Avodah Mailing List

Volume 03 : Number 159

Wednesday, August 11 1999

• erronious psak
• Re: Erroneous psak
• Re: Sanhedrin
• LA Shooting
• Re: Erroneous P'sak
• Re: Erroneous P'sak
• lifnim mishurat hadin (was: Erroneous P'sak)
• Re: Alleogry - Authority
• Rabbi Teichtal and Brisker Rav
• Re: Erroneous P'sak
• Re: Erroneous P'sak
• Re: Erroneous P'sak
• eclipse
• Ma'aseh B'reishis
• Re: Ma'aseh B'reishis
• Pedants R Us: Qol qoreih and exegetical freedom

Regarding being  machmir when you should be meikel,   See our paper in
Tradition, 32:2, pp. 5-118 (Winter 1998), note 232.

According to several sources, included in the prayer of R. Nehunya ben haKana
(Berakhot 28b) is the phrase, "... And that we should not permit the forbidden
and forbid the permitted;" see Yerushalmi, Berakhot 4:2; Maimonides, Commentary
to Mishna Berakhot 4:2 and M.T., Berakhot 10:23; Rif and Rosh, Berakhot 28b. In
addition, the Mishna in Avot V:8 states, "A sword comes to the world...
because of those who teach Torah not according to the halakha." Rabbeinu
Jonah of Gerondi, R. Ovadiah of Bartenura, Tosefot Yom Tov, Tiferet Yisrael,
and R. Pinhas Kehati all understand this to include both he who prohibits
the permitted and he who permits the forbidden. R. Shabtai haKohen, supra,
note 230, states: "Just as it is forbidden to permit the forbidden, so it is
prohibited to forbid the permitted... because [a stringency in one place]
will lead to a leniency elsewhere." Resp. Teshuva meAhava, I, sec. 181, at
the end, states, "The punishment for one who is improperly stringent in his
ruling is greater than that of one who is improperly lenient." Resp. Divrei
Hayyim, I, Y.D. sec. 2 (based on Maimonides' Sefer haMitsvot, Lo Ta'ase 273)
argues that one who forbids the permitted violates the biblical prohibition of
"Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment..." (Leviticus 19:15). Resp. Igrot
Moshe, Y.D. II, sec. 45, states: "It is also clear that one is obligated
to clarify the law, even if there is reason to fear that as a result there
may be some wrongdoers and fools who will err.... And the clarification
of the law, even to be lenient, is an obligation even greater than teaching
Torah...." Particularly noteworthy are the comments of R. Samuel Eliezer Edels,
Hidushei Aggadot to Hullin 44b, s.v. "haRo'e," who indicates that one who is
stringent in case of doubt gets a share in the world to come, but that one
who labors to find grounds for leniency not only gets a share in the world
to come, but enjoys this world as well! See also Encyclopedia Talmudit, VIII,
"Hora'a," p. 489, and references cited in footnotes 48-50 therein; Sedei Hemed,
Aleph, kelal 214, "Asur la-asor et haMutar" and Pe'at haShulhan, Ma'arekhet
haAleph, kelal 75; Resp. Maharashdam, Y.D. sec. 91; Resp. Ya'aveits, I, sec. 5,
s.v. "veKhi teima"; R. Joseph Engel, Beit haOtsar, Aleph, no. 136, s.v. veAyyin
od beSifra," p. 204; R. Baruch HaLevy Epstein, Mekor Barukh, III, sec. 17;
R. Abraham Isaac haKohen Kook, Orah Mishpat, no. 111 (pp. 117-120) and 112
(pp. 120-129); R. Ephraim Meir Lasman, cited in Resp. Seridei Eish, I, sec. 6,
subsection a, s.v. "Kedei le-kayyeim"; R. Aaron Levin, Birkat Aharon, no. 233;
Resp. Devar Yehoshua, I, sec. 19 and the addendum thereto; Resp. Az Nidberu,
VI, p. 156 at end; Mishne Halakhot, IV, sec. 105; V, sec. 104; IX, sec. 262,
and Mahadura Tinyana, II, Y.D., sec. 119; Late Chief Rabbi Isaac haLevi Herzog,
Pesakim uKhtavim V, She'eilot uTshuvot beDinei Y.D., sec. 158, end of no. 1;
R. Gedalia Felder, Nahalat Tsevi, II, pp. 22-24; Sefer Beit Aharon, VII,
kelal "Ein laAsor haMutar," pp. 565-605. For a popular presentation of the
subject, see R. Moshe Weinberger, "Keeping up with the Katz's," Jewish Action
48:3 (Rosh haShana 5749) (1988), pp. 10-19 and references cited therein;
see especially p. 15ff and footnote 62 ad loc. Despite the above, R. Raphael
Blum, Resp. Birkhot Shamayim, O.H., Introduction, suggests that in the modern
period, one should be strict when it comes to public matters. He cites both
the past Satmar and Belzer Rebbies as supporting this position.

