Avodah Mailing List

Volume 02 : Number 159

Tuesday, February 9 1999

• Re: Pisuk raglaim
• missing data and palms
• Kol isha
• Re: t'filla b'tzibbur and chazoras ha'SHaTZ
• Siyyum Mishnayos
• Negio
• (no subject)
• Re: t'filla b'tzibbur and chazoras ha'SHaTZ
• Saying Amido with Shatz
• Fruit of the forbidden tree
• Hair Covering -- Not necessarily the same as ervah
• Re: Pisuk raglaim
• Re: (no subject)
• Re: Fruit of the forbidden tree
• Re: [Fwd: Re: Halachic Man]
• Re: Hair Covering -- Not necessarily the same as ervah
• Re: missing data and palms
• RE: Synthesis and R. Soloveitchik (the Rav)

On Mon, 8 Feb 1999, Gershon Dubin wrote:

> >because pisuk raglayim is not tzanu'a even for men
> 	As they have taken to saying on this list, zu minayin lach?  Rashi
> mentions it for women.
> 
> Gershon
I must be missing something in this discussion because we learn the
problem of pisuk raglayim from the ramp on the mizbeach, and here we are
definitly dealing with men, by the way, what Rashi are you referring to?
Elie Ginsparg

1.  Here's the solution I gave to the missing data problem.  I started,
like our listowner, by asserting that the Chumash plus the 13 middoth
should give virtually all halachah (only instead of the Malbim I cited
the Rambam's hakdamah to peirush hamishnayoth).  Virtually because of
the halacha-l'moshe-misinai problem.
  I then continued by extrapolating from Rabbi Bloch fils' introduction
to Rabbi Bloch pere's Shiurei Daath.  He says there that to every thing
in each world corresponds something in each other world, but that the
Torah is the blueprint of everything.  I suggested that the halachoth
which are explicit in chumash are there because they represent things of
particular importance in olamos haelyonim.
  As an example we started the first sugya in Zohar parshas Mishpatim
(and ran out of time very quickly).

2.  The palms are in H. Deoth 5:9.  I cited it to Rabbi Bechhofer in an
amusing circumstance.  A speaker at Skokie Yeshiva asserted that, if any
ben yeshiva violated any halacha in that perek, he deserves capital
punishment (the Rambam himself applies them only to talmidei chachamim -
I'm not - and fails to mention capital punishment).  I mentioned to
Rabbi B after the speech that, because of the Rambam's opinion about
palms, the only person in the room (including the speaker) who was safe
from dying was Elie Ginsparg.
  Incidentally, this vindicates the holy words of the Babylonian Talmud
that nowadays fools like me can become prophets.  As far as I know Elie
is still alive.

David Riceman

Joke alert (just received this email:
The question was, can a frum man go to the opera? 
Answer: You are not "over" until the fat lady sings. <g>

Rich W.

In response to R. Michael Poppers query:

Yehivos Ner Yirsroel and Yitzchok Elchonon regularly davened mincho with a 
"heicho kedusho".  R. Parness at YU had a full chazoras hashsatz.

Artus corp. has a heicho kedusho

At our IBI minyan, I suggested a heicho kedusho.  Why?  Mostly because the 
problem with insuring 9 "shom'im".  A Heicho kedusho does not require the wait 
for 9 people to finish and listen to Chazoras haShatz.  I also suggest that when
we start late (say more than 5 mintues), we do heicho kedusho so as not to abuse
the time.

WRT to HOW to do a "heicho kedusho" I've seen 2 models.

Model #1 the shatz alone begins and davens thru ho'kel hkadosh and then everyone
starts from teh beginning. 

Model #2.  The tzibbur says silently along with the chazzon thru the end of 
kedusho.

One sevoro for heicho kedusho is that mincho minyonim at work, or in the "shiur"
room are ad hoc minyonim and not ke'vuo the way they are in a shul or BM. In 
regular shuls, the only heicho kedushos I've seen are when the minyan starts 
late - and they might miss the zman, etc.

WRT to those who say silently with a chazzan - such as late comers, etc. - we 
recently discussed in shul whether (Nusach Ashkenaz) the private davenrers 
should say ledor vodor or v'ato kadosh.  I don't think it's me'akeiv either way,
but I am not clear which way to go.  I am noteh to say v'ato kadosh even though 
the shatz is saying ledor vodor.  Comments welcome.

