their personal lives (at the hands
of Heaven) as a result.

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL 60659
http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila    ygb@aishdas.org

----- Original Message -----
From: Carl M. Sherer <cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il>
To: Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, February 09, 2000 9:27 AM
Subject: Re: Was Re: Gezel Akum, Now Re SE


> On 9 Feb 00, at 8:54, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M wrote:
>
> > Yahadus, as formalized by Cherem d'Rabbeinu Gershom, dictates a
> > specific level of privacy in defining the contours of a person's
> > theological or philosophical persona: Unpublished material not
> > authorized for distribution is seen as rumination and speculation,
> > which may admittedly be frivolous, half-baked or even inane -
> > certainly private and priveleged - and precisely for that reason its
> > admission as testimony in the historical record is more harmful -
> > either to the person, the persona, or theology and philosophy in
> > general - than good.
>
> Just curious -
>
> How would you apply the above to the posthumous publication of
> many of Rav Moshe's tshuvos which he (apparently) chose not to
> publish during his lifetime? Feel free to put this on the list if you
> think it's relevant and won't cause lashon hara.
>

>>>every school of history brings its own perspectives, and often biases, to bear on the data (or blithely disregards the data), which is, of course, subject to multiple layers of interpretation. Many - if not all- historians "censor" history - they just call it "research". In this regard, the choice of venue for publishing these letters is fascinating, as the TuM journal is not an objective historical journal, but one whose very name belies an overt agenda. The publication (and, occasionally, the citation) of these letters, was not bias-free "history" (if there is such a thing) but very much agenda driven (prohibition aside).<<<

There are two errors here:

1) Confusing interpretation with bias.  Every field - history, science, etc. - relies on forming hypothesis - interpretations - to explain facts.  And by definition, some facts are weighed as more significant than others.  What Washington ate for breakfast is as much 
historical fact as the strategy of crossing the Delaware, yet it would be foolish to say a 
history that considered one and excluded the other is biased or agenda driven.  Considering ALL the facts and making judgements about their import is interpretation, or as D. Finch put it, "all facts are fair game."  Considering only a subset of available facts is bias.  

2) Publication of letters is neither an interpretation nor a biased history.  It is simply a presentation of facts that had been unavailable.  The weight that should be assigned to those letters in evaluating the life of the SE is a matter of interpretation left up to the reader.  

Reb David Finch asks an interesting question:

>Question: How is the process by which we now all repudiate Gezel Akum differ
>technically from the process by which many Jews (some MO, most Conservatives)
>repudiate specific halachic ideas that they claim to be invalid beyond their
>original "historical context" or otherwise need not be followed today? I'm
>not equating Gezel Akum with, say, the prohibition against listening to a
>woman sing a song. But I'm not sure I understand the difference, at least in
>terms of which legal rules can and cannot be adapted to contemporary
>realities and notions of propriety.

If I understand you, you are loading a very heavy question on a fairly
lighweight piece of evidence.  The Halakhah is clear: gezel akum is
prohibited, but indirect gezel (e.g., hafka'at halva'ato) is not, though
it may raise other issues, like hillul ha-Shem.  Today, many Orthodox
Jews (including, apparently, the Seridei Esh) would consider this
distinction to be morally problematic.

However, this is an abstract, philosophical problem, not a practical
one.  After all, obviously there is no halakhic obligation to deprive
non-Jews of their money.  So an Orthodox Jew who is moved by humanism
can simply refrain from acts of hafka'ah, rather than rely on the
halakhic loophole.  Call it a "humra" if you will.  Similarly, most
people today would probably feel uncomfortable owning an eved kena'ani.

However, this cannot be compared to someone who refrains from an
affirmative obligation or disregards a prohibition because he or she
finds it morally problematic or historically obsolete.  There is a
difference between going lifnim mi-shurat ha-din and abrogating the din.
 For example, prominent Conservative rabbis have permitted a kohen to
marry a divorcee, in open violation of an explicit biblical verse.  This
is simply trampling on the law.

Moral dilemmas are one thing; for some they are a fact of life.  But
they do not give one license to rewrite the law to one's personal
liking.  I hope the distinction is clear.

Kol tuv,

Eli Clark

Short version of my question: If non-Jews can't steal from each other, what
is the hava amina the Gezel Akum might be mutar?

Longer version:

I can think of several examples of where the Sheva Mitzvos Bnei Noach do not
apply to Jews. One is that therapeutic abortion is assur for non-Jews in
certain cases which would be mutar for Jews. The other is that a non-Jew may
not eat meat until the animal is dead, but the Jew may eat it any time after
shechita, even if it is still moving.

I remember a gemara which discusses the shechita case, and rules that we
must not eat such meat, so as not to make it look like the Torah relaxed the
rules for Jews. This seems to imply that the Torah *did* relax the rules for
Jews, but d'rabanan we must avoid letting it look that way. This whole Gezel
Akum thread says the same thing: Before Matan Torah it was assur to steal
from an Akum, but now I'd be allowed to, except that it looks bad.