See the SHACH in Yoreh Deah Hora'oht Issur V'Hetter (right before Siman 243)
on: "k'shem she'assur l'hattir et ha'issur, kach assur le'essor et ha'muttar".
The Shach goes into detail on precise conditions.

Josh

Look at the RASHASH on the gemara in Horayot 2b: "Horu bet din she'cheylev
mutar..".  and also the Yerushalmi there.

Josh

>Date: Tue, 10 Aug 1999 14:25:29 -0500
>From: Avram Sacks <Avram_Sacks@cch.com>
>Subject: LA shootings
>
>There is a breaking story of shootings about an hour and a half ago at  a
>JCC in Granada Hills in or near Los Angeles in which at least five were
hit,
>including two children under 8.   Police are still searching for the lone
>gunman.   Does anyone on the list, particularly those in L.A. , yet know
who
>was shot?   News sites on the web have not posted any names.
>
>//Avi
>Avram Sacks
>sacksa@cch.com
>Chicago, IL
>


What an incredibly tasteless inquiry!

Chana Luntz writes:
:               And to me, yiras shamayim in a posek is where that posek
: genuinely knows that he will be judged for the psak that he gives, if
: too makil, for being over on the Torah, and if too machmir, for every
: drop of pain suffered by those who receive the psak from following it.

I agree with her assessment that "erring on the side of caution" is wrong,
and with earlier discussions about how rare it is to find a situation where
caution WRT one issue isn't a kulah WRT another. (BTW, one possible case:
hilchos niddah, where the wife is both post menapause and doesn't have much
desire for relations. Neither piryah virivyah nor ona'ah would be issues.)

However, that's not the only reason to be machmir. Nor is it even the only
case where yir'as shamayim is an issue. Chana summarizes another poster
as saying "he wanted somebody to just work through the halacha, and not give
him a mussar shmuess or be machmir because of fear of heaven."

My guess is that the other poster was thinking of the general chumrah as
a measure of yir'as shamayim. (Although we could re-open the whole "Mishnah
B'rurah and ba'al nefesh" discussion if we're not careful.) But what about
a specific chumrah as a specific bit of mussar?

For example, what's wrong with a poseik telling someone who has problems with
stinginess that he personally ought to be machmir WRT ma'aser kisafim? Or
someone who has problems with kavannah being told that for him it would be
better if he repeated sh'moneh esrei -- even though he sang "mechayeh meisim
ata ... umorid hageshem" 90 times?

I believe that some definitions of "kidoshim tihyu" require (what would
otherwise be) lifnim mishuras hadin where necessary for obtaining kedushah.
(The Ramban appears to limit this to dinim that rein in ta'avah.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 10-Aug-99: Shelishi, Shoftim
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H O"Ch 352:3-353:6
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Pisachim 20b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Nefesh Hachaim I 4

In a message dated 8/10/99 8:40:34 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
micha@aishdas.org writes:

<< 
 My guess is that the other poster was thinking of the general chumrah as
 a measure of yir'as shamayim. (Although we could re-open the whole "Mishnah
 B'rurah and ba'al nefesh" discussion if we're not careful.) But what about
 a specific chumrah as a specific bit of mussar?
 
