Avodah Mailing List

Volume 03 : Number 151

Monday, August 2 1999

• Perils of Pedantry
• 1. Munkacs; 2. _____; 3. "I'd bury Paul"
• Sinai and the spectrum of ideas
• tower of Bavel
• Re: Sinai and the spectrum of ideas
• Re: Sinai and the spectrum of ideas
• Divided Community
• re machlokes
• Enjoyment of mitzvot ma'asiot
• Re: allegory - authority
• Re: divided community
• Flood--Kol kore bamidbar
• Re: allegory - authority
• Is all music value-neutral?
• Joesphus

Correction.  As R. Daniel Yolkut pointed out to me in a private post,
the kol kore ba-midbar was John the Baptist, not Paul, who lived after
the events in the Gospels took place.

Sorry for the error.

Eli Clark

1. It appears that the letter by the Munkacser has been questionably
translated. For the benefit of those who have lost track: Please supply
the specific reference to the original and the translation.

2. Eli Clark has pointed out the many drawbacks, repetitiveness,
disrespect, overlong simmering, that characterize the internet forum. In
full agreement, let nevertheless add that there are worse alternatives.
Unfortunately the proportion of heat to light in many oral shouting
matches is much higher, and less amenable to correction. This is, of
course, no reason for us to be satisfied with the status quo. ve-ein kan
makom l'haarikh.

3. Rabbi Clark meant John the Baptist.

>By saying that Chazal's constructivist role had something to do with their
>positions of what is or isn't historical, I'm afraid I must agree with RYGB
>that it sounds like the Conservative/historical school's approach. There's an
>implied denial that some spectrum of ideas actually came from Sinai. That's
>the only justification for saying that a new idea, one which is outside the
>currently existing spectrum, ought to be considered.

Why must that be the only justification?  Perhaps we weren't correct before about the breadth of the spectrum.  A new idea might already have be found within the spectrum, but our previous definitions were inexact.

Plus I'm not sure where you get the statement that "some spectrum of ideas come from Sinai."  "Ideas" are khokhmo, no?  They're found aplenty among the umes haoylem.  Torah is something else.

Sholem Berger

In the argument over the flood I feel very much in the middle. The questions
bother me but I am not happy with an allegorical answer.

As such, I wish to pose similar problems that bother me about the Tower of
Bavel and am seeking some answer other than just turning this into another
allegory. BTW allegorizing this is a little more difficult since
Avraham was already alive at the time.

Internal difficulties:
It seems that battle of the 4 kings vs 5 kings started immediately after the
dispersion. Somehow all these kingdoms were well established and already at
war right after the entire population moved from Babylonia to around the
world.
Similarly, when Abraham goes to Eygpt it occurs only aboyt 25-30 years
after the Tower. Nevertheless, the Pharoh does not seem to act like a
new monarch. Similarly for Achimelech. Perhaps in Sodom there is more
reason to assume that it was recent. However, even there Lot is criticized
for introducing new customs when the whole town is new.

External difficulties.
The Tower of Bavel happened in 1996 from creation less than 4,000 years ago
(even if we add the controversial years missing from the second Temple).
The record of Eygptian phraohs is longer than that and I also believe that
of the Chinese kings. I am not sure how far back the legends of the Incas
and Aztecs go.

According to a literal reading of the Bible the entire human race lived in
Balblonia until the year 1996 and spoke one language. Thus the rest of
the world was desolate from humans. The continents of Africa, Americas,
Australia, etc. all became populated from this group.

My question is whether there exists any "classical" intrepations that the
Tower of Bavel was a local story rather a global story - this would answer
all my questions as then the Torah does deny the existence of human
communities outside of Bavel before 3763 years ago.

Thanks,
Eli Turkel

p.s.
I am also bothered by the other difficulty, already noted by the
commentators, that Noach, Shem, etc. were all living at the time but
seemed to have no influence in spite of the fact that they were all
descendants of Noach.

