Avodah Mailing List

Volume 02 : Number 183

Sunday, March 7 1999

• (no subject)
• Re: Avodah V2 #180
• Re: literal aggada
• Re: (no subject)
• Re: Denis Rodman- A model for Jewish Youth
• Segula
• Re: Rules of learning
• Re: Chazal are constitutive?
• Re: Rules of learning
• Women, minyan and megillah
• Chazal and Science
• Re: Chazal and Science
• Chazal

>>>My earlier posts allude to just who can override whom!
When I attend Ner Yisroel, I was very bothered how the Rishonim were held to
be 
virtually binding, while the Geonim were given quite short-shrift. <<<

R' Soloveitchik is reported to have remarked that R' Chayim knew had to learn
better than some of the geonim (referring to newly unearled geonic literature
- he didn't mean R' Hai or the Shiltos, so don't everyone jump!)  In a
nutshell, that's the answer. 

>>>does the observance of these mitzvos d'rabbonon correspond to some source
of
sanctity that was created by the Rabbis with their enactment, and does
there observance imply any theological or metaphysical benefit other than
the dogmatic observance of law? <<<

L'mai nafka minah? - All you have to do is obey, not ponder metaphysics.

-Chaim

In a message dated 3/5/99 2:21:51 PM Eastern Standard Time, EDTeitz@aol.com
writes:

<< History, however, are events that occured here on earth.  In those matters,
 there is a definite right and wrong, either the events happened when Chazal
 said so, or not.  Chazal recording incorrect dates, whether intentional or
 accidental, has nothing to do with their power to decide halacha. 
  >>

Actually, Eliyahu (oops...R' Teitz) any student of the second day of the
Battle of Gettysburg will tell you that there is very little right and wrong
in the study of history. In fact, as archeology, anthropology, and social
sciences evolve, we are learning that there is very little about the study of
history that is purely objective.

Jordan

In a message dated 3/5/99 2:27:27 PM Eastern Standard Time, EDTeitz@aol.com
writes:

<< Please tell me where the sefer is that has the listing of literal as
opposed
 to non-literal aggada.  I do not remember any disclaimer in BB that the
 following 2 pages are to be taken as highly amusing, but not literal stories,
 from which many interesting points can be gleaned.
  >>

I think when reading the Aggadita, it is possible to determine to some extent
based on context and content which stories the Gemara wanted us to view as
true and which as pure allegory.

Jordan

In a message dated 3/6/99 10:40:52 PM Eastern Standard Time, C1A1Brown@aol.com
writes:

<< >>>does the observance of these mitzvos d'rabbonon correspond to some
source
 of
 sanctity that was created by the Rabbis with their enactment, and does
 there observance imply any theological or metaphysical benefit other than
 the dogmatic observance of law? <<<
 
 L'mai nafka minah? - All you have to do is obey, not ponder metaphysics. >>

Well, the way in which a Rabbinic enactment  achieves metyphysical
significance to the point of having us recite the B'racha "Asher Kid'shanu
B'Mitzvosav" is of some theological significance. It is all well and good to
say that obedience is all we need to worry about, but observance of mitzvot is
more than that. 
Linking the power of Rabbanan to create mitvot to the divine will should
deepen our understanding of, and solidify our observance of, Mitzvot
D'rabbanan.

Jordan 

Jordan

In case you missed it, this past week's Parsha tells us that Jewish boys
wore earrings (Porku nizmei ha-zohov Asher bi-oznei Nisheichem BNEICHEM
Uvinoseichem...), and men wore jewelry! 

Any ho-oras
SAD
___________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com/getjuno.html
or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]

>I am reminded that I read in a sefer an intro written by the
>survivors/children of the author, that he had fallen ill and, in the 
>hopes of triggering the "known" segula for arichus yamim, prepared a 
>tzava-a (will). Alas, they record that it appeared not to be efficacious
in 
>the author's circumstance.
	I said segula,   not guarantee.   If every segula were 100% effective, 
we would have retrieved the "sefer refuos" whence Chizkiyahu hid it!