 For example, what's wrong with a poseik telling someone who has problems with
 stinginess that he personally ought to be machmir WRT ma'aser kisafim? Or
 someone who has problems with kavannah being told that for him it would be
 better if he repeated sh'moneh esrei -- even though he sang "mechayeh meisim
 ata ... umorid hageshem" 90 times?
 
 I believe that some definitions of "kidoshim tihyu" require (what would
 otherwise be) lifnim mishuras hadin where necessary for obtaining kedushah.
 (The Ramban appears to limit this to dinim that rein in ta'avah.)
 
 -mi
  >>
Rav A. Lichtenstein in his essay " Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic 
Independent of Halakha?" (must reading in my book to deal with the question 
can one be frum but not good or good but not frum)  mentions that in the 
Mishna Tora the Rambam seems to see Lifnim Mshurat Hadin  as " a lofty plane 
whose attainment is a mark of eminence but whose neglect cannot be faulted as 
reprehensible".(see Hilchot deot). In shmona prakim however, he sees it as " 
a propaedeutic technique for attaining it(the Golden Mean). As in Aristotle's 
familiar example of straightening a bent stick, one excess is simply used to 
correct another...."

Kol Tuv,
Joel Rich

--- Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> I believe that some definitions of "kidoshim tihyu" require (what
> would
> otherwise be) lifnim mishuras hadin where necessary for obtaining
> kedushah.
> (The Ramban appears to limit this to dinim that rein in ta'avah.)

I don't believe that the Ramban limits it thus.  See Ramban on
"v'aseta hayasher v'hatov" where he links that concept to kedoshim
t'hiyu.  Ramban on "v'aseta hayasher v'hatov" gives the example of
bar metzra, clearly not a ta'avah issue.

Kol tuv,
Moshe
_____________________________________________________________
Do You Yahoo!?
Bid and sell for free at http://auctions.yahoo.com

Rich Wolpoe <richard_wolpoe@ibi.com> asks:
: Hypothetical Question #1: Rabbi XYZ becomes a physicist and via modern
: tehcnical advances realizes that electricity is totally different from Aish.
: Now what? Do we alter halocho? Does the matter become re-open for discussion?

We've been through this question repeatedly. R' Kook clearly says "yes" --
after all, how is it different than discrediting abiogenesis of maggots? R'
Avraham ben haRambam understands "nishtaneh hateva" to mean "scientific theory
changed" which means there are numerous examples in the rishonim. Again,
only lechumrah, since likulah requires invalidating all sevaros behind a
p'sak, and we don't claim to know them all.

: Hypothetical Question #2:  Givin that women WERE not given aliyos due to
: "kovod hatzibbur" would the socioligical metzius of today ...
:                                   (Perhaps analogous to mayim acharonim after 
: the disappearacne of melach sedomis?)

The difference between #1 and #2 is that #1 is about a p'sak based on a
misunderstanding of the facts, and #2 is about takanos based on facts that
are no longer true. I find the difference between p'sak and takkanah to
be more telling than the difference between misunderstanding and a change
in situation. Takkanos have power beyond their instigating s'varos (again,
assuming we know all of the s'varos). For a third example that is oft presented
in these terms, r'fu'ah biShabbos.

I'm not sure why this is relevent. The question was what limits you'd place
on Adas Yisra'el's power to decide halachah. Not on what limits you'd give
its leaders in reopening questions.

:                           It seems that there is something to the fact that a
: valid tzibbur can "veto" a decision; but probably only when there are 2 valid 
: options.

This "only" is what's missing from Catholic Israel (Schechter's formulation).
Validity of the options is /also/ up to CI! I think this distinction is more
relevent than the one your draw (below).