On a tangent, R. S. Shwab regularly held a minyan in his apt. due to his 
arthritis;  Nevertheless, he insisted that they NOT say Magen Avos Friday Night 
because it was not a "full-fledged" minyan...

I hope this helps.
Rich Wolpoe 

A nearby Orthodox Shul annually signs up members to learn 1 or more masechtos 
Mishnayos; and they conduct a siyyum based on the collective completion of shas.

I noticed that one masechto was "taken" exclusively by a female member.

Any comments WRT the propriety of being mitztaref her learning to the siyyum? 

Rich Wolpoe

benogeio lenegio <PUN> Michael Broyde writes:
>> Thus, in our society, there is no such thing as social kissing.  When a law
professor kisses students "hello," he or she gets fired.  That is not true for 
hand shaking, which I think is mayikar hadin mutar. <<

What about kissing hands <smile>
Rich Wolpoe

In response to the "challenge" below, I was informed of the following.

"This section originally appeared in
Ha-Maayan when R. Weinberg's essay on hair covering was
published. For some reason it was not reprinted in Seride Esh."


Ari





>I think, in light of recent questionable publications of the
Seridei Eish's
>letters, we need to know:
>
>1. To whom and when was this letter written.
>2. Did he intend that it be published.
>3. Did the person who published it do so with permission.
>
>For the moment, I will not question the Hashkofo expressed by
the SE, but
>whether, in light of the above questions, it can be introduced
into
>evidence...
>
>> On Mon, 8 Feb 1999 meir_shinnar@smtplink.mssm.edu wrote:
>>
>> > In the recent volume of writings of Rav Yehiel Weinberg,
there is an
>> > interesting letter about hair covering relevant to the
recent
>
>YGB
>
>Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
>Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
>ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila
>

In a message dated 2/8/99 5:05:49 PM Eastern Standard Time,
MPoppers@kayescholer.com writes:

<< 
 General comments are welcome, but I bring all this up as a prelude to
 wondering if the quoted shiur practice occurred only because Rav
 Soloveitchik wanted to return to learning ASAP, as a "half/k'dushah"
 approach to minchah might essentially (issues of b'rochos l'vato'loh aside)
 be considered no worse than davening bi'chidus.
 
 Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ
 (and member of MIS staff at Kaye, Scholer, et al., LLP)
 
  >>
Dear Michael,
     My uninformed guess is that the Rav's approach was based not on the
lesser value of prayer but on the greater value of learning which, as has
already been noted,  especially in his earlier years  led him to daven
byichidus when the priority of learning , in his eyes, demanded this response.
I don't think anyone would argue that in the abstract tfila btzibur is a
worthwhile thing(especially if you want to increase the probability of having
your prayers answered-which goes back to how much does one really believe in
the efficacy of prayer). As is usually the case, the hard questions come when
you have competing goods- eg prayer and learning. Then each of us, or each
minyan as the case may be, has to decide its relative values.
     There's no doubt in my mind that the Rav's decision was right for him(I'm
sure he would appreciate my haskama:-)) OTOH I have been at minyanim where a
'half' kedusha was made so that the participants could get back to the
smorgasbord.  WRT work minyanim I guess each one is making a similar value
judgment of work or lunch or learning versus tfila [or perhaps in order to
attract more participants(kiruv?)]
     I think one of the challenges here is similar to learning during chazarat
hashatz- even though an argument can be made that its OK, what message does it
send to the hamon am? I would argue that in many cases the message is not that
learning and tfila are high priorities and one who has high priorities for
learning can learn during chazarat hashatz or make a 'half' kedusha , but
rather that chazarat hashatz does not require our attention and each
individual can decide what to do during that time .
  
Kol Tuv,
Joel Rich

Michael Poppers wrote: >>Rav Aharon Lichtenstein sh'l'y't'ah so paskened we 
should daven; moreover, it is said that Rav Soloveitchik emphasized the 
Maimonidean point of t'fillah *b'*tzibbur, which is accomplished far better by 
all members saying the Amidah together.<<

There is a minhag when one has come late to daven one's private Amido along with
the Shatz.  Question: What is the origin of this minhog?  IOW which poseik FIRTS
suggested it?

Regards,
Rich Wolpoe

Rav Bechhofer wrote


>I think, in light of recent questionable publicationsof the Seridei Eish's
>letters, we need to know:

>1. To whom and when was this letter written.
>2. Did he intend that it be published.
>3. Did the person who published it do so with permission.