Sholem Berger quotes me and asks:
:                                           Perhaps we weren't correct before
: about the breadth of the spectrum.  A new idea might already have be found
: within the spectrum, but our previous definitions were inexact.
....
: Plus I'm not sure where you get the statement that "some spectrum of ideas
: come from Sinai."  "Ideas" are khokhmo, no?

I'm arguing here against a particular kind of ammendation of Chazal's
position: creating a new shitos that disagree with a unanimous decision
that was never before questioned.

By "spectrum of ideas" I'm refering to the diracheha darchei no'am of TSB"P,
a spectrum because diracheha is plural (i.e. eilu va'eilu). To be sure, I
don't know how to explain plurality of mutually exclusive historical claims.

We have a mesorah telling us that some given spectrum of ideas about the mabul
was given to Moshe Rabbeinu. That mesorah is consistant on insisting that
the mabul was a historical event.

Claiming that "Chazal would have said" means that the omission of the idea
by them can be due to a lack of outside data on their part. Which could only
said if one ch"v believes that these ideas are created ex nihilo by Chazal.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  2-Aug-99: Levi, Re'eh
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H O"Ch 346:3-9
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Pisachim 16b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Kuzari V 21-24

In a message dated 8/2/99 12:30:05 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
micha@aishdas.org writes:

<< 
 Claiming that "Chazal would have said" means that the omission of the idea
 by them can be due to a lack of outside data on their part. Which could only
 said if one ch"v believes that these ideas are created ex nihilo by Chazal.
 
 -mi
  >>
Are you saying that everything that Chazal(to be defined - including what 
time periods) said was received by them as a specific mesora(ie they provided 
no creativity or insight based on general principles) but rather just wrote 
down what they heard? For example the Rashi in Noach(10:1) concerning what 
"dvarim achadim"meant gives a number of things that achadim implied. Did 
Chazal have a specific mesora that it was each  of these, or a general mesora 
of the situation in which case each of these implications would make 
sense?(ie do I have to believe that they literally said to each other that 
floods only happen every 1656 years or can I believe that they said that 
Hashem will not continually intervene in human affairs or will allow nature 
to take its course etc.)


Kol Tuv,
Joel Rich

> Reb Daniel Eidensohn wrote the following:
> 
> "I guess that my problem is finding real life examples of a gadol
> perceiving that his opponents views were a threat to yiddishkeit - yet he
> disagreed vehemently though respectfully."

How about Rav Kook zt"l and Rav Zonnenfeld zt"l? Contemporaries 
in Volozhin before they came to Eretz Yisrael, they became the 
leaders of two vehement rival camps once they got here - the 
Religious Zionists and the Neturei Karta, respectively. And yet they 
maintained a close relationship throughout their lifetimes. Would R. 
Eidensohn suggest that their disagreements were any less deeply 
felt than the other examples given? 

I think that in most cases, the Gdolim are able to separate out 
disagreeing and disdaining the idea from disagreeing and 
disdaining the person. I think the followers are much less able to 
do so, and much of what goes down in history as having been said 
or done by the Gdolim, was actually said or done by their followers. 
Obviously that is difficult to argue when what is said is in writing, 
but I have heard stories in the past of Gdolim being pressured to 
issue or not to issue piskei halacha.

More recent contemporary example: during the arguments over the 
new road to Pisgat Zev (which - let's face it - was about a lot more 
than Kvoros - it was about whether and to what extent the Charedi 
world would attempt to resolve disputes with the State of Israel 
within a Halachic framework, or whether it would continue to argue 
for the sake of arguing), one Gadol's talmidim allegedly threw 
stones at another Gadol's car. The talmidim were promptly 
expelled from their Yeshiva.

-- Carl M. Sherer


Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

Carl and Adina Sherer
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Daniel Eidensohn wrote:

>I was once bothered by the statement of the Shaarei Tshuva 482:2. Two people
>are in jail during Pesach with a single kazayis of Matzoh tossed in to them.
>The halacha is that they must fight for that kazayis. The Shaarei Tshuva says
>this is the paradigm for Avodas HaShem as we see with Yaakov &  Eisav and Boaz.
>I asked Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach - why can't they just be nice and let the
>other guy have the Kazayis. He smiled his famous smile and said, "If you aren't
>willing to fight for the Mitzva that shows you don't care about it. It is an
>insult to the Mitzva."

