Avodah Mailing List

Volume 03 : Number 176

Thursday, August 19 1999

• Midgets criticizing Giants
• Shmiros
• Charedim
• Torah Girsos
• Bereshit Literalism -- 2 sides to every story
• Re: The argument by design
• Re: Bereshit Literalism
• Re: Miracles
• Re: Erroneous Psak
• Re: Midgets criticizing Giants
• Re: Shmiros
• What is a "Changed content" with regard to laining

The discussion regarding ketanim criticizing Gedolim has raised some
important general issues, such
as the need for a ben Torah to speak properly and the value of
consulting with one's rebbe.  Moreover, it is always good to be
reminded, as R. Daniel Eidensohn has reminded this list, of the Gemara
in Berakhot 19a.  But I think several issues specific to this discussion
have been neglected.

RDE writes:

>There is a difference between the problem of expressing one's
>understanding of a gadol's Torah which may inaccurate and
>making assertions about the Gadol himself.

I am a bit uncertain about exactly how one draws this dictinction.
Given that Gedolim teach us how to behave as much by example as anything
else, I think their behavior is also part of their Torah.  This is
certainly how the Gemara views the Amoraim, and I think that example has
been followed consistently until our day.

RDE also writes:

>My concern is that "known
>facts" require a coherent context to be understood properly and
>that we midgets need to be more humble in talking about the
>giants.

The concern regarding context is always valid, but I would say that, if
anything, it applies least to gedolim.  As we all know, the dinim of
hillul Hashem apply to an adam gadol in a way that they do not apply to
us midgets.  And, it goes without saying, the Giants are obviously aware
of this as well.  It seems to me, then, that the Halakhah does not grant
a Gadol leeway based on "context," and, that being the case, we can
generally assume that a Gadol's conduct may indeed be taken at face
value.

This does not mean a "midget" has carte blanche to criticize a "giant,"
but I do think that we have a right to assume that a Gadol views his own
actions as valid and proper.

Finally, we encounter what i think may be the most difficult issue of
all: what constitues "criticism."  In the most recent issue of something
called the Torah U-Madda Journal, there is a discussion of the propriety
of publishing certain letters that were written by a Gadol to a
heterodox professor, letters that reflect a warm personal friendship
between the gadol and the professor (who knew a great deal of Torah,
notwithstanding his hashkafot/association with a non-Orthodox Jewish
movement).  The existence of such a friendship is very unusual, and no
doubt surprising to many.   My question is: does publicizing the fact of
this friendship constitute bizui of a talmid hakham?  (I hope not,
because I've just done so; but maybe I am patur as a shogeg or because I
have not divulged the gadol's name.)

Obviously, the author of the article and editor of the journal which
published the article thought not.  However, some letter writers who
criticized the article apparently thought yes.

What is the proper approach in such a situation?  One argument could be
that the statements of R. Yehoshua b. Levi in the Gemara apply only to
someone who is deliberately mevazeh a talmid hakham.  Hence, there may
be a requirement of kavvanah regarding bizui.  But is that really true?

It appears to me that there are many possible statements that one person
would consider praise and another criticism.  If someone were to say,
for example, that a certain Gadol recited Hallel on Yom ha-Atzma'ut, a
fervent religious Zionist would consider that praise, while a fervent
anti-Zionist would consider that criticism.  Alternatively, if one were
to say that a certain Gadol prohibited using a sefer published by a
Zionist publisher, the Zionist might consider that criticism, while the
anti-Zionist might consider that praise.

Here the question is not whether it is right to criticize a Gadol, but
what constitutes criticism of a Gadol.  Should one ask the Gadol's
talmidim or followers?  Should one ask one's own rebbe?  According to
whose hashkafah does one evaluate the criticism/praise?  Obviously, this
issue only arise regarding what RDE correctly calls "hotly disputed
issues."  But here the evaluation of the conduct depends not so much on
the context, but the hashkafah of the person doing the evaluating.

