Avodah Mailing List

Volume 04 : Number 253

Tuesday, January 4 2000

• re: Registry of "Who is a Jew"
• Re: Registry of "Who is a Jew"
• Fwd: THE ALTALENA AFFAIR(long)
• Re: Halachah and Football
• Re: Intrinsic value, kashrus vs arlah
• Re: Intrinsic value, kashrus vs arlah
• Re: LeChumrah/LeKulah
• Re: Registry of "Who is a Jew"

RHM wrote: <<

Has it come to this? We are talking about severing our
ties to our bretheren.  If such a registry is adopted,
then over time, we will never be able to marry out of
the registry because there will never be any certainty
aas to who is a Jew, who is a mamzer, who got a proper
divorce.  . . . . which
will cause ever more alienation and maken it harder to
do Kiruv work on those whom we DO know about their
Yechus.  And what about the sincere soul searcher who
was likely a Tinok Shenishba? What do we tell such an
individual searching for Emes when he comes to us from
outside the registry? Sorry, we don't know your
Yechus?  >>

I think you are laboring here under a basic misconception.
You seem to be under the impression that only "anshei 
shlomeinu" will be registered, with the chilonim left
to intermarry with the non-Jews.  From what I've read about
the plans for the registry, an attempt will be made to
register *all* kosher Yidden, chilonim included.   Now
you can question how that can be done logistically.
But that is a far cry from the questions you are
asking here. 

KT,
Shlomo Godick

Here in the US the most likely way the unthinkable can be avoided is bi'as
hamoshiach.

Intermarriage is at roughly 60% outside the Orthodox community. I'm counting
those who know they're intermarrying, those who marry non-kosher converts,
and those who marry people whose father is Jewish. And, while Conservative
Jewry follows rules closer to halachah's in this regard, they will accept
Reform conversion-for-the-wedding post-facto.

So, we're talking about roughly 30% of the current generation that thinks
they are Jewish aren't. Their children plus those who do the same in the
next generation will come to 60.6% of the subsequent generation -- rov!

Add to that the US's high divorce rate, and the paucity of gittin amongst
non-frum divorces. So, of the remaining 40%, we have significant numbers
of mamzeirim.

How will it possibly be mutar for my grandchildren to marry into this
community? Who'll remember whether bubbie had a get, or if great-grandma
was a convert?

It hurts just to think about it.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 30-Dec-99: Chamishi, Shemos
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Pisachim 91b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

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Thanks to my sister(the white sheep of the family)for the Irgun's side of the 
story

Kol Tuv,
Joel Rich




 Here you have everything you need!
 http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac20.htm
 --------------------
 
 THE ALTALENA AFFAIR
 
 The Altalena, purchased by Irgun members abroad, was originally intended to 
reach Israel on May 15, 1948, loaded with fighters and military equipment. 
Weapons purchase and organizational matters took longer than expected, 
however, and the sailing was postponed for several weeks. Meanwhile, on June 
1st, an agreement had been signed for the absorption of the Irgun into the 
IDF and one of the clauses stated that the Irgun had to cease all independent 
arms acquisition activities. Consequently, representatives of the Israel 
Government were informed about the ship and its sailing schedule. 
 

 The Irgun headquarters in Paris did their best to keep the Altalena's 
preparations for departure a secret, but it was difficult to conceal the 
movement of 940 fighters and the loading of a large quantity of arms and 
ammunition. It was feared that if the plans were discovered, attempts might 
be made to sabotage the Altalena at sea. For this reason, when it raised 
anchor on June 11th, no cable was sent to the Irgun command in Israel, for 
fear that it would fall into the wrong hands. These precautionary measures 
proved fruitless, however, and the following day Radio London reported that 
the Altalena had sailed from Port-de-Bouc (France) in the direction of Israel 
with 1,000 Jewish volunteers and a large quantity of weapons on board. 
 