Gershon

___________________________________________________________________
You don't need to buy Internet access to use free Internet e-mail.
Get completely free e-mail from Juno at http://www.juno.com/getjuno.html
or call Juno at (800) 654-JUNO [654-5866]

Dear Listmembers,
Perhaps someone can help me with the following questions that came up
yesterday. Please feel  free to comment on either the question or the
assumptions.
I think it's generally accepted that a gzera shava must come through mesora(eg
see Rashi Psachim 66a). In a number of places the gemora discusses when a g's
can be logically challenged(not mufneh or only one side mufneh). This would
seem to contradict the mesora clause(ie if you had mesora than it shouldn't be
challengeable on a logical basis-unlike kal v'chomer). The answer that I had
been taught is that the mesora could have been that there was a g's between 2
words(eg kli) but not a mesora of which 2 inyanim where kli is written, or
that there was a mesora that there was a g's between 2 inyanim (eg metzora and
sota) but not which 2 words. Thus unless it was clear(eg mufneh from both
sides) the g's could be logically challenged.
(BTW I think this has implications for our earlier thread on what exactly
moshe 'knew')

My question is- has anyone ever analyzed throughout shas to see if there are a
fixed number of g's according to all man d'amars- for example - if Rav X
rejected a particular g's between 2 words or inyanim, does he always have a
substitute one elsewhere? If the answer I learned is correct, it would seem
this should be the case.

Question 2. The gemora sometimes(I think only when no other answer is
available) will say 'Milta d'atya Bkal vachomer, tarach v'katav la kra'. Any
insights as to why in some cases the tora would do this and others not?
Assumedly punishment might be one reason.

Kol Tuv
Joel Rich

Rather than get into semantic quibbles about the word "constitutive", let's
consider two different ways of thinking about chazal's authority:
1. Chazal's interpretations and extensions of the halakhah they receive is
authoritative by definition. The collective decision of klal yisrael to
choose to follow particular poskim may be rooted in general perceptions
about the breadth and depth of these poskim's knowledge in all relevant
areas (presumably including science and history, to the extent that these
are relevant). Nevertheless the authority of such poskim derives directly
from their having been broadly accepted and hence is independent of any
particular qualities they might have.
2. Chazal's interpretations and extensions of halakhah are authoritative
because chazal possess qualities (including knowledge of science and
history) that lead us to believe that their interpretations and extensions
correspond to some independently-defined notion of the "correct" halakhah.
Evidently, RYGB votes for #2, pointing out (I'm paraphrasing loosely) that
it has the virtue of positing some "holy" Shulchan Aruch in Shamayim as
opposed to #1 which seems to assume a halakhah which sort of unfolds on the
fly. But "alya vekotz bah". Because the only nafka mina lemaiseh between #1
and #2 is that somebody who feels that the evidence on certain historical
or scientific matters weighs in against the view of chazal -- and it should
be evident by now that there are many yirei shamayim and ehrlicher yiden on
this list who fit that description -- could continue to regard all of
chazal's halakhic conclusions as authoritative according to #1 but
(possibly) not according to #2. This property of view #2 is apparently what
prompted RYGB's somewhat ill-tempered broadside against RDG (this R
business is kind of cute, I've grown to like it), questioning -- even if
only rhetorically -- the basis for RDG's acceptance of the
authoritativeness of chazal's halakhic rulings. 
Perhaps the conclusion RYGB ought to draw from his own rhetorical question
is that #2 is a dangerous position and is best left unespoused.

-Moish Koppel



 

Joelirich@aol.com wrote:

> My question is- has anyone ever analyzed throughout shas to see if there are a
> fixed number of g's according to all man d'amars- for example - if Rav X
> rejected a particular g's between 2 words or inyanim, does he always have a
> substitute one elsewhere? If the answer I learned is correct, it would seem
> this should be the case.