Kol tuv,

Eli Clark

Rabbi Bechhofer asks (v3#171) if there is an earlier source than
Chida + Maharshal for the tradition of the revelation to Moshe + Dovid of Tehilim 67 written in the form of a menorah and the placement of that image on Dovid's battle shield.  To the best of
my recollection, the Chida in Midbar Kedaymos brings this tradition
from a ksav yad of Maharshal that is no longer extant, and I don't remember whether the Maharshal's source is given. I will check this, b'lee neder, the next time I have convenient access to this sefer. I don't think we have this in any midrashim, but perhaps the Maharshal
had a midrashic source that has been lost. For what its worth, Yalkut
Meom Loez on Tehilim cites the following sources in connection with
this tradition: Akaydas Yitzchok, Kesef M'zukak, Dorash Moshe and
Yosef Tehilos.

Rabbi Bechhofer also suggests that the shmiros mentioned by Ramaz in
Shorsay Hashemos need to be written or read with kavana to be
effective. Micha Berger makes a similar point (v3#173), suggesting
that a meditative focus on them is required. The point is well taken and I do not disagree. It does seem possible, however, that a shmira written or produced without kavana, such as a photo-offset image,
can nevertheless be beneficial if it is read or meditated upon with
kavana, and that a shmira that is not read or meditated upon with
with kavana can nevertheless be beneficial if it was written with
kavana, such as a kamia written by a bona fide mekubal for a choleh.

Rabbi Bechhofer also asks why a Chumash or other sefer kodesh wouldn't
function as a shmira in the same manner as a Chitas (Chumash,Tehilim
and Tanya in one volume). The Lubavitch answer to this is that the
Chitas has unique shmira value because the word chitas, which is
formed by the roshay tayvos of Chumash, Tehillim and Tanya, appears in
B'rayshis 35:5 regarding the fact that b'nay Yaakov were not pursued
following the Sh'chem massacre because the fear of Hashem (chitas
Elokim) was upon the inhabitants of the land. Apparently, a
combination of sifray kodesh whose roshay tayvos form chitas has
special power to arouse chitas Elokim and ward off harm. 

Whether or not we find this answer satisfactory, I think Rabbi
Bechhofer's last question raises an important point. It reminds me of a remark I once heard in the name of Rav Schach in reference
to the 84 fasts prescribed by Arizal as a tikkun for shichvas zerah
l'vatala, which Kaf HaChayim says may be "redeemed" by purchasing 84
meals for the poor. Rav Schach is reported to have said "Daf also
equals 84; learn a daf for a tikun." I don't believe that Rav Schach
was making light of the tikkunim of the Arizal recorded in Shaar Ha-
kavonos.  I think he was trying to point out that, in this dor
yosom, what is most important is to remain focused on the fundamentals
and strive to perfect the basics, rather than divert ones energies
to matters that are beyond our madrega, strength or comprehension. 

In the context of this thread regarding shmiros, perhaps the fundamental on which we should remain focused is "Im nisrabeh adam b'mitzvos ribo v'eleph malachim m'shamrim oso, v'im hu shalem b'torah
ub'maasim tovim hakodosh boruch hu b'atzmo m'shamro." (Tanchuma,
Mishpatim) Torah, mitzvos and maasim tovim are the ultimate
shmiros.

I suspect that, except for the last paragraph, Russell J. Hendel is
appalled by the foregoing, given his position (v3#172) that shmiros
are borderline "idolotrous practices," a source of shame that represent the "degeneration" of our "advanced religion" and "violate the essence of Judaism." Even Rambam does not go as far in his
disturbingly harsh condemnation of kamios and ridicule of those who
produce them. (See Moreh Nevuchim I:61. It is curiously ironic that
the matter of hotzoas kamios on Shabbos appears on daf 61 of M'seches Shabbos.) I also doubt that Rabbi Weinreb meant to suggest anything
of the kind (v3#164), but he can certainly speak for himself. 

I find RJH's language and attitude intemperate and troubling, and,
needles to say, I disagree. I am not ashamed of the healing kamios
of Shabbos 61, the sefer refuos of Brochos 10, the healing stone of
Bava Basra 16 or any other aspect of our mesorah that relates to
meta-physical or super-natural refuos or shmiros. I have no problem
with the notion that times may warrant the g'niza of such extaordi-
nary s'gulos, as we in fact find in the case of sefer refuos and
the even tova, and I respect the position that shmiros in general are not suitable for our generation, but I resolutely reject any claim
that they are degenerate or idolotrous.

