Avodah Mailing List

Volume 02 : Number 014

Thursday, October 8 1998

• Re: mesorah-Multivariate analysis
• t'fillin and chuma
• t'cheyles and mesora
• RE: Panim Hadashot (yes, more) and public policy
• Re: mesorah-Multivariate analysis
• Re: mesorah-Multivariate analysis
• Re: mesorah-Multivariate analysis
• Ponim Chadashos
• Re: inappropriate statement
• Shaving on the Intermediate Days of the Festivals

My question (I think) still stands: do we indeed have a "negative mesorah" on
chagavim or do we simply lack a positive mesorah.

Ari




Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer wrote:

>
>
> I thank R' Ari Z for the good example of Chagavim of something on which we
> have a negative mesora, and think it fits my perspective well!
>
> YGB
>
>

<< I happen to put on Tefillin based upon my family Minhig.  I wonder 
     about those who drop therir family minhog in favor of a shito they 
     learn (EG goingt to Eretz Yosroel).  I don't see the logic of being 
     meikil in this case.  UNLESS, refraining from Tefillin is itself some 
     kind of chjmro (kovod Yomtov)?
>>

The idea of not putting on t'fillin in Eretz Yisrael has to do with minhag ha-
makom and al tifrosh min ha-tzibur.  The minhag of EY is to NOT put on
t'fillin.  Therefore one is not permitted to don them in public.  

During my years of study there, my father informed me of what his father told
him.  Daven without t'fillin, and then back at home go into a room alone and
put them on for sh'ma.

<<
Question: 
     who first decided machines were ok for tsitisis?  The answer to that 
     might hold an indirect key to viewing the advent of techeiles bizom 
     hazeh.  That is to say, machines at one time had no mesora either.
>>

There is a difference between starting a NEW mesora and trying to reinvent a
lost one.

<<
The next issue might be tefillin derabbeinu Tam.  A colleague at work 
     insists they are a chiyuv.  al pi his minhog, they might be.  Al pi my 
     minhog they might not.
>>

The GR"A, it is told, remarked when asked about R. Tam's t'fillin, "And what
of the other shittos?"  He calculated that there are, I think, 8 independent
shittos relating to t'fillin, necessitating many pairs of t'fillin to satisfy
all possibly permutations.  Why chose one over all the others?

Eliyahu Teitz

On Thu, 8 Oct 1998, Clark, Eli wrote:

> I agree!  Whether public policy militates in favor of shev ve-al
> ta`aseh, however, depends upon whom you ask.  Clearly, R. Sternbuch
> feels it does.  On the other hand, Joel Wolowelsky is fond of quoting a
> statement of R. Ahron Soloveichik, in which he argues that if we forbid
> women from doing that which is permitted, we will surely drive them away
> from frumkeit. 
> 

Great! Let's ask R' Aharon. There are talmidim on the list. I happened to
have asked his son, who was against, but let someone ask him directly,
please.

> Moreover, if you oppose women serving as panim hadashot on policy
> grounds, say so!  But don't go around resurrecting rejected Rishonim and
> disregarding explicit Aharonim.
> 

That is my point - I don't think the Rishonim have been rejected. You do.
This is the public policy at stake here. Not a women's issue, but can we
follow an Acharon under these circumstances (no tradition) where the SA is
questionable (for some reason I cannot fathom you hold it is clear-cut)
and there is a question of safek berachos involved. (Minhag is okker safek
berachos. I know. Here there is no minhag. This is more like a beracha on
Hallel on Yom Ha'Atzma'ut.)

> What prevails right now may be based on ignorance and neglect, rather
> than conscious public policy.  Or it may be based on the highhly
> questionable formulation of the Sova` Semahot -- who either missed the
> Hatam Sofer or chose to omit him. 
> 

Who knows? Not you or I. That is why we need a world class Posek.

> Thank you, I do too.  But to me, it is an example of a neglected
> halakhah that has been revived without the benefit of a gadol be-hora'ah
> or an explicit "mesorah," whether from Frankfurt, Pressburg or anywhere
> else.  What do you think it is an example of? 
> 

A case where I do not think those who do not fulfill it are *wrong*, even
though the halacha is on the books. But there the issue is far less
significant, as noted previously.

> >I think we might find a >parallel in the "Minhag Yisroel" not to use
> any means of amplification - >not even transistor microphones, or
> electronics - even solid state radios > - - on Shabbos or Yom Tov. 
> 
> Sorry, I don't see the parallel.  Zimmun and sheva berakhot are
> objective halakhic kiyyumim/hiyyuvim.  I am not aware of any halakhic
> value in using the devices you mention. 
> 

1. B'rov am hadras melech.

2. Talmud Torah d'rabbim.

3. Parnassa - for a Rabbi with a weak voice.

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

On Thu, 8 Oct 1998, Ari Z. Zivotofsky wrote:

> My question (I think) still stands: do we indeed have a "negative mesorah" on
> chagavim or do we simply lack a positive mesorah.
> 
> Ari
> 

I believe we have a mesora to *not* rely on simanim in the area of
chagavim (we=Ashkenazim).