The Chavas Yair (Mar Kashisha page 43-46 has an extensive discussion of the issue
of gezera shaveh. The explanation of the fixed numbers is that of Tosfos. Mar
Kashisha says Rashi could answer Tosfos' problem by simply saying that the
obligation to accept a gezerah shaveh was only that stated by one's rebbe. There
was no obligation to accept the validity of one stated by anyone else. Thus there
is no fixed number according to Rashi. He says another problem with Tosfos' answer
that there is a fixed number is the fact that there are gezera shaveh's between
verses in Torah and Neviim and sometimes Neviim to Kesuvim. Finally he notes that
it appears from Moed Katon 4a that one can actually make up gezera shaves as long
as it doesn't override a verse or go against a halacha. This is what he says
Tosfos notes in many places "that it is not a complete gezera shaveh".

Prof Yitzchok Gilat has an interesting article in his Studies in the Development
of the Halacha [Bar Ilan 1992) pages 365-373.

In sum, the answer of a fixed number of gezera shaveh's is a proposed answer by
Tosfos to explain the gemora - it is not an established principle. There are
alternative answers.

>
> Question 2. The gemora sometimes(I think only when no other answer is
> available) will say 'Milta d'atya Bkal vachomer, tarach v'katav la kra'. Any
> insights as to why in some cases the tora would do this and others not?
> Assumedly punishment might be one reason.

Rav Yitzchok Isaac Scher "Sichos Musar" vol II  (page 354) states "...It is a
clear thing that those things which are written openly in the peshuta shel mikra
are much more elevated and the obligation on the person is much greater than those
things which are learned from drash. Even though both are dvar Torah as we see in
Kerisus 5a 'a gezera shaveh should not be viewed lightly because the death penalty
can be learned from it'.  Nevertheless the obligation of something which is
learned from peshuta shel mikra is much greater than the obligation of something
which is learned from a drasha of Chazal.....we see also in the Rambam's
statements in Sefer haMitzvos (shoresh II) that the 613 Mitzvos are those that are
openly in the pshat of the verse and not those things which are learned from
medrash chochmim. Those that are learned from medrashim are called Divrei Sofrim
by the Rambam. They are not considered Rabbinic but are not considered as full
Torah Mitzvos either..."

The general rule is that the ultimate authority is an open verse in the Torah.
Next in order is something learned from the 13 Midos or a diyuk. Next are things
described as asmachtos. Thus a possible answer to your question is that the Torah
will provide redundancy in order to validate the general nature of drashos in
producing Torah laws. In addition that which was discovered by a drasha, or known
by mesora - Chazal made efforts to show that it is actually in the Torah to give
it the highest possible authority.


                                       Daniel Eidensohn

This past "shalashudis" I asked R' Chaim Davis, the Rosh Kollel of the Passaic
Community Kollel, a/k/a Beis Medrash LaTorah (although usually just called
"Rabbi Davis's") for his thoughts on the subject.

He feels that K'rias Megillah is composed of tzvei dinim: pirsumei nisah and
mechiyar Amaleik. While "af hein hayu b'oso haneis" means that women share in
the same chiyuv of pirsumei nisa, he wasn't as sure about the Amaleik issue.

Therefore, R' Davis would /not/ count women toward a minyan for the b'rachah
after megillah reading.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287        MMG"H for  7-Mar-99: Cohen, Vayakhel-Pekudei
micha@aishdas.org                                       A"H O"Ch 301:223-302:6
http://www.aishdas.org                                  Eruvin 46a
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.       Shmuel-II 14

I dug up old notes, I have no idea from when or who's class (or even if it
was a seifer I was learning) that shows that Chazal's cosmology was just that
of the non-Jewish scientists of their day.

In the days of Alexander (Tamid 31b), we believed that the world was flat.
That rules out the Ptolmeic universe. Notice also that R' Eliezer and R'
Yehushua both desbribe the flood (R"H 11b) as falling through the heaven onto
the earth. This is the same era in which we have the already quoted opinion
that the sun goes behind the sky at night (Pisachim 94b), and that the world
floats on the tehom, or is held above it by pillars (Chagigah 12b). The sky is
a lid that toughes, or almost touches, the earth at its edges (Chagiga 15a).
All in all, a flat earth, no orbits.