On Thu, 19 Aug 1999, D & E-H Bannett wrote:

> The haredim feel the divinity of the Torah makes it impossible for there
> to be spelling "errors".Yet everyone knows of daka with hei or alef and
> it never causes anyone to passel a Sefer.. The other eight differences
> were not commonly known. 
> 
> Why does one not frighten but nine does? 
> 

I dunno. I'm Charedi (a reasonable one, to quote RMFrankel) and not
particularly frightened. :-) 

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

From: D & E-H Bannett <dbnet@ibm.net>

R' Moshe Feldman asks: Is Breuer's chumash, which is based on keter 
'aram tzova (at least starting in the middle of sefer dvarim), clearly 
the most correct?

<snip>

I recommend Breuer's book on the keter to all who cannot understand why the 
haredim are in an uproar. The Yoreh Deah (275) says interchanging haser and 
malei is posel.
<snip>

The idea that it is possible for there to be spelling differences is 
frightening to the charedim despite Kedushin 30 where chazal admitted they 
couldn't count letters because they didn't know the chaserim and yeterot.

The haredim feel the divinity of the Torah makes it impossible for there 
to be spelling "errors".Yet everyone knows of daka with hei or alef and 
it never causes anyone to passel a Sefer.. The other eight differences 
were not commonly known.

Why does one not frighten but nine does? 
<<

FWIW, we were taught in Benrard Revel Graudate School that the Rambam's 
insistense that the Troah in our hands is that of Moshe Rabbeinu. etc. refers 
only to the fact that neitherdid Moshe, nor did any subsequent scribe 
intentionally alter or forg anything.  However, it did not preclude the 
possibility of "honest" (ie. unintentional) scribal errors.

As such, I have accepted the possiblity of "lower criticism" in many cases; but 
reject "higher criticism" which is based upon the premise of some kind of 
conspiracy, forgery or pseudopigraphy.  That distinction would cross the line 
that the Rambam drew.

On a machshovo level I think the any rigid, literal understanding is prone to 
make one paranoid because if one piece of the strucutre falls it all collapses. 
9 only frightens because certain people have reactionarily assumed that since 
the Torah was 100% the word of Hashem 3300 years ago therefore the verions we 
have must be 100% perfect as it is now; w/o allowing for any holes in the 
process of transmission.  

The beauty of Saffus is that the Sofer is so thoroughly involved in meticulous 
ritual in order that he not only minimize the likelihood of error, he also 
inspires our confidence in a superior product.  Even so, that meticulous process
itself cannot preclude human error 100% of the time.

Rich Wolpoe

From: "Clark, Eli" <clarke@HUGHESHUBBARD.COM>

A pro-creationist decision in Kansas is more than a blow against Darwin
BY STEPHEN JAY GOULD
<snip>
....to something like chemistry without the periodic table, or American
history without Lincoln.<<

As a student of American history and a native of Connecticut, I learned the 
correct version of Lincoln and the Civil War - at least I though so until I met 
my wife who hails from Virginia. I eventually learned how great a man named 
Robert E. Lee was and how aweful that fellow Lincoln  was... <smile>

Rich Wolpoe

>As I was trying to show, from
>the perspective of information theory, each new interlocking system is
>incredibly improbable. To happen regularly is lima'alah min hateva.

"Incredibly improbable" (or even "incredibly improbable" times "incredibly improbable" times...) is not the same thing as "lima'alah min hateva."  It could be that "teva" happened to work that way, and here we are -- just lucky. The next universe won't have life in it, and the previous ten-to-the-ten-to-the-Nth didn't either. 

But look at the universe in a Bayesian way: factor in the existence of humanity as a necessity (in Bayesian terms: a large posterior probability), and the prior probability is pretty high, too.  So, if we're supposed to be here, the fact that automata come together regularly isn't "lima'alah min hateva" either, just the way things are supposed to work out.