:                      Philisophically speaking, in order to have a relatively 
: stable Mesorah we should avoid or "estop" ourselves from making sudden
: lurhces, even if it is based on the premise that an old decision was
: "faulty".

IOW, AY can "veto" a decision only when there are two valid options, but if
it was found a few generations later that they chose an invalid option, that
decision sticks? Why? Is this limitation only lichatchilah?

What I'd consider a more accurate formulation of this distinction to CI is
that Schechter doesn't require the old decision to be faulty -- even if just
the desires of the masses change, halachah can be changed. You go much further
to the other extreme than I would -- you close all possibility of reopening a
question.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 10-Aug-99: Shelishi, Shoftim
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H O"Ch 352:3-353:6
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Pisachim 20b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Nefesh Hachaim I 4

Fron Shlomo B Abeles <sba@blaze.net.au>
Subject: Rabbi Teichtal and Brisker Rav

chaim wasserman wrote:

<<Where are the "tanna demesaye's" to Rabbi Teichtal zt'l? >>

 >>>Rav Yosef Eliyohu Henkin ztl. (and)... the Brisker Rav <<

Whilst I agree that Rav Henkin does write that he changed his views once

Israel became a reality (although not in such 'glowing' terms as EHS),
it is preposterous
to  list the Brisker Rav as a tanna demesaye. His shittah regarding the
state of
Israel was similar and sometimes even more severe  than that of the Edah
Hacharedis
- even going as far as not participating in elections. His harsh
anti-Zionist opinions are
well-known and carried forward by his sons and grandsons - whose
Yeshivos and
Kollelim staunchly refuse to accept support from  government sources -
just
like other Mosdos associated with the Edah and Neturei Karta.

>> ... the Brisker Rav was dead set against a word of ugly protest
>> against the Zionist establishment. "Would they talk that way in
Moscow?"

I have never heard that story before, but the following well-known
episode may explain: The rav once strongly criticised the legendary
leader of the
Neturei Karta, Reb Amrom Blau who led weekly protests against Chillul
Shabbos
n Jerusalem. The Brisker Rav had been told that on the previous Shabbos
Reb Amrom had laid down on the road in front of the police cars.

He berated Reb Amrom and told him that he (R' Amrom) was a zionist! A
shocked R' Amrom asked: " Me!?  Why?"  The Rav answered him, that (by
laying
down before the car)  you have shown you feel quite safe and that they
will not run
you over - proving you have positive thoughts about zionists....

Maybe (now this is my pshetel)  that is the reason the Rav  said
"Moscow" - another place
where protesters faced similar dangers - and didn't say 'New York' or
'London' - where of
course there would be no such risk of Pikuach Nefesh....?

In any case, those who remember those times will recall
that the Brisker Rav was proven  to be 100% correct as some time later
another Shabbos protester Reb Pinchos Segalov HYD was
actually beaten to death by the police.

Sof dovor, the Brisker Rav was definitely no Tanna
deMesaye for Rabbi Teichtal...

SBA

In a message dated 8/10/99 8:40:34 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
micha@aishdas.org writes:

> For example, what's wrong with a poseik telling someone who has problems 
with
>  stinginess that he personally ought to be machmir WRT ma'aser kisafim? 

See Rambam Hil. Deiois 1:4-5, 2:2 (IOW this may not be a Chumrah rather an 
obligation).

Or
>  someone who has problems with kavannah being told that for him it would be
>  better if he repeated sh'moneh esrei -- even though he sang "mechayeh 
meisim
>  ata ... umorid hageshem" 90 times?
>  

Why isn't this a Hefsek?, (there are many Halochos that are based on the fact 
that we are not Mchavein today).