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer wrote:

> The Gemara uses these principles to *set* policy, not just confirm it, see
> Berachos 55 and Pesachim 66.

couldn't find Berachos 55. Pesachim 66a only indicates that the practice of the
people can be a stimulus to remember the halacha. Pesachim 66b might support you.
My son pointed out, however, that these examples are not necessarily relevant to
our discussion.  The gemora at best would support the contention that in an
environment where there is an accurate Mesora and talmidei chachomim - we can
rely in case of doubt with the observation of the common practice and assume
inertia. The question with the Yemenites is whether the mesora on grasshoppers is
comparable. It seems clear that they have not produced a written record that
would readily answer this question.

                            Daniel Eidensohn

On Thu, 8 Oct 1998, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:

> couldn't find Berachos 55. Pesachim 66a only indicates that the practice

Sorry. 45.

> of the people can be a stimulus to remember the halacha. Pesachim 66b
> might support you.  My son pointed out, however, that these examples are
> not necessarily relevant to our discussion.  The gemora at best would
> support the contention that in an environment where there is an accurate
> Mesora and talmidei chachomim - we can rely in case of doubt with the
> observation of the common practice and assume inertia. The question with
> the Yemenites is whether the mesora on grasshoppers is comparable. It
> seems clear that they have not produced a written record that would
> readily answer this question. 
> 

Why do they need a written record? There was a written record about the
knives to shecht the Korban Pesach?

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

You know, it struck me that I did not clarify an important point, which
may have lead people to misunderstand my position vis-a-vis the Chasam
Sofer.

The Rama in CM 25 says that if Rishonim come to light that say differently
from an Acharon, we may pasken like those Rishonim over the Acharon. If I
recall correctly, he also says that the Acharon may have changed his
opinion when confronted by the Rishon. My contention here is simple: The
CS does not quote the Ritva and Nimmulei Yosef, then reject them. I think
that when writing the Chiddushim he either did not see them or forgot them
- otherwise he would have cited them. Had he seen or remembered them, he
would have quoted them. True, I cannot prove this. But we cannot prove
otherwise. Safek berachos requires us to be machmir. It's that simple :-).

YGB

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

On Wed, 7 Oct 1998, David Glasner wrote:
 But I am afraid that I must also plead guilty to having
> least favorite p'sukim in Chumash as well.  I generally try to avoid
> mention of the p'sukim mandating genocide of the Canaanites, Hittites,
> Emorites, et al.  I also think that we should narrow the application of the
> injunction lo yavo mamzer b'kahal hashem to the maximum extent
> possible.  And as I recall R. Akiva and R. Tarfon state that if they had
> been judges when the death penalty was still in force, no one would
> ever have been executed.  Chazal apparently were also uncomfortable
> enough with the p'sukim of ben sorer u'moreh that they interpreted them
> in a way that made it impossible that the prescribed punishment ever did
> or would actually be applied.
Unless I'm missing something you're post gives me the impression that what
YOU think is good and right has some importance in the world of Torah. Of
course this is incorrect, the torah sets the dtandards of what is emes.
I'm sorry that you don't like the pasukim that tell us to kill the 7
nations but this was the will of Hashem so it's correct---i'm not sure why
you think you have a right to pass judgement of the will of HAshem.
Furthermore the implication that Chazal made drashas to serve their own
conscience is absurd and completely untrue. Chazal had mesorah from Moshe
as well as the ability to decide truth objectively based on the 13
principles---what they felt was right or wrong didn't enter the picture.
Just because you have a problem in that you believe that you have a right
to judge Hashems morals isn't a license to project that on
Chazal, Chazal  were men of complete emes. Your post is very disturbing
because the next step is to say I don't know why women shouldn't be
witnesses, I'll think I'll have them sign on a get. Then you'll really
have
to deal with "lo yavo mamzer bkahal":)
Elie Ginsparg 

R' MJB asked if this was appropriate for the list. Topic-wise it is,
lengthwise, well... I made an exception.

It took me some time to coerce the text into something the list could handle.
So, formatting might be off, and I may have made editing mistakes while I had
the file open.

Moadim Lisimachah,
-mi





	Shaving on the Intermediate Days of the Festivals
			Rabbi Michael J. Broyde


Table of Contents

I.   Introduction
II.  Talmudic Basis for the Decree Prohibiting Shaving
III. The Opinion of the Codifiers
IV.  Shaving as a Prohibited Form of Work
V.   The Controversy between Rabbi Landau and his Colleagues
VI.  Clean Shaven Men in a Clean Shaven Society
VII. Conclusion


I. Introduction

The Sages of the Talmud frequently enacted rabbinic decrees in order
to prevent certain types of activity which they felt was deleterious to
the spirit or the observance of a particular holiday. Indeed as noted by
Nachmanides in his biblical commentary, absent these decrees one would find
it very difficult to keep the holidays or Sabbath sacred.[1] This article
will explore one such set of decrees: the prohibition to shave one's face [2]
or cut one's hair on the intermediate days of the festivals (chol hamoad).[3]

In particular, this article will focus on the application of the prohibition
to shave for people who are generally clean shaven and who are residing in a
society where Jewishly observant people (and the general society at large)[4]
frequently are clean shaven, as that is the cultural norm in modern day
America.[5] As has been noted by halachic decisors, this cultural phenomena
seems to be unique to America.[6]