  It should be recalled that the first truce had begun on June 11th. When the 
Irgun leaders in Israel learned through the broadcast of the embarkation of 
the vessel, they feared that this breach of the truce conditions (i.e. the 
ban on bringing military equipment and fighters into the country) would  be 
revealed. <A HREF="people/begin.htm">Menahem Begin</A> decided therefore to 
postpone the arrival of the ship, and the Irgun staff secretary, Zippora 
Levi-Kessel, sent a wireless message to the Altalena to stay put and await 
orders. A similar cable was sent to <A HREF="people/katz.htm">Shmuel Katz</A> 
(member of the General Headquarters), who was then in Paris, but contact with 
the ship was poor and the message was not understood.
 

 On June 15th, Begin and his comrades held a meeting with government 
representatives, at which Begin announced that the ship had sailed without 
his knowledge and that he wanted to hold consultations on how to proceed.  In 
his diary for June 16th, Ben-Gurion wrote the following about the meeting: 
 Yisrael [Galili] and Skolnik [Levi Eshkol] met yesterday with Begin. 
Tomorrow or the next day their ship is due to arrive: 4,500 tons, bringing 
800-900 men, 5,000 rifles, 250 Bren guns, 5 million bullets, 50 Bazoukas, 10 
Bren carriers. Zipstein (director of Tel Aviv port) assumes that at night it 
will be possible to unload it all. I believe we should not endanger Tel Aviv 
port. They should not be sent back. They should be disembarked at an unknown 
shore. </table></center>
<a name="7">  Galili informed Begin of Ben-Gurion's consent to the landing of 
the ship, adding a request that it be done as fast as possible. Zippora 
Levi-Kessel then wirelessed the vessel to come in at full speed. The 
following day, a working meeting was held between Irgun representatives and 
Ministry of Defence personnel. While the Irgun proposed directing the 
Altalena to Tel Aviv beach, Ministry of Defence representatives claimed that 
the Kfar Vitkin beach was preferable, since it would be easier to evade UN 
observers there. The ship was therefore instructed to make for Kfar Vitkin.
 Whilst there was agreement on the anchoring place of the Altalena, there 
were differences of opinion about the allocation of the cargo.  Ben-Gurion 
agreed to <A HREF="people/begin.htm">Begin</A>'s initial request that 20% of 
the weapons be despatched to the <A HREF="ac19.htm">Jerusalem Battalion</A>. 
His second request, however, that the remainder be transferred to the IDF to 
equip the newly-incorporated Irgun battalions, was rejected by the Government 
representatives, who interpreted the request as a demand to reinforce an  
'army within an army'.  This was far from Begin's intention; rather, he saw 
it as a question of honor that the fighters enlist in the IDF fully-equipped. 
    
The Altalena reached Kfar Vitkin in the late afternoon of Sunday, June 20th.  
Among the Irgun members waiting on the shore was Menahem Begin, who greeted 
the arrivals with great emotion. After the passengers had disembarked,  
members of the fishing village of Michmoret helped unload the cargo of 
military equipment. Concomitantly with the events at Kfar Vitkin, the 
government had convened in Tel Aviv for its weekly meeting. Ben-Gurion 
reported on the meetings which had preceded the arrival of the Altalena, and 
was adamant in his demand that Begin surrender and hand over of all the 
weapons: 
We must decide whether to hand over power to Begin or to order him to cease 
his separate activities. If he does not do so, we will open fire!  Otherwise, 
we must decide to disperse our own army.  </table>
The debate ended in a resolution to empower the army to use force if 
necessary to overcome the Irgun and to confiscate the ship and its cargo. 
Implementation of this decision was assigned to the Alexandroni Brigade, 
commanded by Dan Even (Epstein), which the following day surrounded the Kfar 
Vitkin area. Dan  Even issued the following ultimatum:
To: M. Begin
 By special order from the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defence 
Forces, I am empowered to confiscate the weapons and military materials which 
have arrived on the Israeli coast in the area of my jurisdiction in the name 
of the Israel Government. I have been authorized to demand that you hand over 
the weapons to me for safekeeping and to inform you that you should establish 
contact with the supreme command. You are required to carry out this order 
immediately.
 If you do not agree to carry out this order, I shall use all the means at my 
disposal in order to implement the order and to requisition the weapons which 
have reached shore and transfer them from private possession into the 
possession of the Israel government.
 I wish to inform you that the entire area is surrounded by fully armed 
military units and armored cars, and all roads are blocked.
 I hold you fully responsible for any consequences in the event of your 
refusal to carry out this order.
 The immigrants - unarmed - will be permitted to travel to the camps in 
accordance with your arrangements. You have ten minutes to give me your 
answer.