It seems clear that our 613 mitzvos *replaced* the 7 earlier ones, bein
l'kula, bein l'chumra. I'm not arguing the point, only looking for the
source: Is there any clue for this phenomenon in Torah Sheb'ksav? Why isn't
there a presumption that the 613 can only restrict what is allowed by the 7?

Akiva Miller

A related point:

Several years ago, when I was involved to some degree
in kiruv work, I found that what troubled many secular
Jews was not gezel akum (I am sure they never even
heard of it), but the commandment to murder the 7
nations (harigas zayin ammimim) when the Jews entered
Israel.

In their minds, this bloodshed was incompatible with
their contemporary notions of fairness, equality and
basic human rights.

Even if we resolve the Gezel Akum issue, I believe
that this still must be addressed.  

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In a message dated 2/9/00 10:18:15 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
micha@aishdas.org writes:

<< 
 Third, I wouldn't assume a comparison between not removing an issur (fish
 and meat) and creating a new issur (assuming smoking weren't a pesak). I
 also wouldn't assume that refusal to be meikil do to changes in science
 implies refusal to be machmir (although neither are the case here) -- as R'
 Kook requires keeping and creating chumros, but not kulos.
 
 -mi
  >>
It's interesting that the traditional heter for smoking(dashu beh rabim) 
which appears in the daf(yevamot 72.) seems to be a case where the perception 
of danger originally existed but had been lost - I'm not sure how that fits 
in with R' Kook.

Kol Tuv,
Joel Rich

David Eisenman writes, inter alia: 

> One other question that must always be kept in mind with the
> science/halacha issue is what do we consider science.  Are the 
> social
> sciences included?  What if a psychologist tells us that "tav 
> l'meisav
> tan du..." is invalid in 21st century America?  What if a 
> sociologist
> tells us that "ein adam oseh b'ilaso b'ilas z'nus" is wrong most of 
> the
> time?  What about if a veterinary psychologist told us that a 
> certain
> shor had congenital violent tendencies?  How do we utilize 
> manuscript
> evidence in psak?  R. Lichtenstein once quipped (in a similar 
> context)
> that in a few thousand years someone will dig up Y.U. and think 
> there
> was a machlokes about which way was mizrach.  If we admit scientific
> evidence we have to decide what is scientific, and I'm not sure how
> halacha can do that.  I would guess that hilchos rov would play a
> significant role here.  In this context I would add that I don't 
> think
> much of "medical/clinical" knowledge in its present state should be
> treated as weightily as molecular biology, genetics and math (for
> examples).
> 
> I don't agree that this is simply a question of whether we believe
> nishtana hateva.  The gemara (Pesachim 94b) seems to indicate that
> Chazal recognized that their scientific knowledge could be 
> incorrect,
> but it does not tell us whether they thought this could have 
> normative
> impact.  So the issue is not whether we accept that their science 
> could
> be wrong.  Once we see that Chazal themselves were aware that their
> science (and therefore science in general) could be wrong, we have 
> to
> determine what they defined as reliable evidence of fact (which is
> loosely what all science is), and when they felt determination of 
> fact
> plays a role in the halachic process and when it is irrelevant.
 
This topic was addressed by RYBS in an address to the RCA convention, in
a response  to Rabbi Rackman's approach of bitul kiddushin (in an earlier
gilgul, in 1975. Indeed, ain chadash tachas hashemesh).  A transcript of
the address appeared in a publication called "The Light," in its issue of
17 Kislev 5736.  He writes, "Not only the halochos, but also the chazokos
Chazal introduced are indestructible. You must not tamper, not only with
the halochos, but even with the chazokos. For the chazokos Chazal spoke
of rest, not upon transient psychological behavioral patterns, but on
permanent ontological principles rooted in the very depths of the
metaphysical human personality, which is as changeless as the heavens
above.

"Let us take for instance the chazoka -- that's what I was told about --
of 'tav l'maisav tan du mil'maisav arm'lu.' This has absolutely nothing
to do with the social and political status of the woman in antiquity. 
The chazoka is not based upon sociological factors. It is a posuk in
Braishiss, 'v'el ishaich t'shukasech'. It is a metaphysical curse rooted
in the feminine personality. She suffers incomparably more than the male
while in solitude. Solitude to a male is not as horrifying an experience
as solitude to a woman. And this will never change kiymei hashamayim al
haaretz. It is not a psychological fact; it is an existential fact. It is
not due to the inferior status of the woman, but is due to the basic
distinction between the female personality and the male personality.

"An old spinster's life is much more tragic than the life of an old
bachelor. This was true in antiquity; it is still true; it will be true a
thousand years from now. . . . If you should start modifying and
reassessing the chazokos upon which a multitude of halochos rest, you
will destroy yahadus! Instead of philosophizing, let us take a match and
set fire to the Bais Yisroel!"


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#1.This is based the yeshivishe/Gro shito that regards piyyutim between Borchu 
and Amida as a hefsek. The Remo does not concur.

#2. No doubt yeshivos have every right to invoke: "tov me'at tachanunim 
bekavvono meharbei belo kavvono."  I concur wholeheartedly on that.  My 
impression, however, is that their shitos about what should be said and what 
should not be said has more to do with hefsek etc, than with time constraints.