I find myself not only bothered by the Shaarei Teshuva as quoted here, but
even more so by what is reported to have been said by R' Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach.  It is my understanding that in Judaism we avoid insulting Hashem
and human beings, not personified mitzvot.  In fighting for the kazayit of
matzah, we may have shown our zealotry for the performance of mitzvot
detached from their makor, i.e. as ends in themselves, but we have lost the
battle to live in a G-dly fashion.   I can hardly think of a more pathetic
sight as some evil jailor tossing a piece of matzah into a jail cell with
two frum Jews in it and then laughing hysterically as he watches the two
"orot l'goyim" beat each other into a pulp for the privilege of "fulfilling
a mitzvah".  But even if we remove the chilul Hashem by saying that the case
is where the jailor has left and no one else is around, kedoshim tihiyu
would seem sufficient to make us wary of performing a mitzvah haba'a
b'aveirah.  I find it hard to believe that neither the Shaarei Teshuva nor
R' Auerbach expressed reservations about having a fighting match to decide
who can perform a mitzvah.  And what of the sakanat nefesh inherent in such
a fight?

I realize that I'm being highly critical of major poskim, but in this case
the ma'aseh of the asirim is being brought to support the type of fighting,
primarily non-physical but also physical, which tragically occurs between
segments of k'lal Yisrael because of halachic differences.  Precisely
because of my views on halachic confrontations, I would never aggressively
fight over this issue, but I am prepared to speak out even against g'dolim
if they do injustice to Hashem's message and thereby preach that which I do
not believe is "eilu v'eilu", i.e. within the framework of Torah Judaism.
In saying that, I have answered Daniel Eidensohn's query.  The proper
response to situations where others seem to hold views which constitute a
threat to Yiddishkeit is option number five which unfortunately wasn't
offered as a choice.  Option five is to openly debate in a firm but
respectful style.

I remain hopeful that the Shaarei Teshuva and R' Auerbach have been
misquoted.  But if not, then perforce I must reject their opinions in the
matter of the two asirim.  And I certainly reject Daniel Eidensohn's opinion
that caustic fighting, free use of hachrama, and violence are generally
acceptable methods for dealing with severe halachic disagreements.


Robert Klein
Be'er Sheva, Israel

Joel Rich had the guts to bare his soul and describe an action in prayer that moves 
him. 

>Ok I'll bare my soul - walking to the shul door to greet the sabbath queen at 
>the end of Lcha Dodi - just about always puts me in touch with shabbat as 
>well as the  previous generations (from the Rav (JB Soloveitchik) to the 
>Kabbalists of zfat) 

The gemara (B"K 32: and Shbt 119.) describes two ways of welcoming the
Shabbat queen. R' Hanina went out to meet her while R' Yanai greeted her
when she came in.

Lekha Dodi commemorates both methods of greeting. The second stanza,"Likrat
Shabbat l'khu ve-nal'kha..." describes R' Hanina's action. The last stanza,
"Bo'i ve-shalom... bo'i khalla..." is according to R' Yanai.

It would appear more appropriate to go out to greet the Shabbat when saying
the second stanza and turn to greet her as she comes in from the west during
the last stanza.

To avoid the possibility of reducing JR's enjoyment, I offer the teirutz
that JR is following R' Yannai who, while he didn't go outside, did greet
the honored guest at the door as she entered..

Of course, this teirutz applies only to shuls with the entrance door on the
west, as we are told that the Shabbat comes from that direction.

In message , Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer
<sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu> writes
>On Mon, 2 Aug 1999, Kenneth G Miller wrote:
>
>> When he wrote "US" he did not mean the Avodah mailing list, nor the RCA
>But this too is not true! Ironically, the new Beis Din (based, however,
>only on EY - we in Chu"l do not count) could well overturn derashos based
>on the yud gimmel middos, but not takkanos d'rabbonon, unless, as someone,
>perhaps RCB, earlier pointed out - they are gadol b'chochmo u'b'minyon.
>And, as we know, that is an impossibility.