>For the moment, I will not question the Hashkofo expressed by the SE, but
>whether, in light of the above questions, it can be introduced into
>evidence...

This post raises other problems independent of the hair covering issue

Rav Bechhofer is intimating that the person who published it may have published
a private letter  without permission, and even against Rav Weinberg's wishes, a
serious accusation.  Even if this is true, what is the problem with using, once
available, the havat da'at of one of gdolei haposkim about the rationale for a
mitzva?  Any sources about why we can't use this?  Is there a "fruit of the
forbidden tree" doctrine in halachic (and meta halachic) discussions that would
ban this evidence?  

  My understanding is that  many collections of tshuvot were gathered
posthumously by descendants or talmidim from the people to whom they were sent,
without any evidence that the rav who gave the tshuvot agreed to public
dissemination of every tshuva.  On the list, many people cite conversations they
have had with their rabbeim in the past.  In each of these instances, it is
quite possible that the written tshuva or oral conversation may not have
accurately reflected the true position of the rav, but be formulated for the
specific recipient, a criticism that sems implicit in Rav Bechhofer's criteria. 
Do we always ask whether specific permission was given to cite them?  I
understand that a posek may give a private psak that he does not wish to be
publicized.  However,  there is nothing in the letter of a private nature, or
which suggests that he views this position as controversial.  He views his
explanation is simple pshat.  Are there any sources about why this can't be
introduced into evidence, if not in bet din, at least in avoda??  



Meir Shinnar

In our discussion of hair covering, I took the position that one cannot
compare a sheitel to a dress, noting that a form fitting dress would be
prohibited, but a form fitting hat would not.

RYGB wrote:
>I am disappointed in my usually erudite friend, R' Eli! I will be dan
>l'kaf zechus, that writing midday has its limitations. But, in fact, the
>Poskim - including the MB - who rule that shok includes the area of the
>calf beneath the knee - still, overwhelmingly - permit form fitting
>stockings as a valid form of covering for that region of the body

RYGB quotees an "alert reader" who notes that the Mishnah Berurah
defines the shok as the area above the knee.  RYGB gracefully
acknowledged the correction.

>MB and CA are the lone mattirim. The AH, SA haRav,
>Chazon Ish and most others are machmir among the Acharonim. See Nishmas
>Avraham 75:3 for a list. Sorry!

See the Peri Megadim (OH 75:1) who is also matir and who seems to be the
source of the Mishnah Berurah.  The Hazon Ish (OH 15:8) is unclear.
First he writes that the shok must be the calf, because the thigh "lo
tzarikh le-hashmi'a."  But he concedes that this would prohibit a women
to walk barefoot, because a bit of calf would surely show.  Therefore,
he writes, "nir'eh she-shok ha-muzkar kan, hayenu shok she-etzel
ha-yerekh" like the Peri Megadim.  He concludes: "Kasheh le-hakhri'a
ba-davar."

RYGB also writes:

>I think flesh colored stockings are approved for beneath the knee.

I think that this make more sense according to those who hold the shok
ends at the knee.  The general rule for is that a transparent barrier is
disregarded when it comes to ervah.  See Berakhot 25b, Rashi s.v.
be-ashashit.  R. Ovadya rejects transparent stockings in Yabbia Omer VI,
YD 14:1.  But see below.

But the main issue is hair covering.  RYGB defends sheitlach by arguing
that women's hair, like the calf are "technical ervah."

>Clearly the enticing nature of hair does not change mystically from before
>to after the Chuppa.Therefore, Ervah here is not a term of allurement at all.

>The halacha of hair
>covering is no more stringent than the halacha of the calf beneath the
>knee - (which is not why a bathing cap would be considered ample covering,
>but the analogy sure is tempting!). If anything it is less stringent, as
>it applies not at all to besulos, while gilui shok does.

>These are technical "ervos."
>They are not necessarily me'orer ta'ava, but it is considered - d'orysa or
>d'rabbanan - proper for a woman to cover everything but her hands, feet
>and face, and, for married women, also her hair.

Having reviewed the mekorot a bit last night, I would like to disagree,
in part.  I think that the issue is not what is a technical ervah.
Moreover, I think that Halakhah assumes that ervah is intrinsically
related to hirhur.  In fact, it seems that, fundamentally, one should
not compare married women's hair covering to shok, because they are
fundamentally different halakhot.  However, this is now the subject of a
mahloket Aharonim.