II. Talmudic Basis for the Decree Prohibiting Shaving

The Mishnah in Moad Katan recounts:

	The following are permitted to shave on the intermediate days of
	the festivals: One who comes from far away or is released as a
	prisoner or released from prison or one who was excommunicated and
	whose excommunication was removed on the intermediate days or one
	who took a vow not to shave and his vow was rescinded by a Rabbi on
	the intermediate days or one who is a nazir or a metsorah and who
	goes from uncleanliness to cleanliness.[7]

The mishnah continues and states:

	The following can wash their clothes on the intermediate days: one
	who comes from far away and is released from captivity or prison or
	one who is excommunicated and is now released on the intermediate
	days or one who swore not to wash his clothes and his vow was lifted
	on the intermediate days...

The Talmud, in explaining the rule of the Mishnah, states that a decree was
enacted by the Sages that one should groom oneself and wash one's garments
prior to the onset of the holiday so as to insure that one looked dignified
and neat for the festival.[8] The Talmud adds that in order to give this
decree some teeth and assist in compliance, the Sages further decreed that
one may not shave or wash one's clothes during the intermediate days so as
to insure that one be careful to shave and wash on the eve of festival.[9]
The rules mentioned in the mishnah concerning people who were permitted to
shave during the intermediate days and were granted a dispensation from this
in terrorem decree are limited to cases of people who could not shave prior
to the holiday.

The Talmud questions the rule by asking:

	One who loses an object [which he is looking for] prior to the holiday
	so that he is duressed into not shaving prior to the holiday [because
	he is looking for his object] may he shave on the intermediate days?
	Or perhaps since it is not apparent to others why he could not
	shave it is not permissible for him to shave? Abayah replies to
	this question by stating: "Can we say that all of the garments may
	not be washed except for a particular person's garment."[10]

While the Talmud is not categorically clear that the normative halacha is
like Abayah, almost all early and late authorities accept his opinion and
limit the dispensation to shave not merely to those who were duressed, but
mandates that only those who were publicly duressed so that their special
status would be known to one and all may shave on the intermediate days.
All others may not.[11]

However, there are two basic ways to understand this talmudic discourse.
The overwhelming majority of the rishonim[12] rule that a rabbinic decree
was enacted and the nature of the decree was as follows:

1) One may not shave during the intermediate days of the holidays.
The reason for this decree was in order to induce a person to shave prior
to the onset of the holidays.

2) An exception to this decree was made for those who could not shave
prior to the holidays due to duress or a compelling circumstance and this
duress or compelling circumstances were obvious to the casual observer,
like a person who is released from prison. A person who was duressed, but
in a private way that would be unknown to others, is prohibited by rabbinic
decree from shaving.

Rabbenu Tam, however, provides a different framework for discussing this
dispute.[13] He ruled that the decree was as follows:

1) One who does not shave in preparation of the holidays may not do
so on the intermediate holidays as the Sages penalize this person for not
preparing himself for the holidays.

2) This penalty provision was waived for a person who -- it is clear
to the casual observer -- could not shave prior to the holidays due to
public duress.

3) This penalty provision was inapplicable to a person who, in fact,
does shave prior to the holidays.

Thus, Rabbenu Tam ruled that one who does shave prior to the holidays in
preparation of the holidays may shave during the intermediate days of the
holidays. Rabbenu Tam argues that there is no point in preventing a person
who had shaved in preparation for the holidays from also shaving during the
intermediate days.

While apparently analytically logical, Rabbenu Tam's position can be critiqued
-- as noted by Tur -- since if Rabbenu Tam were right, the mishnah should
have included a person who shaved prior to the holidays in preparation for
the holiday in its list of people who may shave. In addition Tur notes
that Rabbenu Tam's reasoning would defeat one of the purposes of the decree
of the Sages -- which was designed to create a significant encouragement to
shave on the eve of a holiday by preventing one from shaving for a week after
that day -- as who would know who shaved and who did not. Bearded people
could then shave on the intermediate days of a festival and claim that their
conduct is permissible, by stating that they shaved on the festival eve.[14]



III. The Opinion of the Codifiers

While there are some authorities who attempt to demonstrate that both Rambam's
and Rashi's opinions were, in fact, in agreement with the opinion of Rabbenu
Tam,[15] the overwhelming majority of authorities rejected his approach
based on the Tur's critique. Rabbi Jacob ben Asher, writing in the Tur,
states the law as follows:

	One may not shave on the intermediate days of the festival and
	the reason is that one should not enter the festival un-groomed.
	The explanation for that is that if one could shave on the intermediate
	days of the festivals people would not be careful to shave on the
	eve of the festival and there is an obligation upon all to shave
	prior to the festival in its honor. Since it is prohibited to shave
	on the intermediate days, one will be careful to shave on the eve.
	Rabbenu Tam asserts that since this is the reason, one who does shave
	on the eve of the festival can shave during intermediate days. It is
	very difficult to accept this as permissible and it also does not
	appear to be correct from the text of the gemara, since if this had
	been true, it would have been appropriate to list this exception in
	the mishnah . . . [as it does a person who has only one shirt [16]].
	Also, who will know if one shaved prior to the festival? . . .Thus
	it appears that one should not permit shaving except to those listed
	in the mishnah explicitly.[17]

Both Beit Yosef and Bach discuss this issue and indicate their agreement
with the opinion of the Tur.[18]

The Shulchan Aruch does not even mention the opinion of Rabbenu Tam.
Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 531:1-3 states:

1) It is a mitzvah to shave on the eve of the festival.