Sholem Berger  

> Date: Thu, 19 Aug 1999 14:53:00 -0400
> From: "Clark, Eli" <clarke@HUGHESHUBBARD.COM>
> 
> most theologians. No scientific theory, including evolution, can pose
> any threat to religion--for these two great tools of human understanding
> operate in complementary (not contrary) fashion in their totally
> separate realms: science as an inquiry about the factual state of the
> natural world, religion as a search for spiritual meaning and ethical
> values.

I have heard this statement several times recently, on NPR and in the
Washington Post, and for some reason it rubs me the wrong way.

1) It is a statement of opinion presented as fact. In fact I believe that
while there is support for this position within the Jewish tradition,
there are also examples of those who clearly hold that the religious
tradition *does* answer inquiries into the "factual state of the natural
world."

2) It presents religion as a man-made tool (or as a human 
experience/process) with given parameters and goals. I see (true) religion
as comprising the received component of Divine communication, which may
contain facts about the natural world just as easily as it contains
messages of spiritual meaning and (most importantly in our religion)
ethical and spiritual values and demands. I think it is this "what's in it
for me" presentation of religion (I don't even like the term, I prefer
"religious tradition/practice") that I find a little offensive.

We recognize that people disagree on what religion *is*. How can one claim
that everyone should agree on what religion is *for*?

Any thoughts?

In a message dated 8/19/99 8:45:49 AM EST, richard_wolpoe@ibi.com writes:

> As to the Nvi'im there is no reason to deny that it was a miracle, (see 
Reish 
>  Taanis Mafteiach Shel Tchiyas Hameisim) Umfurosh in Rambam Yesodei Hatorah 
>  10:1, as to Rabboh and R' Zeira on Purim, the Gemarah says that "he 
prayed" 
>  Vsu Loi, OTOH there is the Gemara that Simtre helps (see B"M 74 and 
Yevomos 
>  Reish Perek 15)...
>  
>  Yitzchok Zirkind<<
>  
>  Nu, so who's denying they are miracles? 

Perhaps I misunderstood your original post, that it was an advanced form of 
mouth-to-mouth, and the qualities of the Yardein.

> OTOH there is no indication re: the  3 
>  cases of the Nevi'im that they were miracles.  

So it is understood by the Mforshim (i.e RaDaK by E-lisha), also pointed out 
was the Rambam in Igeres Techiyas Hameisim, that Techiyas Hameisim is 
completely miraculus, (as also in Hil. Mlochim when ruling that Moshiach does 
not have to do wonders he adds Techiyas Hameisim), the Tos. in Taanis 2a asks 
on the Gemara of Mafteiach Shel Techiyas Hameisim from E-liy-ohu and E-lisha, 
so they were of the same kind of Techiyas Hameisim, likewise in Sanhedrin 47a 
the Gemara calls the healing of Naamon a Techiyas Hameisim, which rivals the 
Techiyas Hameisim of
E-liy-ohu.

Also on a Pshat level, if it was some kind of advanced mouth-to-mouth etc., 
why did he at first send Geichazi with his stick to place on the dead child's 
face, likewise WRT Naamon, why didn't it become known afterward as a place 
one can get rid of Tzoraas.

>  radio signals.  I.E. Hashem is ALWAYS broacasting messages, but it takes a 
> tuner
>  to receive those messages.  In that sense, Moshe Rabbeinu was the most 
>  fine-tuned of tuner;

What is the source for this? why not say that he is AVAILABLE at all times 
(see Rambam Hil. Yesodei Hatorah 7:6)

KVCT

Yitzchok Zirkind

Chana Luntz writes:

> In message , Carl M. Sherer <csherer@netvision.net.il> writes
> >> a) the woman is going to mikvah after the 7 clean days, but they are
> >> having relations before then;
> >
> >[snip] 
> >
> >> d) they had relations during the sheva nekiim in the past, but they now
> >> wish/have done, teshuva.