Rebbe (Pisachim 94b) championed the Chachamim over the non-Jewish sages
that the "galgal" (R' Avraham b' HaRambam, the Aruch: the sphere) is fixed,
and the "mazalos" (R' Avraham b' HaRambam: contellations, although the word
move. His proof: We never see the Wagon (the Big Dipper) in the south or
Scorpio in the north. So, by the end of the tannaim, we certainly believed
that the stars were embedded in a solid sphere. Ptolmey published the same
idea in Almagest, mid-2nd cent CE, a generation before.

R' Chiya, although a talmid of Rebbe's, didn't understand that when the
non-Jews said the sun went under the earth, it was in an orbit. The b'raisa
supports that idea because "pools are warm at night". So, he thought that
the sun were closer to the pools when it was under the earth, and not
that it was going in a full circle staying a constant (or near constant)
distance.

And, of course, we know how Rishonim consistantly understood the sun
standing still for Yehoshua. Ptolmeic. Once again, like the conservative side
of scientific thought of their contemporaries.


HOWEVER,

With the exception of computing the molad, I don't think the Gemara intended
to share scientific data. Interestingly, when discussing the molad (eg:
R's Gamliel I & II and R"H 10a, 11a), observations are described -- BUT NOT
THEORY! There's no discussion (that I found) of why the moon is new every
so many of chalakim, or why the "horns" of a new moon always point the same
direction.

LAD, the discussion of astronomy in the gemara is mashal -- they were trying
to explain some hashkafic concept using ideas floating around the surrounding
culture. They didn't intend the Gemara (or B'raisa) to be a science text.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287        MMG"H for  7-Mar-99: Cohen, Vayakhel-Pekudei
micha@aishdas.org                                       A"H O"Ch 301:223-302:6
http://www.aishdas.org                                  Eruvin 46a
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.       Shmuel-II 14

On Sun, 7 Mar 1999, Micha Berger wrote:

> 
> And, of course, we know how Rishonim consistantly understood the sun
> standing still for Yehoshua. Ptolmeic. Once again, like the conservative side
> of scientific thought of their contemporaries.

it should be noted that Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan uses this as a "proof" to the
truth
of the miracle. He reasons that anyone writing the story would never
suggest that the moon and sun would stop because of this very point, ie
people thought the sun revolved around the earth, so stop the sun not the
moon. However, we know that the earth spins around the sun , So Rabbi
Kaplan posits that the miracle was performed by Hashem stopping the
revolution of the Earth, naturally both the sun and moon stood
still--afterall the Earth stopped moving, and the miracle was faithfully
recorded in tanach. 


> HOWEVER,
> 
> With the exception of computing the molad, I don't think the Gemara intended
> to share scientific data. Interestingly, when discussing the molad (eg:
> R's Gamliel I & II and R"H 10a, 11a), observations are described -- BUT NOT
> THEORY! There's no discussion (that I found) of why the moon is new every
> so many of chalakim, or why the "horns" of a new moon always point the same
> direction.
> 
> LAD, the discussion of astronomy in the gemara is mashal -- they were trying
> to explain some hashkafic concept using ideas floating around the surrounding
> culture. They didn't intend the Gemara (or B'raisa) to be a science text.