2) It is prohibited to shave on the intermediate days even if one shaved
on the eve of the holiday.

3) Even one who is duressed and thus cannot shave on the eve of the
holiday cannot shave on the intermediate days.

Rabbi David Halevi (Taz) explains the rationale for rules two and three
by stating that this is prohibited because "who will know that one shaved
prior to the festival."[19] Indeed, Shulchan Aruch itself expands on the
list of those who may shave mentioned in the mishnah to include other people
who cannot shave in preparation for the festival and whose reason for being
unable to do so is obvious and apparent to all. The classic example of this
is the Rama's ruling that one who returns from apostasy to observing Judaism
-- which in earlier times was demonstrated by shaving and haircutting --
may do so even on the intermediate days, since such a person could not cut
their hair prior to their return to tradition.[20] A similar example might
also be the Shulchan Aruch's ruling that one who a minor may be given a
hair cut on the intermediate days; the rationale for permitting a child's
haircut is that all will know from looking at this small child that he or
she is not obligated in the commandments.[21]

In sum, the overwhelming majority of classical decisors reject the opinion of
Rabbenu Tam and prohibit a person from shaving on the intermediate days even
if they shaved prior to the festival; indeed the classical commentaries only
mention Rabbenu Tam's approach to assert that it is not accepted as proper.[22]
However, they accept the principled rule of the mishnah and rule that a person
who has a widely known excuse for being unable to shave in preparation for the
holiday -- even if it is not one elaborated on explicitly in the mishnah --
may shave on the intermediate days. Indeed, other examples of cases where
there is public duress of a different type than that found in the mishnah,
and yet shaving is permitted abound.[23]

The reverse is true also. One who is exempt according to the text of the
mishnah, but in our modern times that same activity would not cause the type
of public discussion that would classify this person's travels as public, is
not exempt. Thus, one who arrives from overseas, which the mishnah exempts,
is no longer exempt, since crossing transnational boundaries and oceans is
now a common event unlikely to inspire people to widely discuss that persons
travel's or prevent them from shaving.[24]



IV Shaving as a Prohibited Form of Work

Having addressed the parameters of the rabbinic decree, one other fundamental
issue needs to be discussed: does shaving [25] violate the prohibition to work
("melacha") on the intermediate days of the festivals?

The Talmud recounts [26] that the general rule is that work is prohibited on
the intermediate days and there is a dispute as to whether that prohibition
is biblical or rabbinic.[27] Whatever the nature of the prohibition, the
rule is that work that is prohibited on the festivals is also prohibited
on the intermediate days unless one of five (relatively broad) exemptions
are present. They are:

(1) Work, if not done will lead to a significant financial loss;[28]

(2) Work done to produce food for the sake of either the intermediate days
or the holidays;[29]

(3) Work where the action is of benefit to many people;[30]

(4) Work done by an amateur, rather than a professional, or in a amateurish
way rather than a professional way, for the sake of the holiday;[31]

(5) Work done by a person who does not have money to buy food or other
necessities.[32]

Thus, a discussion of shaving or haircutting as a form of prohibited work
involves a discussion of the various possible exceptions which permit work
on the intermediate days.

Tosafot, addressing the issue of haircutting, states that "even though this
action [shaving and haircutting] is work [and thus should be prohibited]
the Sages would have permitted it for the sake of the holiday [if not for the
rabbinic decree].[33]" Tosafot also gives an alternative answer and states
that "there are some forms of work that involve no real effort or exertion like
parkiamatri,[34] nonetheless, that which is done for the sake of esthetics,
it is appropriate to permit it on the intermediate days." According to
both approaches, shaving in one's home with an electric shaver is not a
form of prohibited work on the intermediate days when done in the privacy
of one's own home in the manner that all adults groom themselves nowadays
(as opposed to prior times, when people were shaved by a barber. Tosafot,
in essence, maintains that except for the rabbinic decree not to shaving,
shaving would be permitted, and is not subject to some independent prohibition.