As RYGB writes, shok is a din of ervah.  Similarly, the Gemara says that
se'ar be-ishah ervah.  But this is not a reference to married women; it
is a reference to all women.  Indeed, the din of shok, se'ar and kol
ishah all seem to apply equally to all women and all arise in the Gemara
in the context of keriat shema.  (By all women I mean all women who are
old enough to arouse hirhur.  See Hazon Ish OH 16:8.)
Now, Rambam viewed the din of kol and se'ar as extending beyond the
context of keriat shema to the general issur of histaklut, and that's
how the Shulhan Arukh rules.  In sum, we have a general rule prohibiting
histaklut be-ervah (intentionally), and a rule prohibiting reciting
keriat shema in front of ervah (even if he is not mitkavven; see Bah to
OH 75.)

Now, as the Shulhan Arukh notes, we are not makpid with respect to the
hair of a betulah  -- for keriat shema.  This is because "darkan
lalekhet peru'ot rosh."  The same rule applies to the bangs of a
nesu'ah.  This reflects that the categorization of hair as ervah depends
on whether it is normally covered.  I believe this is based on the view
of Ra'avayah, who writes that there is no hirhur with respect to hair
that is normally uncovered.  The same rule would presumably apply to
shok, which would explain how someone who considers the calf to be the
shok would permit stockings.  (Kol, of course, is not subject to
different degrees of kisui.)  But we see that the definition of ervah is
intrinsically tied to hirhur.

In contrast, the rule of peri'at rosh seems to have nothing to do with
ervah (or hirhur).  First, as is well known, the mishnah categorizes it
as dat Yehudit.  In other words, this is a rule adopted by Jewish women,
as opposed to the rules of ervah.  Secondly, the din is learned from the
pasuk in Bamidbar, whereas the din of se'ar be-ishah ervah is derived
from Shir ha-Shirim.  (This distinction is noted by R. Moshe, see
Iggerot Moshe I OH 42.)  Thirdly, on its face the rule applies only in
the shuk.  Fourthly, except for a handful of posekim, we view the
obligation of kisui rosh as objective, not dependent on the societal
norms like ervah.

It seems, however, that according to some posekim, the practice of kisui
rosh by married women transforms the hair of married women into ervah.
See Mishnah Berurah OH 75:10.  For this reason, they rule that it is
forbidden today to recite keriat shema in front of a married woman with
uncovered hair.  For these authorities, a married woman's hair is just
as much ervah as the shok, s both can arouse hirhur.

In contrast, the well-known Arukh ha-Shulhan and R. Moshe (ibid) hold
that the practice of married women not to cover their hair means that it
is not ervah and one can recite keriat shema in front of them.
According to these authorities, there remains a prohibition of peri'at
rosh for married women, even though married women's hair today is not
ervah.  On this view, we cannot compare the rules regarding shok to the
rules of kisui rosh for married women.

Side issues: A related question arises regarding non-Jewish married
women: if the practice of kisui rosh by Jewish women transforms their
hair into ervah, does this apply to the hair of non-Jewish women as well
for keriat shema purposes?

Apparent setirah: R. Moshe's teshuvah regarding keriat shema indicates
that married women's hair does not have a din of makom mekhuseh.  But he
requires a married woman to cover her hair in her home in the presence
of other men because her hair is a makom mekhuseh.  Mi-mah nafshakh?

In a message dated 2/9/99 10:09:05 AM EST, R'  E.G. writes:

> I must be missing something in this discussion because we learn the
>  problem of pisuk raglayim from the ramp on the mizbeach, and here we are
>  definitly dealing with men, by the way, what Rashi are you referring to?
>  

I assume he is referring to Rashi in Psochim 3a Loshon Nkiyoh, by the ramp the
issue is not Pisuk Raglayim rather Harchovas Hapsios, a Kapote would not have
helped.

Kol Tuv

Yitzchok Zirkind

On Tue, 9 Feb 1999, Ari Z. Zivotofsky wrote:

> In response to the "challenge" below, I was informed of the following.
> 
> "This section originally appeared in
> Ha-Maayan when R. Weinberg's essay on hair covering was
> published. For some reason it was not reprinted in Seride Esh."
> 
> 
> Ari

Could we please get a date and volume so we can look up the "HaMa'ayan" if
necessary?