The ultimatum, and in particular the demand for an answer within ten minutes, 
was insulting and unrealistic. It was made, according to Even "in order not 
to give the Irgun commander time for lengthy considerations and to gain the 
advantage of surprise."   Begin refused to respond to the ultimatum, and all 
attempts at mediation failed. Begin's failure to respond was a blow to Even's 
prestige, and a clash was now inevitable. Fighting ensued and there were a 
number of casualties. In order to prevent further bloodshed, the Kfar Vitkin 
settlers initiated negotiations between <A HREF="people/meridor.htm">Yaakov 
Meridor</A> (Begin's deputy) and Dan Even, which ended in a general ceasefire 
and the transfer of the weapons on shore to the local IDF commander. 
>Begin had meanwhile boarded the Altalena, which was now heading for Tel 
Aviv. He hoped that it would be possible to enter into a dialogue with the 
Provisional Government and to unload the remaining weapons peacefully. But 
this was not the case. Ben-Gurion ordered Yigael Yadin (acting Chief of 
Staff) to concentrate large forces on the Tel Aviv beach and to take the ship 
by force. Heavy guns were transferred to the area and at four in the 
afternoon, Ben-Gurion ordered the shelling of the Altalena . One of the 
shells hit the ship, which began to burn. There was danger that the fire 
would spread to the holds which contained explosives, and the captain ordered 
all aboard to abandon ship. People jumped into the water, whilst their 
comrades on shore set out to meet them on rafts. Although the captain flew 
the white flag  of surrender, automatic fire continued to be directed at the 
unarmed survivors. Begin, who was on deck, agreed to leave the ship only 
after the last of the wounded had been evacuated.
Sixteen Irgun fighters were killed in the confrontation with the army; six 
were killed in the Kfar Vitkin area and ten on Tel Aviv beach. Three IDF 
soldiers were killed: two at Kfar Vitkin and one in Tel Aviv.
<a name="21">  After the shelling of the Altalena, more than 200 Irgun 
fighters were arrested on Ben-Gurion's orders. Most of them were released 
several weeks later, with the exception of five senior commanders (Moshe 
Hason, <A HREF="people/lankin.htm">Eliyahu Lankin</A>, <A 
HREF="people/meridor.htm">Yaakov Meridor</A>, <A HREF="people/amitzur.htm">Bez
alel Amitzur</A> and <A HREF="people/kook.htm">Hillel Kook</A>), who were 
detained for more than two months. (They were released, thanks to public 
pressure, on August 27, 1948).
Years later, on the eve of the Six Day War, in June 1967 (after Ben-Gurion 
had retired from political activity and Levi Eshkol was Prime Minister), 
Menahem Begin joined a delegation which visited Sede Boqer in order to ask 
David Ben-Gurion to return and accept the premiership again. After that 
meeting, Ben-Gurion said that if he had then known Begin as he  did now, the 
face of history would have been different.
 