As noted by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein,[35] it seems that the final insight of
Tosafot creates nearly a new category of permissible work -- prohibited
activity done merely for aesthetic reasons, which then becomes permissible.
Indeed, elsewhere, Tosafot appears to rule that shaving one's facial hair
is generally a permitted form of work and is only prohibited because of the
rabbinic decree discussed above.[36]

Although this issue might seem unimportant at this point -- as what difference
does it make whether shaving is prohibited by both a rabbinic decree and
as a form of prohibited work, or merely as a form of rabbinic decree -- the
consensus of halachic authorities accepts that shaving is not a prohibited
form of work, or if it is, it is typically covered by one of the enumerated
exceptions to prohibited work.[37] A small minority of halachic authorities
rule that shaving is forbidden work, even in a case where the rabbinic decree
is not applicable.[38]



V The Controversy between Rabbi Landau and his Colleagues

Rabbi Yechezkal Landau, writing in Nodah Beyehuda 1:13 adopts a novel
interpretation of the dispute between Rabbenu Tam and his colleagues. Indeed,
he completely reinterprets and harmonizes Rabbenu Tam's view with that of
other Rishonim and concludes that there are many circumstances in which it is
completely permissible to shave on the intermediate days of the festival.[39]

Rabbi Landau, writing in the Nodah Beyehuda, accepts the position of Tosafot
that hair cutting is a forbidden form of work on the intermediate days [40]
which would have been permissible in theory as a matter of Torah law if done
for the sake of the holiday.[41] The rabbinic decree discussed in Moad Katan
13b, according to this analysis, essentially returned hair cutting on the
intermediate days to the status of work that is not needed on the festival,
and therefore biblically prohibited. Thus, according to Rabbenu Tam as
explained by Rabbi Landau, hair cutting or shaving is biblically forbidden
to all, whether one did or did not shave on the eve of the holiday.

However, there is a crucial difference between the case of one who has taken
a haircut or shave prior to the festival and one who has not according to
Rabbi Landau. The one who has shaved already is only prohibited to shave
as it is "biblically prohibited work"; one who has not shaved prior to the
holiday is caught between in two separate problems: the prohibited work rule
and the decree of the Sages penalizing one who has not shaved.

Rabbi Landau then adds that one who is in the category of permitted to do any
work -- such as a poor person who has no money for food [42] -- may cut hair
during the intermediate days of the festival, and one who has had his hair cut
prior to the festival may have such a person cut his hair or shave his face.
Rabbi Landau defended this ruling a number of times in his responsa [43]
and while it has been reported that he retracted this decision later in life,
that assertion is difficult to defend.[44]

A number of preeminent authorities disagree with the premise of Rabbi Landau
and thus reject his conclusion. The most forceful of those who disagree is
Rabbi Moshe Schreiber, writing in Chatam Sofer,[45] who states clearly that
Rabbi Landau's basic analysis is incorrect. Chatam Sofer states that it is
clear that the true issue is the nature and scope of the rabbinic decree
prohibiting shaving and not whether that physical activity is a form of
prohibited work on the intermediate days of the festival.

To prove this, he notes that the model used by the Talmud for the decree
concerning the intermediate days was the ancient decree that priests who
work in the Temple may not have their hair cut or be shaven during their
tour of duty in the Temple so as to prevent them from entering their service
period unkempt (i.e., if they needed to be groomed, they must do it prior
to the start of their service). This decree has no basis at all as a form
of prohibited work -- and Chatam Sofer states, neither does the rabbinic
decree concerning grooming oneself during the intermediate days. Thus, Rabbi
Schreiber rules that the rabbinic decree prohibits shaving and haircutting
by all, independent of whether one is or has found a poor person in need
of work, since the crucial issue is not "work." Most authorities appear to
agree with the approach of the Chatam Sofer although a number agree with Rabbi
Landau.[46] As noted by Rabbi Neuvert writing in Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata:

	One does not cut one's hair or trim one's beard on the intermediate
	days, not even on the eve of the final days of the holiday, even if one
	had one's hair cut or removed one's beard prior to the festival.[47]

Even if one were to accept the insights of Rabbi Landau (and most do not),
its applicability in America would be limited to extremely poor people or
people who know extremely poor Jewish barbers.[48]



VI. Clean Shaven Men in a Clean Shaven Society

Modern secular society has changed, to some extent, the social reality
concerning shaving. While there was a time when most observant people were not
clean shaven -- and indeed it was difficult to remain clean shaven and function
in accordance with halacha -- such is no longer true. A clean shaven person
in a clean shaven society creates a new halachic question vis-a-vis shaving
on the intermediate days of the festivals. A person who has no beard, even
if he shaves in preparation of the holiday, nonetheless will look unkempt
during the holiday and it will be visibly apparent to all that this person
shaved in preparation of the holiday and yet still needs to shave again.[49]
The fact that the person shaved prior to the holiday does not, in any way,
insure that this person will look proper during the intermediate days.
The only way for a clean shaven person to look neat during the intermediate
days is for him to shave during that time. The presence of many such people
insures that this fact is common knowledge.

In light of the change in societal norms, an examination of the rabbinic
literature indicates three different approaches have been taken to the topic
of a clean shaven person in a generally clean-shaven society shaving every
day during the intermediate days of the holiday.