[snip]

> >> In the case of a)  and c) clearly the couple don't care about being over
> >> an issur d'orisa chayav kares (until she goes to mikvah, she is assur
> >> d'orisa), so why is a chumra going to change matters.  
> >
> >I deleted (c), because that's not the case I was talking about. As to 
> >(a), it's unfair to say that any couple that has relations under the 
> >circumstances described in (a) doesn't care. They do. The fact that 
> >what they have done violates an issur d'oraysa doesn't mean they 
> >don't care. They succumbed to temptation - they didn't set out to 
> >violate Hilchos Nida.
> 
> Sorry, I obviously wasn't clear enough in my characterisation. ie by
> having two categories, (a) and (d) I meant to separate out those who
> "habitually" violate the 7 clean days (but because they live in a frum
> environment keep up everything that might be obvious to the outside
> world, eg to the extent of going to mikvah) as opposed to those who
> succumbed to temptation - which I categorised as (d).

Even living in a fruhm environment, generally no one aside from she 
and her husband is supposed to know when a woman is going to 
the Mikveh. Obviously, the Mikveh Lady and any other women she 
meets at the Mikveh will know, but in general it is supposed to be 
kept quiet (although one occasionally hears stories about how 
people find out that a woman is not going). I always understood 
that to be one of the reasons why women today only go to Mikveh 
at night. I think that's why I had trouble understanding your 
distinction between (a) and (d). If that's the case, I think we're 
talking about (d).

> But even in the case of (d), while I understand now what you are saying,
> and (unlike the cases I was thinking of) it doesn't strike me as bizarre
> - - it still strikes me as problematic.
> 
> Assuming they were taught hilchos taharas mishpacha before their
> marriage, or up till then, they will be keeping (or have been told to
> keep) a certain number of harchokos - either by this posek or another.

I'll tell you that when we got married we discovered that not 
everything we had been told in our separate Chosson and Kallah 
classes matched, and we ended up reviewing the Halachos with 
the Rav who was then our posek (pre-Aliya) to reconcile the 
differences. BTAT.

> If the posek suddently tells them to keep more, it is going to be
> obvious that they are chumros.  If he says they aren't, then he is
> effectively stating that whoever taught them previously didn't know what
> they were talking about. Do you really want to undermine their faith in
> what they were taught in that way?

I don't think you have to classify things as "chumros." The term 
has a connotation of "it's not for everyone," (and not just because 
not everyone needs it), and I'm not sure that's the connotation we 
want here. I would suggest that the posek should say something 
like, "you did something that was wrong, and you feel sorry about 
it, so I would like to give you some extra preventive measures that 
will help you to avoid having that happen again in the future." 

Are the extra harchokos chumros? For this couple I don't think it 
matters whether or not they are. For this couple they are an extra 
layer of fencing that will prevent them from being nichshal in an 
issur. They are not there for punishment, they are not there for 
them to feel that they are on a higher spiritual level, they are not 
there to give them a challenge. They are there to help them to 
succeed in an area where they have failed. And in many cases, it 
is entirely conceivable that if they ask a different posek they will be 
told that these harchokos are me'ikar hadin.

> So again, the only solution I can see is to be up front about it and say
> that these are chumras (although you could mention that there are other
> opinions that hold differently) which the posek recommends in order to
> decrease the possibility that they will be tempted again. 

I think we have now reached pretty close to the same point. I'm just 
not calling them chumros because that term has connotations that 
I don't want to introduce.

> But in fact, in relation to harchokos - certainly the attitude of my
> taharas mishpacha teacher was to the opposite extreme - that is, it she
> made it very clear that (excepting the obvious ones about dress etc
> which I suspect fall into your category of everybody holds by them)
> were only intended as a reminder of the situation.  (She was working
> from notes that were prepared for general use by the Jewish Marriage
> Council, and so were expected to be used in teaching women from frum to
> non frum extremes).  The reason why this was made so clear was because
> otherwise there was a fear (which I can see as legitimate) that one
> might think - oh well, we muffed it, we passed a plate from one to the
> other, since we failed to keep taharas mishpacha, we might as well have
> relations (might as well get hung for a sheep as a lamb, as they say).

I think what you have described is a proper way of presenting 
harchokos. They are designed to remind a couple of the woman's 
status as a nida, and that therefore they are doing things that will 
ensure that they do not become intimate. They're not a punishment.