  >>


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Subject: THE ALTALENA AFFAIR
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Here you have everything you need!
http://www.etzel.org.il/english/ac20.htm

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<html>
<head>
<meta name=3D"keywords" contanent=3D"etzel,Irgun,Irgun Zvai Le'umi,Altalena"=
>
<title>
THE ALTALENA AFFAIR
</title>
</head>
<body bgcolor=3D"#ffffff" background=3D"../pictures/l_blue.gif">
<center><img src=3D"20.gif"></center>
<p><a name=3D"1">
The Altalena, purchased by Irgun members abroad, was originally intended to=20=
reach Israel on May 15, 1948, loaded with fighters and military equipment. W=
eapons purchase and organizational matters took longer than expected, howeve=
r, and the sailing was postponed for several weeks. Meanwhile, on June 1st,=20=
an agreement had been signed for the absorption of the Irgun into the IDF an=
d one of the clauses stated that the Irgun had to cease all independent arms=
 acquisition activities. Consequently, representatives of the Israel Governm=
ent were informed about the ship and its sailing schedule.=20
<p><a name=3D"2">

The Irgun headquarters in Paris did their best to keep the Altalena's prepar=
ations for departure a secret, but it was difficult to conceal the movement=20=
of 940 fighters and the loading of a large quantity of arms and ammunition.=20=
It was feared that if the plans were discovered, attempts might be made to s=
abotage the Altalena at sea. For this reason, when it raised anchor on June=20=
11th, no cable was sent to the Irgun command in Israel, for fear that it wou=
ld fall into the wrong hands. These precautionary measures proved fruitless,=
 however, and the following day Radio London reported that the Altalena had=20=
sailed from Port-de-Bouc (France) in the direction of Israel with 1,000 Jewi=
sh volunteers and a large quantity of weapons on board.=20
<p><a name=3D"3">

It should be recalled that the first truce had begun on June 11th. When the=20=
Irgun leaders in Israel learned through the broadcast of the embarkation of=20=
the vessel, they feared that this breach of the truce conditions (i.e. the b=
an on bringing military equipment and fighters into the country) would  be r=
evealed. <a href=3D"people/begin.htm">Menahem Begin</a> decided therefore to=
 postpone the arrival of the ship, and the Irgun staff secretary, Zippora Le=
vi-Kessel, sent a wireless message to the Altalena to stay put and await ord=
ers. A similar cable was sent to <a href=3D"people/katz.htm">Shmuel Katz</a>=
 (member of the General Headquarters), who was then in Paris, but contact wi=
th the ship was poor and the message was not understood.
<p><a name=3D"4">

On June 15th, Begin and his comrades held a meeting with government represen=
tatives, at which Begin announced that the ship had sailed without his knowl=
edge and that he wanted to hold consultations on how to proceed.  In his dia=
ry for June 16th, Ben-Gurion wrote the following about the meeting:=20
<p><a name=3D"6">
<center>
<img src=3D"../pictures/small/smpencil.gif"><br>
<table cellpadding=3D"7" bgcolor=3D"#ffffcc" border=3D"3" width=3D"80%"><tr>=
<td>
<font color=3D"#9900ff">
Yisrael [Galili] and Skolnik [Levi Eshkol] met yesterday with Begin. Tomorro=
w or the next day their ship is due to arrive: 4,500 tons, bringing 800-900=20=
men, 5,000 rifles, 250 Bren guns, 5 million bullets, 50 Bazoukas, 10 Bren ca=
rriers. Zipstein (director of Tel Aviv port) assumes that at night it will b=
e possible to unload it all. I believe we should not endanger Tel Aviv port.=
 They should not be sent back. They should be disembarked at an unknown shor=
e.=20
</table></center>
<p><a name=3D"7">

Galili informed Begin of Ben-Gurion's consent to the landing of the ship, ad=
ding a request that it be done as fast as possible. Zippora Levi-Kessel then=
 wirelessed the vessel to come in at full speed. The following day, a workin=
g meeting was held between Irgun representatives and Ministry of Defence per=
sonnel. While the Irgun proposed directing the Altalena to Tel Aviv beach, M=
inistry of Defence representatives claimed that the Kfar Vitkin beach was pr=
eferable, since it would be easier to evade UN observers there. The ship was=
 therefore instructed to make for Kfar Vitkin.
<p><a name=3D"8">