A number of authorities, including Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, adopt the simplest
halachic position and they rule that the decree made by the Sages of the Talmud
has only the delimited exceptions given in the Mishnah and cases identical
to them. Thus these authorities rule that even if it might perchance have
been logical for the Sages in the time of the Mishnah to exempt a clean shaven
person in a clean-shaven society, for whatever reason, they chose not to do
so and they enacted a broad decree without any exemption -- except for one
who is clearly duressed and did not shave on the holiday eve out of duress.
Rabbi Yosef states:

Even if one shaved his beard on the eve of the festival it is prohibited to
shave again on the intermediate days of the festival; this is true even if
one is accustomed to shaving every other or third day. There was one who
permitted one who shaved prior to the festival to shave on the intermediate
days through a poor Jewish barber who has nothing to eat. Most authorities
argued with him and the consensus is that it is prohibited.[50]

This approach is also found in Rabbi Neuvert's modern classic Shemirat Shabbat
Kehilchata.[51] Thus it is prohibited for even a clean-shaven person to
shave on the intermediate days of the holidays according to this approach.
Indeed, these authorities rule that accepting the argument that one who
shaved prior to the holiday is definitionally duressed during the holiday is
tantamount to accepting Rabbi Landau's or Rabbenu Tam's approach -- which
were clearly rejected by normative halacha two hundred and five hundred
years ago, respectively. Those authorities who are strict on this matter
would argue that one must assume that the decree found in Moad Katan 13b-14a
is applicable to all those who shaved prior to the festival (and even if an
exception might appear logical for clean shaven men, absent an indication
that the Sages who made the decree made such an exception, the decree is
binding even where it appears logically inapplicable).[52]

Of course, even these authorities admit that a person who will suffer a
significant financial loss (certainly the loss of his job) if he does not
shave himself may do so, as the Sages did not prohibit either haircutting
or shaving in the case of significant loss.[53]

The second approach, which is found in the responsa of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein,
rules that it is permissible for a clean shaven person to shave on the
intermediate days if the person does so regularly in a society where many
others are also clean shaven, and the person shaved on the festival eve.[54]
Essentially, Rabbi Feinstein argues that since it is common knowledge and
visibly apparent that people who do not wear beards shave frequently and
regularly and have certainly shaved on the eve of the festival (this can
be verified in a glance), such a person is the equivalent of the visibly
duressed person who may shave. Just like one who is publicly released from
prison may shave since his plight is widely known, so too the bearded person
recognizes that the un-bearded person is in a visibly different situation
and will not be confused with the bearded person. This is similar to the
assertion of the Ritva that women are permitted to adorn themselves on the
intermediate days with jewelry as:

	this is needed for one's body and is like food preparation since it
	is normally done with little effort. It was not prohibited by the
	Sages under the rubric of 'least one enter the festival dishevelled'
	as this activity is done daily and it is not the custom of people
	to delay it."[55]

Rabbi Feinstein adds that the objection by the Tur that this category of
clean shaven people is unmentioned in the mishnah or talmud is not relevant
to a society where many are clean shaven, as that society was unknown in the
time of the mishnah.[56] This social situation -- where many people are clean
shaven -- would, according to Rabbi Feinstein, eliminate the possible problems
of suspecting a person of not shaving on the eve of the holiday, as anyone
can tell when a clean shaven person last shaved, and such knowledge is common.

However, the two final paragraphs of Rabbi Feinstein's responsa state:

		Thus, it is clear that, in my opinion, in our era and in
		this country -- where those who shave their face do so every
		day or every other or third day -- there is no prohibition
		[to shave on the intermediate days] . . .

		Nonetheless, my custom is not to permit shaving on the
		intermediate days except for one in significant need or great
		pain. If one wishes to rely on this line of reasoning for
		mere aesthetic reasons alone, one should not rebuke him, since
		the halacha is in accordance with that conduct in my opinion.

Thus, according to this analysis, shaving is permitted, but not encouraged,
on the intermediate days of the festival.[57]

The third position is taken by Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik. Based on the
analysis similar to that of Rabbi Feinstein discussed above, Rabbi Joseph
B. Soloveitchik and his son-in-law, Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, rule that since
it is permissible to shave during the intermediate days it would seem logically
compelling that one who is clean shaven must shave on the intermediate days
and particularly on the last day of the intermediate days since there is
an upcoming festival.[58] Shaving during the intermediate days, for a clean
shaven person, is a fulfillment of the rabbinic commandment to look dignified
and proper during the intermediate days and on the final days of the festival.

Rabbi Hershel Schachter, in his intellectual biography of Rabbi Soloveitchik,
Nephesh HaRav, recounts Rabbi Soloveitchik's reasoning as follows:

	To those who shave every day, it is obvious that they may shave on
	the intermediate days too, since it is clear from the explanation
	of the mishnah given in Moad Katan 14a that every case where it is
	obvious to all that a person is duressed, and thus cannot shave, that
	person may shave on the intermediate days. All know that a clean
	shaven person cannot shave on the eve of a holiday those hairs that
	have not yet appeared. [Thus, this person's unkempt appearance is
	considered a product of duress, and he is permitted to shave.[59]]
	One can also add that in the case of a person permitted to shave on
	the intermediate days must shave, so as not to be disgusting on the
	intermediate days and so as to avoid entering the last days of the
	festival repugnant.[60]

Thus, these authorities argue that once one accepts that the rabbinic decree
found in Moad Katan 13b-14a are inapplicable to a clean shaven person, one has
no choice but to rule that one who is clean shaven must shave at least in honor
of the final days of the festival, like one must for any other festival.[61]

It is important to understand that the approaches of both Rabbis Feinstein
and Soloveitchik are not predicated on the correctness of either Rabbenu Tam
or Rabbi Landau. Rather, it accepts that even those who argue with these
two approaches would agree that shaving is permissible on the intermediate
days in a case where it was obvious to all that the clean shaven person had
shaved in preparation for the holiday, and yet was still unkempt because
of the growth on new hair which could not be removed prior to the holiday.
Those who argue with this reasoning would assert that the talmudic leniencies
found in Moad Katan 14a concerning those who may shave on the intermediate
days is limited to those who did not shave in anticipation of the holiday,[62]
unless one accepts the rulings of Rabbi Landau or Rabbenu Tam.