And yet, if, when the takana was passed, the people had been unable to
bear it, the takana would have fallen away (since we are on the subject
also of the takanos of Beis Shammai, look at how many of those we do
observe, and how many of those we don't! - shemen yisroel anyone?).
Similarly the Rambam and others stress the authority of the Talmud as we
know it as being due to its acceptance by klal yisroel (not just by the
gedolim in Eretz Yisroel - in which case I doubt very much it would have
been the Talmud Bavli that would have been dominant). Ditto is often
said about the Shulchan Aruch.

If anything, that we, meaning the whole of klal yisroel decide, is
relatively uncontraversial in relation to something that has not been
definitively poskened in an earlier generation.  For example, where
there was a maklokos between, say Rav Moshe and Rav SZ Auerbach on some
matter - in some cases you can already see that klal yisroel has
poskened one way or the other, although there may be a handful of hold
outs - usually close talmidim to one Rav or the other . In other cases
it may need a couple more generations to be sure (one can definitely say
this about electricity on shabbas).

Where the issue is much more contraversial, is where something was
definitively poskened in one generation, only to have a subsequent one
(or least in significant part) fail to follow it.  This is where the
dancing on shabbas question does have relevance.  The mishna (don't lets
talk about the gemarra, where it is possible that there might have been
divergence between Bavel and Eretz Yisroel), is perfectly clear - its
assur.  Ashkenazim were already doing it in Tosphos's time, and certain
signficant and legitimate segments have kept doing it.

Now the poskim are faced with a situation where frum yidden are doing
(or not doing) whatever it is and in response, have come up with an
explanation (whether it not being baki in musical instruments, or that
chazal's dancing isn't our dancing or whatever). 

Other examples of this are mayim achronim and not covering water/wine
(how many ashkenazim do you know who cover water/wine even in Eretz
Yisroel).  Also the times for davening of certain chassidim.
(I am deliberately picking examples that cannot fit into Rich Wolpoe's
independant mesorah line - eg the salt from s'dom is much more of an
eretz yisroel thing than Bavel, and we know that covering water was big
in Eretz Yisroel).

There is a certain view that explains this phenomenon (and you don't
have to agree with it, but as far as I know it is not heresy) by saying
that frummer yidden (by that I mean that portion of klal yisroel with
yiras shamayim) have a certain innate collective kedusha, and that if
they as a collective are doing, or not doing something, there *must* be
some legitimate justification (which a scholar of note will set
themselves to find and bring).  

My understanding of how the Conservative movement differs is that a)
they extend this to apply to people who clearly are not desirous of
having their actions accord with the will of heaven and b) it is a
process that can be led, eg by agitation. 

But while a gadol can and is entitled to lead, this "process" (for want
of a better word) is one in which by definition there are no leaders (an
individual who decided one day that he was going to dance on shabbas
contrary to the rest of klal yisroel - or for that matter agitate to
make dancing mutar, would indeed be a heretic - while an individual who
decided to follow Rav Moshe on point X may well be entitled to do so,
but he will not prevent the next individual from following some other
gadol on that point).  Hence, to the extent this process exists, its
application in a specific case can only be determined in hindsight.
However, a sense that one is a "voice in the wilderness" is possibly
the closest one can come to a sign that maybe this process is at work
and your views are on the wrong side of it. (However persuasive the
argument that electricity is mutar on shabbas, one certainly would feel
like a voice in the wilderness advocating it today - ditto for that
matter for people who find the position of the Chatam Sofer on umbrellas
more convincing than that of the Node B'Yehuda.  You might enjoy arguing
so as an intellectual exercise, but would you then carry your umbrella?)

It is in that sense of collective kedusha that I understood REDT's
statement.