Whilst there was agreement on the anchoring place of the Altalena, there wer=
e differences of opinion about the allocation of the cargo.  Ben-Gurion agre=
ed to <a href=3D"people/begin.htm">Begin</a>'s initial request that 20% of t=
he weapons be despatched to the <a href=3D"ac19.htm">Jerusalem Battalion</a>=
. His second request, however, that the remainder be transferred to the IDF=20=
to equip the newly-incorporated Irgun battalions, was rejected by the Govern=
ment representatives, who interpreted the request as a demand to reinforce a=
n  'army within an army'.  This was far from Begin's intention; rather, he s=
aw it as a question of honor that the fighters enlist in the IDF fully-equip=
ped.    =20
<p><a name=3D"9">

The Altalena reached Kfar Vitkin in the late afternoon of Sunday, June 20th.=
  Among the Irgun members waiting on the shore was Menahem Begin, who greete=
d the arrivals with great emotion. After the passengers had disembarked,  me=
mbers of the fishing village of Michmoret helped unload the cargo of militar=
y equipment. Concomitantly with the events at Kfar Vitkin, the government ha=
d convened in Tel Aviv for its weekly meeting. Ben-Gurion reported on the me=
etings which had preceded the arrival of the Altalena, and was adamant in hi=
s demand that Begin surrender and hand over of all the weapons:=20
<p><a name=3D"11">
<table><tr><td width=3D"40"><td>
<font color=3D"#0055cc">
We must decide whether to hand over power to Begin or to order him to cease=20=
his separate activities. If he does not do so, we will open fire!  Otherwise=
, we must decide to disperse our own army.
  </table>
<p><a name=3D"12">
The debate ended in a resolution to empower the army to use force if necessa=
ry to overcome the Irgun and to confiscate the ship and its cargo. Implement=
ation of this decision was assigned to the Alexandroni Brigade, commanded by=
 Dan Even (Epstein), which the following day surrounded the Kfar Vitkin area=
. Dan  Even issued the following ultimatum:
<p><a name=3D"13">
<center>
<img src=3D"../pictures/small/smenvelp.gif"><br>
<table cellpadding=3D"7" bgcolor=3D"#ffffcc" border=3D"3" width=3D"80%"><tr>=
<td>
<font color=3D"#9900ff">
To: M. Begin
<br><font color=3D"#0000ff">

By special order from the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defence F=
orces, I am empowered to confiscate the weapons and military materials which=
 have arrived on the Israeli coast in the area of my jurisdiction in the nam=
e of the Israel Government. I have been authorized to demand that you hand o=
ver the weapons to me for safekeeping and to inform you that you should esta=
blish contact with the supreme command. You are required to carry out this o=
rder immediately.
<br>
If you do not agree to carry out this order, I shall use all the means at my=
 disposal in order to implement the order and to requisition the weapons whi=
ch have reached shore and transfer them from private possession into the pos=
session of the Israel government.
<br>
I wish to inform you that the entire area is surrounded by fully armed milit=
ary units and armored cars, and all roads are blocked.
<br>
I hold you fully responsible for any consequences in the event of your refus=
al to carry out this order.
<br>
The immigrants - unarmed - will be permitted to travel to the camps in accor=
dance with your arrangements. You have ten minutes to give me your answer.
<font color=3D"#9900ff">
<br><div align=3D"right">
D.E.,<sbr>Brigade Commander
</table></center><p>
The ultimatum, and in particular the demand for an answer within ten minutes=
, was insulting and unrealistic. It was made, according to Even "in order no=
t to give the Irgun commander time for lengthy considerations and to gain th=
e advantage of surprise."   Begin refused to respond to the ultimatum, and a=
ll attempts at mediation failed. Begin's failure to respond was a blow to Ev=
en's prestige, and a clash was now inevitable. Fighting ensued and there wer=
e a number of casualties. In order to prevent further bloodshed, the Kfar Vi=
tkin settlers initiated negotiations between <a href=3D"people/meridor.htm">=
Yaakov Meridor</a> (Begin's deputy) and Dan Even, which ended in a general c=
easefire and the transfer of the weapons on shore to the local IDF commander=
.=20
<p><a name=3D"19">