VII Conclusion

Both the technology on how to shave, and sociology concerning when one
shaves, have changed considerably in the last century, particularly in the
United States. Until recently it was unusual to encounter an observant Jew
who was routinely clean shaven, and finding a halachicly acceptable way to
remain clean shaven was no easy task. Certainly, until very recently, there
were no societies where most of the observant Jewish community was generally
clean shaven. This has changed. Technology created a halachicly permissible
way to shave; for social and economic reasons many religious Jews choose
to be clean shaven. This article explores one halachic manifestation of
this change in reality: shaving on the intermediate days of the festivals.
As discussed in this article, some see in the change of technology and
sociology no change in the normative halacha concerning shaving on the
intermediate days; others argue that shaving on the intermediate days --
which was prohibited in societies where Jews did not generally shave --
as becoming permissible, but discouraged. Yet others argued that a person
who shaves generally -- if they shave in anticipation of the holidays --
fulfills a mitzvah when he shaves again on the intermediate days in expectation
of the final days of the festival.




FOOTNOTES:

1 Nachmanides (Ramban), Commenting on Leviticus 23:24.

2 Of course, even when shaving is permissible, it must be done without a
razor in accordance with the requirements of halacha; see generally Shulchan
Aruch Y.D. 181.

3 This prohibition is equally applicable to men and women; see Pri Megadim OC
546:9 and Gra 546:5 each of whom accept that men and women are both governed
by this law, but for different reasons; see also Maharsham, Dat Torah 531:2
who notes a practical difference between these two approaches.

4 One author writes:

		There exists in our culture a subtle yet pervasive prejudice
		against those who choose not to shave their faces, perhaps best
		evidenced by our language. The term used to describe those
		males who adhere to the preferred standard is "clean-shaven."
		The reasonable inference, if not the clear implication,
		is that the unshaven must also be unclean.

		Anti-beard sentiment seems to be a relatively recent
		phenomenon, at least in America, perhaps due in part to
		the post-1960s association of beards with nonconformity
		or rebellion, as well as to the perceptions that beards
		are unclean or that their wearers are trying to hide
		something. Before the invention of the safety razor,
		beards were more socially acceptable, largely because few
		men were willing to use the dangerous "straight razor."
		Professionals, able to pay the daily cost (in terms of
		both time and money) of a shave at a barber shop, and not
		as likely as laborers to benefit from the protection from
		the elements that facial hair provides, probably fostered
		the development of the association between "clean- shaven"
		faces and professionalism that survives to the present day.

James M. Maloney, Suits for the Hirsute: Defending Against America's
Undeclared War on Beards in the Workplace, 63 Fordham L. Rev. 1203, 1205
(1995) (footnotes omitted).

5 Historically this was very difficult because there was no simple
permissible manner for a person to shave themselves without violating the
prohibition of shaving with a razor found in Shulchan Aruch Y.D 181:1-2.
The recent invention of electric shavings has changed that reality and thus
many completely observant individuals are clean shaven or shave bare part
of their face (such as a goatee). Nearly all rabbinic authorities accept
that shaving with an electric shaver is permissible and this is the custom
in all but chasidic communities; see Iggerot Moshe OC 4:111, Har Tzvi YD
143, and Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Or Torah (Tevet 5749) but see comments of
Biur Hativ on Yoreh Deah 181:5 and Chelkat Ya'akov 3:79. The reason many
observant Jews wear beards is undoubtedly that suggested by Chatam Sofer,
Orach Chaim 159. (For a modern "scientific" confirmation of one of Chatam
Sofer's observations concerning beards, see Michael S. Wogalter & Judith
A. Hosie, Effects of Cranial and Facial Hair on Perceptions of Age and Person,
131 J. of Soc. Psychol. 589, 590 (1991).)

As noted by Ralbag (and Radak) commenting on 2 Samuels 2:26 this custom
dates from biblical times; but see Rav Pe'elim 4:5.



6 Rabbi Feinstein Iggerot Moshe OC 163 makes repeated mention of the fact that
his approach is limited to "this country [America] and this particular time."
Rabbi Feinstein's approach is discussed in section V; see also note 52.
For a similar example of the unique issues raised by societal norms concerning
shaving, see also Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, "Shaving in Honor of Shabbat
during Sefirat ha-Omer [for clean shaven men]," Daf Kesher 2(133):54-56
(5748). As noted by Rabbi Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe OC 2:96), the rules
related to shaving on chol hamoad and the rules concerning shaving during
sefira are unconnected; but see Mishnah Berurah, Biur Halacha 493 s.v. nohagim.