>
>YGB
>

Kind Regards

Chana
-- 
Chana/Heather Luntz

"Stokar, Saul (MED)" wrote:

>         Thus while R. Eliezer (ben Hyracnus, Shamuti) sees the event in a
> positive light, R. Yehoshua sees it in a negative light. In fact, it is
> possible (and likely) that R. Eliezer's praise is for the decrees themselves
> (they overfilled the basket) rather than for the ensuing events. In any
> case, the redactor of the Yerushalmi saw the event in such a negative light
> that he compared it to the erection of the Golden Calf! In sum, I think this
> example proves the opposite of Rav Daniel's point. Indeed, the fact that R.
> Yehuda HaNasi chose to canonize in the Mishna the positive relationship
> between the two schools rather than the adversarial relationship shows us
> which model he wished us to emulate.

I found your comments very interesting - but I don't see how they are relevant
to the issue we were discussing. I had requested sources supporting the
contention  that Yiddishkeit  mandates that you should act respectfully to one
who you feel is damaging yiddishkeit. I had requested these sources because
blanket criticism had been made of gedolim who had been disrespectful of their
opponents. The response I received was that eilu v'eilu is the source of
requiring respect to be shown to your opponents - even when you feel they are
destructive. I responded that eilu v'eilu only shows that opposing positions
might both be legitimate but not that it mandates respect of opposing positions.
Furthermore I pointed out that the examples of eilu v'eilu that were brought to
support the thesis that Torah mandates respect - were themselves examples to the
contrary. The Maharshal while explaining eilu v'eilu obviously does not feel
constrained from being disrespectful to the ibn Ezra. Similarly the fact that
Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai treated each other respectfully in one halachic
issue - does not prove that there is a shitah that one *must* treat ones
opponents respectfully. This is obvious from the fact that they killed each
other during halachic disputes. My main support against a principle requiring
tolerance was not from these cases. It is from the historic reality that
disrespectful disputes are not rare and I assume that all these gedolim were
acting within the correct parameters of halacha. I was just demonstrating that
these "proofs" from eilu v'eilu did not support the idea of tolerating something
abhorrent.

Your comment that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi had poskened that disputes are to be
handled respectively because he reported a case where it happened and ignored
the case where it didn't happening- is interesting but rather forced. Could you
cite anybody who draws such a conclusion? A simpler explanation is that in this
one particular halachic issue Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai felt that the
situation could be controlled and thus it was not destructive. It in no way
provides a prescription for all disputes - especially in light of the undisputed
historical date to the contrary.

>          "If you read the whole Introduction you will find the Yam Shel
> Shlomo says some        not respectful words about the Rambam and especially
> the Ibn Ezra. This -    despite the fact that obviously knew about the
> concept of eilu v'eilu"
>
> I believe R. Daniel is referring to the R. Shlomo Luria's introduction to
> Yam Shel Shlomo on Baba Kamma. While the Maharshal indeed has some fairly
> harsh things to say about ibn Ezra, he still maintains a certain degree of
> respect for him (he refers to him with the honorific "Rav") and says "since
> he was a great Sage and one does not contradict the lion [after his death]".
> Note that he does not call for the burning of ibn Ezra's commentary on the
> Torah, despite his characterization of it as "aiding heretics, Sadducees and
> the weak of faith".

I don't think the Ibn Ezra would have viewed the Maharashal's comments as
respectful and they obviously were not intended to be. "The ibn Ezra was not a
talmid chachom (bal talmuda). Most of his commentary is based on science and
secular studies. His "chidushim"  in many places are against the words of the
Torah and Talmud - either because of carelessness or ignorance. Nevertheless he
still retains his status as a great chachom and we needn't bother to refute the
lion -  because his commentary not relevant [halacha l'maaseh] either for chiyuv
or patur not to assur and not for hetair. Because he is many times against the
halacha. even against the chachmei haMishna. And against the amoraim of the
talmud countless times. The truth that I have heard about him and that he
himself stated is that he didn't want to be constrained in his comments but
wanted to explain things to the extent a free mind could go without the
kabbala....even so I don't think he was right and I believe that is why he got
the judgment he did because he gave assistance to the heretics and those lacking
in proper faith..."