> And i guess that is the other thing about the harchokos - speaking out
> of my experience as a newly wed, 

Mazal Tov!

that it is these type of harchokos that
> one tends to muff up, not intentionally, but out of forgetfulness (well
> the passing one is the worst - although this may have something to do
> with the absentmindedness that afflicts both my husband and myself
> (although in entirely different forms)).  I expect that with practice
> one gets better at it.  

We all mess up the passing one occasionally. We're married 
eighteen years bli ayin hara and it still happens....

> But if we suddenly had to take on new ones, I
> suspect that again there would be lots of failures before we > 
remembered.

There would. But OTOH, the effort of having to try to remember 
more things you are not supposed to do would serve as a pretty 
potent reminder of your status. ("Your" is probably a bad term - at 
least during the first 5-7 days it's the man who needs the reminder).

> Now if it is just a reminder, well it is also a pretty potent reminder
> every time one says "Sorry ,I wasn't supposed to do that" (ie it works
> even when, or maybe especially when you fail - especially as I am quite
> capable of not being aware I have a plate in my hands, because I am
> concentrating on something else, eg the conversation, so I may then have
> to apply the extra effort to work out what on earth is being referred
> to).  But if it is treated as part and parcel of the issur d'orisa  -
> then I can easily see a danger that failure at these harchokos, merely
> through absentmindedness, will "prove" to the couple that they are not
> capable of avoiding temptation, and why are they even bothering to fight
> their yetza hora. Or, if they become too onerous, may likewise provide
> fuel to the inclination to throw off the yoke all together, at least
> during the heat of the moment.

I think the answer is that if they are presented as harchokos, as 
gdarim to prevent you from doing something else, and not as 
independent halachos in their own right, then it will be less likely 
that a couple will decide that since they can't remember not to 
hand plates to each other, they can't keep Hilchos Nida at all.

> Thus the position taken by this Rav appears to be predicated on an
> assumption as to how the harchokos work and what they achieve, which
> assumes that if some is good, more is better - which I am not sure is
> necessarily the case.

I think that if it's presented properly more harchokos can help a 
couple that needs a few more reminders to steer them away from 
temptation.

-- Carl


Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

Carl and Adina Sherer
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

On Thu, 19 Aug 1999, Clark, Eli wrote:

> Finally, we encounter what i think may be the most difficult issue of
> all: what constitues "criticism."  In the most recent issue of something
> called the Torah U-Madda Journal, there is a discussion of the propriety
> of publishing certain letters that were written by a Gadol to a
> heterodox professor, letters that reflect a warm personal friendship
> between the gadol and the professor (who knew a great deal of Torah,
> notwithstanding his hashkafot/association with a non-Orthodox Jewish
> movement).  The existence of such a friendship is very unusual, and no
> doubt surprising to many.  My question is: does publicizing the fact of
> this friendship constitute bizui of a talmid hakham?  (I hope not,
>

No, and these friendships are not necessarily unusual either. But
publicizing the contents of those letters was clearly forbidden
and outrageous.

Now that the damage has been done by this "something" journal, I wonder
what we are allowed to extract form these letters. In an American court,
Ii believe illicitly obtained evidence is inadmissible. One is tempted to
apply similar standards here.

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

On Thu, 19 Aug 1999 david.nadoff@bfkpn.com wrote:

> Rabbi Bechhofer asks (v3#171) if there is an earlier source than Chida +
> Maharshal for the tradition of the revelation to Moshe + Dovid of
> Tehilim 67 written in the form of a menorah and the placement of that
> image on Dovid's battle shield.  To the best of my recollection, the
> Chida in Midbar Kedaymos brings this tradition from a ksav yad of
> Maharshal that is no longer extant, and I don't remember whether the
> Maharshal's source is given. I will check this, b'lee neder, the next
> time I have convenient access to this sefer. I don't think we have this
> in any midrashim, but perhaps the Maharshal had a midrashic source that
> has been lost. For what its worth, Yalkut Meom Loez on Tehilim cites the
> following sources in connection with this tradition: Akaydas Yitzchok,
> Kesef M'zukak, Dorash Moshe and Yosef Tehilos. 
> 

It eould be interesting to get chapter and verse on the Akeidah. The rest
seem to be Acharonim, although I may be mistaken.