Now that it would seem that this letter is not "forbidden fruit" as R'
Meir aptly put it, let me state that I never had any qualms about the SE's
hashkofo as expressed - but reiterate that we are dealing in the halachic
plane.

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

On Tue, 9 Feb 1999 meir_shinnar@smtplink.mssm.edu wrote:

 
> Rav Bechhofer is intimating that the person who published it may have

Not intimating. Asking.

> published a private letter without permission, and even against Rav
> Weinberg's wishes, a serious accusation.  Even if this is true, what is
> the problem with using, once available, the havat da'at of one of gdolei
> haposkim about the rationale for a mitzva?  Any sources about why we
> can't use this?  Is there a "fruit of the forbidden tree" doctrine in
> halachic (and meta halachic) discussions that would ban this evidence? 
> 

Certainly. Anything he did not publish or give permission to publish may
represent a POV not considered sufficiently - subject potentially to
ultimate rejection, if later reconsidered.

>   My understanding is that many collections of tshuvot were gathered
> posthumously by descendants or talmidim from the people to whom they
> were sent, without any evidence that the rav who gave the tshuvot agreed
> to public dissemination of every tshuva.  On the list, many people cite

Teshuvos are usually written with an eye to publish, letters are not. No
umdena.

> conversations they have had with their rabbeim in the past.  In each of
> these instances, it is quite possible that the written tshuva or oral
> conversation may not have accurately reflected the true position of the
> rav, but be formulated for the specific recipient, a criticism that sems
> implicit in Rav Bechhofer's criteria. Do we always ask whether specific
> permission was given to cite them?  I understand that a posek may give a

If they contain controversial opinions and chiddushim - one would think
so.

> private psak that he does not wish to be publicized.  However, there is
> nothing in the letter of a private nature, or which suggests that he
> views this position as controversial.  He views his explanation is
> simple pshat.  Are there any sources about why this can't be introduced
> into evidence, if not in bet din, at least in avoda??

Common sense. And, possibly Cherem d'Rabbeinu Gershom. R' Chaim David
Halevi - somewhere in his multi-volume "Asei Lecha Rav" - "bleibs shverr"
if CDRG applies post mortem.
 
> 
> 
> 
> Meir Shinnar
> 
> 
> 

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

In a message dated 2/8/99 6:01:11 PM EST, sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu writes:

> It is very likely that RYBS copied the concept from Tanya to a Brisker
>  perspective, no?
>  
I thought so too!

Kol Tuv

Yitzchok Zirkind

Ah! The long-awaited erudition!

On Tue, 9 Feb 1999, Clark, Eli wrote:


> See the Peri Megadim (OH 75:1) who is also matir and who seems to be the
> source of the Mishnah Berurah.  The Hazon Ish (OH 15:8) is unclear. 
> First he writes that the shok must be the calf, because the thigh "lo
> tzarikh le-hashmi'a."  But he concedes that this would prohibit a women
> to walk barefoot, because a bit of calf would surely show.  Therefore,
> he writes, "nir'eh she-shok ha-muzkar kan, hayenu shok she-etzel
> ha-yerekh" like the Peri Megadim.  He concludes: "Kasheh le-hakhri'a
> ba-davar." 
> 

Appreciate the further corrections!

> RYGB also writes:
> 
> >I think flesh colored stockings are approved for beneath the knee.
> 
> I think that this make more sense according to those who hold the shok
> ends at the knee.  The general rule for is that a transparent barrier is
> disregarded when it comes to ervah.  See Berakhot 25b, Rashi s.v.
> be-ashashit.  R. Ovadya rejects transparent stockings in Yabbia Omer VI,
> YD 14:1.  But see below.
>

I did not mean sheer stockings! I understood "flesh-colored" as colored!

 

> In contrast, the rule of peri'at rosh seems to have nothing to do with
> ervah (or hirhur).  First, as is well known, the mishnah categorizes it
> as dat Yehudit.  In other words, this is a rule adopted by Jewish women,
> as opposed to the rules of ervah.  Secondly, the din is learned from the
> pasuk in Bamidbar, whereas the din of se'ar be-ishah ervah is derived
> from Shir ha-Shirim.  (This distinction is noted by R. Moshe, see
> Iggerot Moshe I OH 42.)  Thirdly, on its face the rule applies only in
> the shuk.  Fourthly, except for a handful of posekim, we view the
> obligation of kisui rosh as objective, not dependent on the societal
> norms like ervah. 
> 

So far, I see no defecit in sheitels from this perspective.