>         I am sure that no one disagrees that one may, indeed must, "fight
> for what is right". The question is, what means are legitimate in this
> fight? There is quite a distance between adamant opposition and book
> burning, excommunication and "informing".

Responding harshly doesn't mean that one drops the atom bomb every time. I don't
understand how you interpret the fact that there was no call to burn the ibn
Ezra's writngs that this shows that he was being respectful or at least one not
disrespectful?! I never said that book burning etc. is the norm.

In sum. Your comments that there are times when one must fight is consistent
with my position. It is unclear to me, however,  whether you agree that eilu
v'eilu is not a principle that mandates tolerance of positions that you find
destructive? You also failed to address my key assertion that we [as non
gedolim] must assume that gedolei haTorah act within the parameters of Torah in
their disputes unless informed to the contrary by other gedolei Torah.


                               Daniel Eidensohn

REC wrote:

+ACI-Sadly, after the boxing match had progressed a few rounds, the debate had
ratcheted up to a point
where, indeed, talk of emunah and kefirah were bandied about.+ACI-

I do not agree that it is sad if the emunah/kefirah words are +ACI-bandied
about+ACI- so long as the attribution is at least arguably in place.  It would
be intellectually dishonest as well as religiously questionable if
(especially in this forum) one believed a position held by another to
deviate from the normative, yet failed to point that out.

If you box, you may be bruised.  But if you forgot your shorts, it might
even be a kindness for someone to point that out to you.  Presumably, list
participants are sufficiently open-minded that they may actually change
their minds. (I concede: I don't recall that happening).

Finally, kudos to Reb Eli for pointing out the trop on te phrase in the
referenced subject and its consequences for +ACo-da ma le-hashiv, etc.+ACI-

Noach Witty

On Mon, 2 Aug 1999, Chana/Heather Luntz wrote:

> And yet, if, when the takana was passed, the people had been unable to
> bear it, the takana would have fallen away (since we are on the subject
> also of the takanos of Beis Shammai, look at how many of those we do
> observe, and how many of those we don't! - shemen yisroel anyone?). 
> Similarly the Rambam and others stress the authority of the Talmud as we
> know it as being due to its acceptance by klal yisroel (not just by the
> gedolim in Eretz Yisroel - in which case I doubt very much it would have
> been the Talmud Bavli that would have been dominant). Ditto is often
> said about the Shulchan Aruch. 
> 

The post I was responding to was one that brought up the issue of Chiddush
HaSemicha. That is contingent on EY only. You are discussing the issue of
"lo nispashta", that may well include CHU"L.

> If anything, that we, meaning the whole of klal yisroel decide, is
> relatively uncontraversial in relation to something that has not been
> definitively poskened in an earlier generation.  For example, where
> there was a maklokos between, say Rav Moshe and Rav SZ Auerbach on some
> matter - in some cases you can already see that klal yisroel has
> poskened one way or the other, although there may be a handful of hold
> outs - usually close talmidim to one Rav or the other . In other cases
> it may need a couple more generations to be sure (one can definitely say
> this about electricity on shabbas). 
> 

There is a essay on this topic (called "Mezuzos, Machlokos and Eilu
va'Eilu") available at the aishdas.org/baistefila website by yours truly. 
To be sure, this, and your further line of reasoning, is 100% correct, but
not precisely relevant to nidon didan. 

Firstly, it is not at all clear that R' Moshe's chiddush that clapping and
dancing may be permitted b'zman ha'zeh because there is a retroactive lo
nispashta works. I am not looking right now in the teshuva, but Tosafos is
readily learnt otherwise, and the Gr"o would likely disagree as well
(since the former needed to present a rationale for limiting a takkana and
the latter rejects this form of analysis regardless).

But, more importantly, the following line:

> It is in that sense of collective kedusha that I understood REDT's
> statement. 