In fact, the ramchal in his maamer haagados, writes this point explicitly.
He states that Chazal coded it's messages in the science of the times so
that the readers of that time would understand it. If Chazal wrote in the
1990's they'd code their lessons in the science of our times, which would
look equally archaic in one hundred-1500 years from now. Whether Chazal
knew science like we know it now is debatable, but probably irrelevant.
Chazal were more interested in the spiritual world not the physical world. 
They didn't need to know how the physical world worked because they
controlled things in the spiritual realm. It is only a function of our
galus/low spiritual level that we must spend our time understanding the
far more simple
physical world, and we can only dream of truly undersanding how things
really work. One last point concerning the world being round /flat.
Although there are sources which seem to say that chazal viewed the world
as being flat, it's also interesting to note that there is a Mishna in
Avodah Zara(I think the beg of the third perek) which describes an idol of
a man holding a ball, the gemara
describes this as a person who says he has the world in his hand(or he's
under the world) see tos
there who explicitly says that the world is round,although I always
use this as an answer to the question, menayin lmichael jordan min
hatorah?:)
Elie Ginsparg

> Date: Sun, 7 Mar 1999 02:00:39 EST
> From: TROMBAEDU@aol.com
> 
> Well, the way in which a Rabbinic enactment achieves metyphysical
> significance to the point of having us recite the B'racha "Asher
> Kid'shanu B'Mitzvosav" is of some theological significance. It is all
> well and good to say that obedience is all we need to worry about, but
> observance of mitzvot is more than that. Linking the power of Rabbanan
> to create mitvot to the divine will should deepen our understanding of,
> and solidify our observance of, Mitzvot D'rabbanan. 
> 
> Jordan 
>

Thanks, RJH, for stating my viewpoint succinctly. My brother-in-law's
position on d'rabbanan's seems vaguely to resemble Moses Mendelsohn's
opinion on mitzvos: They have no special qualities necessarily, but we are
bound by them regardless. See below.
 
> 
> Date: Sun, 07 Mar 1999 19:21:48 +0200
> From: Moshe Koppel <koppel@netvision.net.il>
> Subject: Re: Chazal are constitutive?
> 
> Rather than get into semantic quibbles about the word "constitutive",
> let's consider two different ways of thinking about chazal's authority: 
> 1. Chazal's interpretations and extensions of the halakhah they receive
> is authoritative by definition. The collective decision of klal yisrael
> to choose to follow particular poskim may be rooted in general
> perceptions about the breadth and depth of these poskim's knowledge in
> all relevant areas (presumably including science and history, to the
> extent that these are relevant). Nevertheless the authority of such
> poskim derives directly from their having been broadly accepted and
> hence is independent of any particular qualities they might have.  2.

Is that all?

That, again, sounds Mendelsohnian. What about "sod Hashem l'yerei'av" and
"rishonim k'malachim," etc.?

> Chazal's interpretations and extensions of halakhah are authoritative
> because chazal possess qualities (including knowledge of science and
> history) that lead us to believe that their interpretations and
> extensions correspond to some independently-defined notion of the
> "correct" halakhah.  Evidently, RYGB votes for #2, pointing out (I'm
> paraphrasing loosely) that it has the virtue of positing some "holy"
> Shulchan Aruch in Shamayim as opposed to #1 which seems to assume a
> halakhah which sort of unfolds on the fly. But "alya vekotz bah".

Again, it seems you do not agree to #2. If so, then, yes, constitutive
means what I thought it does, no? So, how do you understand AKBV on
d'rabbonon's?

> Because the only nafka mina lemaiseh between #1 and #2 is that somebody
> who feels that the evidence on certain historical or scientific matters
> weighs in against the view of chazal -- and it should be evident by now
> that there are many yirei shamayim and ehrlicher yiden on this list who
> fit that description -- could continue to regard all of chazal's
> halakhic conclusions as authoritative according to #1 but (possibly) not
> according to #2. This property of view #2 is apparently what prompted
> RYGB's somewhat ill-tempered broadside against RDG (this R business is

Ill tempered?! C"V!

> kind of cute, I've grown to like it), questioning -- even if only
> rhetorically -- the basis for RDG's acceptance of the authoritativeness
> of chazal's halakhic rulings.  Perhaps the conclusion RYGB ought to draw
> from his own rhetorical question is that #2 is a dangerous position and
> is best left unespoused. 
> 

Still don't see why! (Let me say that I see #2 as an enhancement of #1,
not two distinct perspectives.)

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]