> It seems, however, that according to some posekim, the practice of kisui
> rosh by married women transforms the hair of married women into ervah. 
> See Mishnah Berurah OH 75:10.  For this reason, they rule that it is
> forbidden today to recite keriat shema in front of a married woman with
> uncovered hair.  For these authorities, a married woman's hair is just
> as much ervah as the shok, s both can arouse hirhur. 
> 

I cannot see any deficit in sheitels from this perspective either - unless
they arouse hirhur. In that case, we should also forbid a man from saying
keri'as shma in front of any beautiful woman who may provoke hirhur, even
fully dressed.

> In contrast, the well-known Arukh ha-Shulhan and R. Moshe (ibid) hold
> that the practice of married women not to cover their hair means that it
> is not ervah and one can recite keriat shema in front of them. 
> According to these authorities, there remains a prohibition of peri'at
> rosh for married women, even though married women's hair today is not
> ervah.  On this view, we cannot compare the rules regarding shok to the
> rules of kisui rosh for married women. 
> 

Which would certainly not cast aspersions on sheitels.

I wish to clarify that I am well aware of Poskim who forbid sheitels or
frown on them, but personally, I believe it is not a kulla to wear a
sheitel, although it may be a legitimate chumra not to wear one.

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

On Tue, 28 Aug 1956, David Riceman wrote:
> 2.  The palms are in H. Deoth 5:9.  I cited it to Rabbi Bechhofer in an
> amusing circumstance.  A speaker at Skokie Yeshiva asserted that, if any
> ben yeshiva violated any halacha in that perek, he deserves capital
> punishment (the Rambam himself applies them only to talmidei chachamim -
> I'm not - and fails to mention capital punishment).  I mentioned to
> Rabbi B after the speech that, because of the Rambam's opinion about
> palms, the only person in the room (including the speaker) who was safe
> from dying was Elie Ginsparg.
>   Incidentally, this vindicates the holy words of the Babylonian Talmud
> that nowadays fools like me can become prophets.  As far as I know Elie
> is still alive.
> 
> David Riceman

I remember the speech vaguely however I can't remember who the speaker
was, can you remind me (even privetly, because if I ever see him I can ask
where his mkor for capital punishment comes from) Furthermore, as it has
become less socially acceptable for me to wear sweaters which I would
pull the sleeves over my hands,(I teach so I find myself wearing a suit
jacket more often) I want to know if I can be somech on the
fact that the halacha doesn't apply to non Talmedei Chachamim. Also, why
was I the only safe one, I remember you also wearing a sweater which
covered your palms.
Elie Ginsparg 

Chaim Brown writes:

>(1) Can you please elaborate on why Kant brings to mind the notion of
>synthesis?  (2) Why do you assume the Rav was a Hegelian - I cannot recall
>offhand any explicit references to Hegel.  (3) The word synthesis has meaning
>even to those who have never read Hegel.  Is there any evidence you have that
>the Rav was uncomfortable using the word because of its specific meaning
>within Hegelian jargon?  Perhaps there were any number of other reasons the
>Rav didn't address the topic or use the term.

From L. Kaplan's translation of Ish ha-Halakhah:

"There is much truth to the fundamental contention set forth by the
dialectical philosophies of Heraclitus and Hegel with regard to the
ongoing course of existence in general and the views of Kierkegaard,
Karl Barth and Rudolf Otto with regard to religious consciousness and
its embodiment in the experience of homo religiosus."

Given that the Rav did read Hegel, I consider it likely that he would be
sensitive to the meaning of "synthesis" in the Hegelian sense,
especially when discussing a philosophical issue.  Nevertheless, it is
clear that the Rav himself felt closer to Kierkegaard than Hegel in his
view of the dialectical nature of man.

It is pointless to speculate why the Rav did or did not use a particular
term.  As it happens, he never addressed the issue of Torah u-Madda per
se, whether with the word "synthesis"  or without it.  I would venture
to explain this silence as follows: the issue was really of no interest
to him.  It seems he never expressed or harbored any doubts about his
decision to study secular subjects; this is somewhat surprising given
the departure it represented from his father and grandfather's derekh.
But it seems he viewed secular study as a natural part of life in the
modern world

For what it is worth, my rebbe R. Lichtenstein, the Rav's son-in-law,
dislikes the term "synthesis" and has stated so publicly.

Kol tuv,

Eli Clark 

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