Kol Tuv

Yitzchok Zirkind

In a message dated 8/10/99 8:56:11 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Joelirich@aol.com writes:

> Rav A. Lichtenstein in his essay " Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic 
>  Independent of Halakha?" (must reading in my book to deal with the 
question 
>  can one be frum but not good or good but not frum)  mentions that in the 
>  Mishna Tora the Rambam seems to see Lifnim Mshurat Hadin  as " a lofty 
plane 
> 
>  whose attainment is a mark of eminence but whose neglect cannot be faulted 
> as 
>  reprehensible".(see Hilchot deot). In shmona prakim however, he sees it as 
" 
> 
>  a propaedeutic technique for attaining it(the Golden Mean). As in 
Aristotle'
> s 
>  familiar example of straightening a bent stick, one excess is simply used 
to 
> 
>  correct another...."
>  

In a message dated 8/10/99 8:56:11 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Joelirich@aol.com writes:

> Rav A. Lichtenstein in his essay " Does Jewish Tradition Recognize an Ethic 
>  Independent of Halakha?" (must reading in my book to deal with the 
question 
>  can one be frum but not good or good but not frum)  mentions that in the 
>  Mishna Tora the Rambam seems to see Lifnim Mshurat Hadin  as " a lofty 
plane 
>  whose attainment is a mark of eminence but whose neglect cannot be faulted 
as 
>  reprehensible".(see Hilchot deot). In shmona prakim however, he sees it as 
" 
>  a propaedeutic technique for attaining it(the Golden Mean). As in 
Aristotle' s 
>  familiar example of straightening a bent stick, one excess is simply used 
to 
>  correct another...."
>  
(sorry about the previous send)

The simple reading of Hil. Deios is that both are true, there is a Chasid who 
does Lfnim Mishuras Hadin (end of 1:5), OTOH when one has problems with his 
Deios then he must fix them by going to the extreem 2:2, and see Lechem 
Mishne there.

Kol Tuv

Yitzchok Zirkind

Some reports from todays total sun eclipse

Most Lebanese heeded government warnings to stay home during the four-minute eclipse, which generated widespread panic in Lebanon where it was
described as a precursor to the Apocalypse.

Some devout Muslims flocked into mosques for special eclipse prayers to ward off the event's dire consequences. Others said they had barricaded
themselves in their homes to avoid even looking at the sun's rays. 

Eli Turkel

Some comments, now that I read the fax of R' ZY Kook's position WRT ma'aseh
b'reishis.

Yes, he calls everything before Lech Lichah "para-history" and "ma'aseh
b'reishis". (I dismissed calling prh- a transliteration for "pre-".)

But.

This is because to R' ZY Kook, "ma'aseh b'reishis" doesn't mean what I thought
it did. He uses it to refer to belief based on metaphysics. The selection I
saw was all about belief based on Avraham's discovery of G-d and of the laws
thereby implied. This is when Jewish history begins, and in that sense
everything before it is para-historical. RZYK is presenting a position much
like that in the begining of the Kuzari. And this is why he takes "ma'aseh
b'reishis" to mean everything before that first tzivui.

You can't combine that with my interpretation of m"b being the material not
understandable to man in any non-metaphoric way. By changing the definition
of m"b, you remove the whole point of his division.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 11-Aug-99: Revi'i, Shoftim
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H O"Ch 354:1-355:3
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Pisachim 21a
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Melachim-I 12

In a message dated 8/11/99 10:04:21 AM EST, micha@aishdas.org writes:

> You can't combine that with my interpretation of m"b being the material not
>  understandable to man in any non-metaphoric way. 

What is the Yesod that M"B cannot be Kipshutoi, (Brias Yesh Mayin is Bkoach 
Haborei who is Ein Soif) ?