> Rabbi Bechhofer also suggests that the shmiros mentioned by Ramaz in
> Shorsay Hashemos need to be written or read with kavana to be effective.
> Micha Berger makes a similar point (v3#173), suggesting that a
> meditative focus on them is required. The point is well taken and I do
> not disagree. It does seem possible, however, that a shmira written or
> produced without kavana, such as a photo-offset image, can nevertheless
> be beneficial if it is read or meditated upon with kavana, and that a
> shmira that is not read or meditated upon with with kavana can
> nevertheless be beneficial if it was written with kavana, such as a
> kamia written by a bona fide mekubal for a choleh. 
> 

Yes, but that kamia was meditated upon by the writer!

In any event, it seems we are likely in agreement that prevalent practices
of hanging up signs (photo-offset) without any meditation is meaningless.
Can we agree that this pertains to those infamous red threads as well?

> Rabbi Bechhofer also asks why a Chumash or other sefer kodesh wouldn't
> function as a shmira in the same manner as a Chitas (Chumash,Tehilim and
> Tanya in one volume). The Lubavitch answer to this is that the Chitas
> has unique shmira value because the word chitas, which is formed by the
> roshay tayvos of Chumash, Tehillim and Tanya, appears in B'rayshis 35:5
> regarding the fact that b'nay Yaakov were not pursued following the
> Sh'chem massacre because the fear of Hashem (chitas Elokim) was upon the
> inhabitants of the land. Apparently, a combination of sifray kodesh
> whose roshay tayvos form chitas has special power to arouse chitas
> Elokim and ward off harm.
> 

What about a Chumash Bereshis with the word "chitas" in it? And, does
that mean that the shemira of the Chitas is limited to evils perpetrated
by non-Jews (l'afukei, let us say, accidents)?

> Whether or not we find this answer satisfactory, I think Rabbi
> Bechhofer's last question raises an important point. It reminds me of a
> remark I once heard in the name of Rav Schach in reference to the 84
> fasts prescribed by Arizal as a tikkun for shichvas zerah l'vatala,
> which Kaf HaChayim says may be "redeemed" by purchasing 84 meals for the
> poor. Rav Schach is reported to have said "Daf also equals 84; learn a
> daf for a tikun." I don't believe that Rav Schach was making light of
> the tikkunim of the Arizal recorded in Shaar Ha- kavonos.  I think he
> was trying to point out that, in this dor yosom, what is most important
> is to remain focused on the fundamentals and strive to perfect the
> basics, rather than divert ones energies to matters that are beyond our
> madrega, strength or comprehension.
> 
> In the context of this thread regarding shmiros, perhaps the fundamental
> on which we should remain focused is "Im nisrabeh adam b'mitzvos ribo
> v'eleph malachim m'shamrim oso, v'im hu shalem b'torah ub'maasim tovim
> hakodosh boruch hu b'atzmo m'shamro." (Tanchuma, Mishpatim) Torah,
> mitzvos and maasim tovim are the ultimate shmiros. 
> 

Agreed! I also agree with your last two paragraphs, although I will defer
to you to converse directly with RRJH on the topic!

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

Russell Hendel wrote:
<<
"Not changed content - Inyan" means

- --Vocalizations done for "fluid speech" such as
- --------BGD KFT
- --------Ending a sentence with Patach, Kamatz
- --------etchah, etach

or

- -Vocalizations which could be [due] EITHER to meaning or phonetics
- ---eg VAHAVta vs VAhavTA 

Everything else is a "changed content"
>>

What do you mean by "due to . . . phonetics"?--That people people in the
same region often pronounce words differently (SYllable vs. syllABle)?

<<
With regard to the last example ALTHOUGH the meaning changes
(you had loved vs you will love) you do not correct the baal koray
because the difference could be due to factors other than meaning.


<snip>

Similarly even if a person YIROO vs YeeReUU (Clearly a change in meaning)
you
would not correct him since Shvas can change [due] to meaning or phonetics.

>>

Does everyone agree?  I once convinced Rav Moshe Brown (of Far Rockaway) to
make a ba'al kriyah repeat the pasuk on a mistake of va'yiri'oo.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

*********************


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