Begin had meanwhile boarded the Altalena, which was now heading for Tel Aviv=
. He hoped that it would be possible to enter into a dialogue with the Provi=
sional Government and to unload the remaining weapons peacefully. But this w=
as not the case. Ben-Gurion ordered Yigael Yadin (acting Chief of Staff) to=20=
concentrate large forces on the Tel Aviv beach and to take the ship by force=
. Heavy guns were transferred to the area and at four in the afternoon, Ben-=
Gurion ordered the shelling of the Altalena . One of the shells hit the ship=
, which began to burn. There was danger that the fire would spread to the ho=
lds which contained explosives, and the captain ordered all aboard to abando=
n ship. People jumped into the water, whilst their comrades on shore set out=
 to meet them on rafts. Although the captain flew the white flag  of surrend=
er, automatic fire continued to be directed at the unarmed survivors. Begin,=
 who was on deck, agreed to leave the ship only after the last of the wounde=
d had been evacuated.
<p><center><img src=3D"../pictures/altelen2.jpg"><br><font color=3D"#ff0000"=
>Altelena on fire</font></center>

<p><a name=3D"20">

Sixteen Irgun fighters were killed in the confrontation with the army; six w=
ere killed in the Kfar Vitkin area and ten on Tel Aviv beach. Three IDF sold=
iers were killed: two at Kfar Vitkin and one in Tel Aviv.
<p><a name=3D"21">

After the shelling of the Altalena, more than 200 Irgun fighters were arrest=
ed on Ben-Gurion's orders. Most of them were released several weeks later, w=
ith the exception of five senior commanders (Moshe Hason, <a href=3D"people/=
lankin.htm">Eliyahu Lankin</a>, <a href=3D"people/meridor.htm">Yaakov Merido=
r</a>, <a href=3D"people/amitzur.htm">Bezalel Amitzur</a> and <a href=3D"peo=
ple/kook.htm">Hillel Kook</a>), who were detained for more than two months.=20=
(They were released, thanks to public pressure, on August 27, 1948).
<p><center><img src=3D"../pictures/altelena.jpg"></center>

<p><a name=3D"22">

Years later, on the eve of the Six Day War, in June 1967 (after Ben-Gurion h=
ad retired from political activity and Levi Eshkol was Prime Minister), Mena=
hem Begin joined a delegation which visited Sede Boqer in order to ask David=
 Ben-Gurion to return and accept the premiership again. After that meeting,=20=
Ben-Gurion said that if he had then known Begin as he  did now, the face of=20=
history would have been different.
</body>
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===================================================
Mrs. Gila Atwood
We are pixels in G-d's imagination.
You are welcome to browse my website at:
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a little Torah, nature, humour, environmental concerns and memoirs.

----- Original Message -----
From: Clark, Eli <clarke@HUGHESHUBBARD.COM>
To: avodah list <avodah@aishdas.org>
Sent: Tuesday, January 04, 2000 12:24 AM
Subject: Halachah and Football


> >From my Purim files:
>
> RUNNING BACKS AND RABBIS
> The Halakhah and Football

That's a good one, and will be appreciated by friends-  one, a Lubavicher
who runs to the radio motzi Shabbos for the latest soccer results.
What about the origin of the halachas of psik resha?  Wasn't that due to a
child's request for a ball?  (though ping pong might be a more likely sport
with a chicken's head. )
Almost forgot-  where I come from soccer= football,  American football=
rugby (be'erech) . In EY football is soccer-  obviously a legacy of the
mandate.  I'll stay with dancing and brisk walking  if you don't mind :-)

GA-  Al pi kaballa each mitzva has
> : profound effect and therefore profound intrinsic value.
>
MB > There's a famous question why Avraham Avinu waited for the tzivui
before
> performing milah. After all, wasn't he mekayeim kol hatorah kulah? The
> Brisker Rav's (also famous) teirutz is that until the skin was declared by
> HKBH to have the din of arlah, it wasn't arlah. Therefore there was
nothing
> to do milah on -- there was no orlah to remove!