Kol Tuv

Yitzchok Zirkind

REClark wrote: 
<One final, largely pedantic, point, addressed to the ba'alei keri'ah,
medakdekim and anti-missionary activists on this lists: The phrase "Kol kore
ba-midbar" does not reflect the cantillation (trop) of our mesorah. The
pasuk reads: Kol kore: ba-midbar panu derekh Hashem. (In other words, we are
clearing the derekh hashem in the midbar; the voice itself is not in the
midbar.) This is an important debating point with missionaries, because the
New Testament describes Paul as wandering through the desert proclaiming the
advent of you-know-who, and says this is a fulfillment of the nevu'ah.
However, our reading of the navi indicates that the nevu'ah is paying no
attention to where the kol is calling out. Nevertheless, the term "a voice
in the wilderness" has become deeply imbedded in western culture.> 

This raises an interesting inyon related to the periodic outbreak of guises
of the exegetical freedom thread.   It is perfectly true that the trope
interprets the posuq as described by REli.  Indeed, every miforeish I saw in
a cursory look at this a long time ago also agrees with the trope on this.
Yet consider, there is no particular religious imperative, discernable at
least to me, requiring one to agree with the trope's preferred parsing, or a
rishon's preferred exegesis. Indeed every rishonic exeegete out there
disagrees with the trope's peirush about some thing or other. And we are
told that already in talmudic times there were differences between bovel and
ma'arovoh in the parsing of verses. of course if all known rishonim
including the ba'alei mesoroh who recorded the trope have converged to the
same translation,  common sense as well as an ingrained respect for any
rishon's  enormously superior textual insight mandate proceeding with the
utmost caution. But must one feel constrained, even in principle, from ever
advancing such a disagreement ourselves?  Note that we are no longer talking
of exegetical differences that may raise ideological hackles such as the old
"ovos bashing" (c"v loa hoyoh viloa nivroh ) accusations, or even
allegorical excursions.  it is now simple translation, with no apparent
resonance to larger issues one way or the other.  (pace REli, surely what
christians think of this should neither maileh nor moirid during our
internal grappling with the plain text.)

Let's consider the specific example of qol qoreih.  That alternative
exegesis was already current in the first century is testified to, not in
rabbinic literature, but in (lihavdil) Mathew 3:3  where a "crying in the
wilderness" is already used - referencing that which John the Baptist was
engaged in.  And while there are those who might wish to dismiss this as
simply another christological "reading in", I frankly do not find that very
convincing (a subjective judgement call to be sure).  Or to be more precise,
we obviously have a christological read-in imagining that yeshayoh is
referencing JtheB, but it is hardly necessary to change the trope's pishat
to do so if one is inclined in that direction.  The trope's choice, that the
way of the Lord was to be prepared in the wilderness, lends itself quite
satisfactorily and equivalently to ascription of the Baptist's preparatory
activities in the Judean wilderness.  And then there is the frankly awkward
and somewhat unusual phrasing attendant upon the separation of bamidbor with
a comma.  The trope's pattern here of prepositional phrase-command
verb-object phrase of bamidbor, panu derech hashem runs contrary to the more
usual (though admittedly not exclusive) pattern of verb-object-prepositional
phrase (as in the paradigmatic Shimos 12:21 "mishichu u'qichu lochem tzoan
limishpichoseichem").   Thus we are left with the notion that the
alternative exegesis - that which is indeed embedded in western culture -
may in fact be quite early (perhaps even biziman habayis) but also makes
sense to us  (also to RYGB apparently, who depicted himself as a voice
crying in the wilderness while waging one of the avodah wars).  lulai
dimistofinoh i might even advance the notion that the uniform poroshonus of
the rishonim and the trope was itself a reaction to the by now - much later
-publicly identified with christological exegesis. 

Now, is there anyone out there who wants to extend  the various exegetical
constraints that some members of this list have developed previously,  i.e.
discerning rules identifying the precise circumstances one might, or might
not disagree with a chazalic or rishonic pishat.   Will any  of our esteemed
members dispute our right to disagree (in principle of course) with the
uniform consensus of all rishonim on a matter such as simple translation? 

Mechy Frankel				H: (301) 593-3949
michael.frankel@dtra.mil			W: (703) 325-1277

*********************


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