Is most questionable when applied to theology (questionable is a
questionable term. "Wrong" is the term I would prefer). While, to be sure,
there are areas in which theological free choice is granted - and those
are most areas - there are core beliefs that are immutable. (There was an
essay in the Torah U'Madda Reader a few years ago that seemed intended to
prove otherwise, but in my view proved davka how little deviation there
really is from the Rambam's 13).

Am Yisroel tried mightily in the times of Bayis Rishon to wreak a "lo
nispashta" on some of that theology - they engaged en masse in Avodah Zara
- but to no avail. D'orysas are immovable obstacles. So, I have maintained
- without necessarily characterizing such as heresy, I might add - is the
principle, eloquently expressed today by RMBerger and others recently, far
better than I have written on such - of the integrity and authenticity of
Mesoras Chazal in matters concerning the historicity and accuracy of the
text and contents of the Torah. If that falls, it is not just undermining
a single d'rabonnon...

Of course, Torah he v'lilmod anu tzrichin. As RET noted today, there are
many kashyes - good ones. Ober alle vissen: "Fun a kashe shtarbt men
nisht" - this too can be another "tzorich iyun" if necessary. But, iif,
for example, R' Akiva Eiger would not overturn a Tosafos based on his
"tzorich iyun gadol", even on his "va'Hashem ya'ir einai", there is a
certain kal va'chomer to be made.

Agav urcha, I shamefacedly thank those who corrected me on the citation of
"kol koreh ba'midbar!" - and I believe that is in the haftara of Nachamu
that I myself lained!

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

>>
From: Kenneth G Miller <kennethgmiller@juno.com>
Subject: Re: 
In Avodah 3:143, Shlomo Godick shared a clip from Arutz Sheva:

<<< The younger Wagner, himself a student of music, said that Israelis
simply do not understand his great-grandfather, and that if they would
research the matter more, they would understand that even compositions
that sound purely artistic contain strong traces of Wagner's
strongly-held racist views." >>>

I believe Wagner is correct; amateurs such as myself do not understand
such things. Are there any music scholars on this list who might try to
teach us?

I can understand how pure music can evoke a very general *emotion*.
Nothing as specific as love or hate, but, for example, classical music
can evoke a feeling of calmness, while heavy metal causes a more frenzied
feeling. Without any accompanying words or imagery, how can pure music
"contain strong traces" of an *concept* as specific as racism?

Akivs Miller<<

FWIW I was freindly with 2 chazzonim both scholars of opera circa 1983.  One 
insisted that Wagner's music was intrinsically "full of death"; whhile the other
claimed he had undeniable talent and that some of the music was beautiful.

Similarly, a freind of mine was visiting a few months ago and I had an opera CD 
on, and it came to a pasage from Wagner.  He told me it was beautiful what was 
it?  I smiled sheepishly told him you really don't want to know, but he insisted
and I told him it was a Wagner overture.

Undoubtedly, there will be SOME people who will find Wagner's music 
initrinsically fascist while others will not.

Rich Wolpoe

>>
I have never pretended to be knowledgeable about my father's field. 
However, it seems to me that Rich's conclusion from my father's
e-mail is not warranted.  You cannot derive from Josephus what people
thought in Josephus' time.  As a matter of fact, my father just
published a book comparing Josephus' portraits of biblical figures
with chazal's statements; there are many, many differences!

Kol tuv,
Moshe<<

IMHO Josephus reported the more or less prevalent veiw of circa 70-100.

Chazal as we have it starts from Mishno (circa 200) Gemoror circa 500.

Chazal's opinions are binding NOW, but IMHO it's abit anachrnonistic at times to
super-impose them as being normative hundreds of years earlier.

This opninion IS debatable.  It is based upon several presumptions:
1) Josephus was more or less accurate and w/o too many axes to grind (except wrt
to the evetns surrounding his era)
2) That many opinions that Chazal took for granted later were still in flux 
during Joesphus's time.

I wish to clarify that Dr. Louis Feldman did NOT lead me to this conclusion, 
rather it was based upon the above suppositions and lectures I attend at BRGS.

Rich Wolpoe

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