FWIW on RH KAJ/Breuer's starts Shacharis at 6:25 AM so as to finish with 
enough time to say Kiddush before chatzos and still not omit anything 
{significant} from the Roedleheim Machzor.

On YK, KAJ says a rotating subset of the YK slichos for Shacharis/Musaff/M 
mincha, iow in any given year they say 6 piyyutim out of a much longer list.  My
shul says only 4 and does not rotate. and there is no break on YK.

#3

let me preface this by pointing out that amongst misnagdim, the dropping of 
Minhag Ashkenaz is not open or blatant - as it was by Chassidim.  Rather it is 
based mostly upon the Gro's triumph in promoting his shitos; and that these 
shitos favor a Sepharidc/Lurianic approach over the old Minhag Ahskenaz.  What 
has supported this "drift" away is that the TB is more in consonant with the 
Minhag Sepharad, while Minhag Ashekenaz is based upon a more oral tradiion and 
relies upon Kalir, Meshulam ben Klonymos, etc.  IOW the texts that did supoprt 
Minhag Ashkenaz were by and large not Talmudic, and the poskim such as Maharil 
and Remo have been widely discounted.


Soem Additional points:

A) So far, all variations of Minhag Ashkenaz have selichos for Kol Nidre 
evening and Ne'ilo.  the only area in flux is Shacharis/Mussaf/Minchahsris

B) During the process of discarding the old Minhag Ashkenza, apparently selichos
for Shacharis etc. were dropped. I cannot say fro certain that this was part of 
the same process, but it sure resembles it.


C) RYBS restored the concept of selichos, but lav davka used the same texts that
prevailed in Lita 200 years ago.

D) While RYBS in general followed the Gro, for some reason he determined the 
need to say Selichos.  I don't know precisely how Sliechos fell into disuse, 
my point is that RYBS did not introduce this, he restore waht had been there. 
I don't think RYBS was conerned with restoring Minhag Ashkenza per 
se...rather my impession is that in the single instance of selichos, he felt 
it was a mistake to omit them because he felt they were part of the Avoda of 
Mussaf.


E) While German kehillos have NO BREAK on YK,  Most non-German (so called 
minhag Polin) services do, and  therefore they do not {appear to} wish to 
restore Selichos

Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com


______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________
Author:  <sherer@actcom.co.il> at tcpgate


#1) For many years my father davened by Rav Mordechai Savitsky 
zt"l. Rav Savitsky used to say most of the piyutim in chazoras 
hahsatz on Yom Tov and the yotzros on Shabbos Shkalim and 
HaChodesh (Musaf only - there are no yotzros in Musaf on Zachor 
and Para).


#2) To the extent that you are talking about yoztros and the like, 
some of the undoing is simply a question of time. In "Yeshivish" 
davening on Rosh HaShanna and Yom Kippur, unless you daven netz, it 
is 
almost impossible to say all the yotzros (let alone slichos) and give 
the amount of time they give for the shtiller Shmoneh Esrei and still 
get through davening. I think that's where doing away with yotzros 
came from (although I have no source to prove it).

-- Carl
---------------------------
> Even on YK where the German minhag is very different, both  have selichos for 
> shacharis/mussaf/Mincha.  Follwers of RYBS thought he was being original when 
he
> "addedg" selichos on YK, but he was actually restoring an older minhag that ha
d
> fallen into disuse (Again see see the Vilna Kol Bo)


#3) Interesting. If they were dropping Minhag Ashkenaz, what were they switching
to? O were they just dropping minhagim?

I ask because Sefaradim say selichot at Arvit, Shaharit, Musaf, Minha, and 
Ne'ilah. Unless I misunderstand, and RYBS was the one dropping Minhag Ashkenaz.


---sam

On 9 Feb 00, at 11:05, Clark, Eli wrote:

> Firstly, there are of course a range of opinions in the Rishonim
> defining mitzvah ha-ba'ah be-averah.  But I think all agree that the
> principle simply forecloses the fulfillment of a mitzvah; it does not
> transmute the attempted mitzvah itself into an averah.  To illustrate:
> If I steal money and donate it to tzedakah, I have not fulfilled a
> mitzvah.  But my donation does not constitute a further averah.  

Huh? I thought the whole point of mitzva habaa b'aveira was that 
both come together. For example, I steal a lulav and esrog and I 
am yotzei the mitzva of lulav at the very moment that I steal them 
by picking them up. 

I think that is what RYGB has in mind (and I am sure he will speak 
for himself on this) when he mentioned mizva habaa b'aveira. Not 
the exclusionary rule (which IIRC only applies to the person or 
entity that obtained the forbidden fruit - it's been about sixteen 
years since Con. Law so I may be wrong :-). I think he would argue 
that the Mitzva of publicizing the SE's views on Gezel Akkum 
comes with the Aveira of further publicizing private correspondence 
that is assur under cherem d'Rabbeinu Gershom.

-- Carl


Carl M. Sherer, Adv.
Silber, Schottenfels, Gerber & Sherer
Telephone 972-2-625-7751
Fax 972-2-625-0461
mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

*********************


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