GA Point taken, but if it's not metzuveh, it's not a mitzvah-  by
definition.  In a sense,  the halacha defines the reality.
Once the halacha is established, the reality itself becomes imbued with
kedusha, or the opposite (take Rosh Chodesh for example) -  but it can't be
independent of the person who will act with this object. Deja vu.  No magic
here. Reminds me of Shroedinger's cat actually.
>
MB There was a concept of "beheimah asher einenu tihorah" as far back as
Noach. Why not say that until
> HKBH assured all but ma'alei geirah umafreses parsah there was no concept,
> and therefore Avraham had no issur against eating pork?

GA He wasn't metzuveh, so it seems there would be no issur. However,
question is, would it still be preferable on a sod level?

MB >There is merit to the simple notion of "ana avda diKudsha berich Hu"

GA Certainly, but is that perhaps in *addition* to an effect al pi sod.
Take the difference between the schar of someone who is "metzuveh" and
someone who is "aino metzuveh" - yours truly eating in a succa for instance.
If I'm not mechuyav to do it, one would think there had to be some intrinsic
value to sitting in the succa to have any schar at all.
>
MB > *) About mal vilo para: Anyone have a good answer for why the berachah
> of "lehachniso bivriso shel Avraham Avinu" on peri'ah? Peri'ah post-dates
> Avraham, first appearing biymei Yehoshua. Of course, this raises the whole
> question of bal tosif...

GA- I learned that this was the difference between Yishmael's mila and
Yitzhak's mila. Anyone have a source?

On Wed, Jan 05, 2000 at 02:00:09AM +0200, Mrs. Gila Atwood wrote:
: GA Point taken, but if it's not metzuveh, it's not a mitzvah-  by
: definition.  In a sense,  the halacha defines the reality.

The problem is that this explains too much. Avraham Avinu kept kashrus
before it was metzuveh, yet he did not keep b'ris milah. Lishitasach,
how do the two differ?

:> There was a concept of "beheimah asher einenu tihorah" as far back as
:> Noach. Why not say that until
:> HKBH assured all but ma'alei geirah umafreses parsah there was no concept,
:> and therefore Avraham had no issur against eating pork?

: He wasn't metzuveh, so it seems there would be no issur. However,
: question is, would it still be preferable on a sod level?

My point is that implied in the Brisker Rav's answer is that kashrus has value
to a non-metzuveh that milah does not. I don't think he paid attention to
sod in formulating this answer, but the implication is that kashrus operates
on a sod level in ways that milah doesn't.

Personally, I'm not comfortable with the idea that HKBH gave a mitzvah that
lacks content as "spiritual medicine" beyond "ana avda". IOW, I feel more
at home with R' Chaim Vilozhiner's take on why Avraham Avinu followed kol
haTorah kulah. But the Rambam does suggest it, and it does seem mashma from
this Brisker Rav.

: GA Certainly, but is that perhaps in *addition* to an effect al pi sod.
: Take the difference between the schar of someone who is "metzuveh" and
: someone who is "aino metzuveh" - yours truly eating in a succa for instance.
: If I'm not mechuyav to do it, one would think there had to be some intrinsic
: value to sitting in the succa to have any schar at all.

Nit: "mechuyeves".

Or, that there's something about the neshamos of men that require the work of
certain mitzvos asei shehazman geramah that the neshamos of women do not.
This would explain the lack of tzivui, as well as explain why an "einu
metzuvah" would gain less from the mitzvah.

: GA- I learned that this was the difference between Yishmael's mila and
: Yitzhak's mila. Anyone have a source?

Last amud of R' Eliezer d'Milah. I just attended a one-week Yarchei Kallah
on that perek of Shabbos. (It was great, btw. Broad spectrum of Rabbanim:
we heard from R' Yonasan Sachs of RIETS discuss amud aleph, and R' Olshin
of Lakewood discuss the amud beis. One disappointment is that R' Gelley was
sick the night he was supposed to speak. IY"H next time.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  4-Jan-00: Shelishi, Vaera
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Pisachim 94a
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

In a message dated 1/4/00 3:31:13 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
owner-avodah@aishdas.org writes:

> R Y Weiss onece told us that - in his opinion - salt substitutes such as 
>  Potassium Chloride were not Salt legabie melicho.  I asked even tha  le 
> kullo that if something were in Potassium chloride we would not consider it 
as 
>  moluach.  And he said yes, EVEN leukulo IOW it was NOT salt period.
>  I suspect many yeshivas would have taken the chumros of both and said you 
> are  not yotzei melicho but it can foul up the meat if it sits in potassium 
> chloride

Two observations:
1. I also learned Yoreh Deah by Rav Weiss Shlita (who was also the Rav at my 
Bris!), and there were times when he ruled leHachmir both ways on Inyanim.

2.  Why extrapolate a "YU" position from Rav Weiss's position? There were 
many things YU did of which he did (and I imagine still does) disapprove. 
Further, R' Genack also teaches Yoreh Deah; perhaps he would disagree?

Mordechai Torczyner
Cong. Ohave Shalom, YI of Pawtucket, RI http://members.tripod.com/~ohave
HaMakor! http://www.aishdas.org/hamakor Mareh Mekomos Reference Library
WEBSHAS! http://www.aishdas.org/webshas Indexing the Talmud, Daf by Daf

In a message dated 1/4/00 5:02:35 PM US Central Standard Time, 
micha@aishdas.org writes:

<< Intermarriage is at roughly 60% outside the Orthodox community. I'm 
counting
 those who know they're intermarrying, those who marry non-kosher converts,
 and those who marry people whose father is Jewish. And, while Conservative
 Jewry follows rules closer to halachah's in this regard, they will accept
 Reform conversion-for-the-wedding post-facto.

So, we're talking about roughly 30% of the current generation that thinks
they are Jewish aren't. 

 >>
Regarding the self-deluded 30 percent:

What is a "non-kosher" convert? Someone converted by a non-Orthodox rabbi, 
even if converted by a mainstream (i.e., kosher, shomer shabbos) Conservative 
rabbi? In what sense do you believe Conservative rabbis will accept Reform 
convervsions-for-the-weddings post facto? What does "accept" mean here? Do 
the convertees-for-the-wedding have to live lives that are any more halachic 
than the typical member of the Conservative rabbi's own largely 
non-observant, assimiliated congregation? Do you grant special exemptions to 
sincere Conservative (or even Reform) convertees who live in out-of-the-way 
communities that have no Orthodox presence, and who turn to the most 
traditional rabbi available? What about Orthodox convertees who later fail to 
follow halacha? Is keeping kosher the cutoff? Being shomer shabbos? Something 
else? What about Orthodox convertees who obtained their conversion under, 
shall we say, suspect circumstances from suspect rabbis? Would you, as an 
Orthodox rabbi, refuse to "convert" someone who wishes to marry an Orthodox 
Jew if the would-be convertee reached his or her conclusion to become a Jew 
after meeting the real Jew he or she wishes to marry? How about after meeting 
the real Jew but before becoming romantically attached to him or her? (How 
can you tell?) Will you (or even can you) withdraw such a conversion if, 
after the marriage, it becomes apparent that the convertee is not, or is not 
really capable of being, religiously sincere, whatever halachic motions he or 
she continues to go through? If such a convertee is a woman, would you refuse 
to treat her offspring as Jewish (i.e., as one of the self-deluded 30 percent 
to which you referred)? Would you refuse to participate in her son's Bar 
Mitzvah or wedding to a real-deal Orthodox Jew?

David Finch

*********************


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