7 Moad Katan 3:1.

8 See Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 531:1 where it states that "it is a mitzvah
to shave on the eve of a holiday."

9 Moad Katan 14a.

10 Moad Katan 13b-14a.

11 See Shita Mekubetzet on Moad Katan 14a as well as Tur and Beit Yosef on 531.
The Ravya (836) resolves this matter leniently, as apparently does Rabbenu
Chananel on Moad Katan 14a. Bach OC 534 also appears to resolve this matter
leniently. The crucial question is whether this is a case of doubt as to a
biblical prohibition or doubt as to a rabbinic prohibition and that seems to be
the disagreement between Bach and Beit Yosef. For more on this, see note 61.

12 See Beit Yosef and Tur on Orach Chaim 531 in the name of many rishonim.

13 Rabbenu Tam's opinion is not found in the works of the ba'ali tosaphot.
It is however recorded in Tur O.C. 531, Hagaot Maymoniat Yom Tov 7:40, and
Hagaot Ashre, Betzia 14a; This also appears to be the opinion of Maharam
Me'Rothenberg, in his Simachot 9.

14 See comments of Tur quoted in text accompanying note 17 and comments of
Taz, Shulchan Aruch 531:1.

15 See e.g. Rabbi Aaron Pinchik "Shaving on Chol Ha-Moad," Noam 12:82 (5729)
and Rabbi Yitzchak Pacha, "Shaving on the Intermediate Days," Techumin 2:116,
133 (note 35) (5741).

16 See Moad Katan 13b-14a, discussed in text accompanying notes 7 to 10 and
note 56.

17 Tur OC 531.

18 Beit Yosef and Bach commenting on Tur OC 531.

19 Taz O.C. 531:2. This comment is supposed to be on Shulchan Aruch 531:2 and
not 531:3 as it is marked in the standard Shulchan Aruch. Similar sentiments
are found in Magen Avraham 531:2 and Aruch haShulchan 531:1-4.

20 Rama OC 531:7. For more on the custom of cutting one's hair when one
returns to observance, see Rama YD 268:2; Shach YD 268:17 and Terumat
HaDeshen 86.

21 Shulchan Aruch OC 531:6. This also explains Magen Avraham's statement
that a child who looks like he or she is past bar or bat mitzvah age should
not be publicly given a hair cut lest people misinterpret that activity;
Magen Avraham 531:9 quoted by Mishnah Berurah 531:16; Aruch Hashulchan 531:6
and Kaf Hachaim 531:29

22 See comments of Magen Avraham, Taz, Kaf Hachaim, Aruch Hashulchan and
Mishnah Berurah cited in notes 19 and 21. Rabbenu Tam's approach is also
rejected by Yalkut Yosef 5:516 and Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata 66:23.

23 For example, see Shita Mekubetzet Moad Katan 14a (s.v. de'ika lemamar)
who asserts that one who is publicly involved in redeeming captives on the
eve of the holiday and thus cannot shave, may do so on chol hamoad; Meiri,
Moad Katan 14a permits a merchant whose business is widely known and who
cannot shave because he is looking for a lost object and everyone knows he
is looking for it, to shave on the intermediate days. For more such cases,
see Encyclopedia Talmudit, Chol HaMoad 13:209-210.

24 Mishnah Berurah 531:13; Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata 66:26 n.119.

25 For the purposes of this article, it is assumed that a person who shaves
does so in the privacy of his own home using an electric shaver and does
not go to a barber or other skilled professional for assistance while shaving.

26 Chagigah 18a; Moad Katan 29a; Rambam, Laws of Yom Tov 7:1; Shulchan
Aruch 530:1.

27 According to those who rule the prohibition to biblical, this biblical
prohibition is different from others in that its precise boundaries were given
to the Sages to define; see Shulchan Aruch O.C. 530 and Biur Halacha 530 s.v.
umytar and Encyclopedia Talmudit "Chol Hamoad" 13:104-113.

28 The precise definition of financial loss varies from society to society
and person to person (Mishnah Berurah 544:6). Notwithstanding that fact,
certain guidelines can be given. Loss of (significant) capital is almost
always considered a financial loss. On the other hand, mere loss of interest
or profit is not considered a true financial loss, and thus only allows
rabbinic prohibitions. One who owns a store that sells items of use on chol
hamoad (food, for example) may unquestionably remain open on chol hamoad.
One who is not selling any such items may only keep the store open if the
general good will necessary to run the business requires that the business
be open each day during the general work week.

	A person who is an employee should strive to take vacation on chol
	hamoad if possible; if one cannot, one may work, since taking that
	improper vacation will jeopardize one's job. There is an interesting
	dispute between contemporary decisors as to whether a worker who
	wishes to take his vacation in order to do a specific vacation
	activity that cannot be done on the intermediate days (for either
	halachic or practical reasons) must nonetheless take them on the
	intermediate days, and forsake that vacation. Rabbi Moshe Feinstein,
	in a responsa published in Sefer Zichron Shlomo #18, states that such
	conduct is permissible (and merely the pious avoid it). In the same
	volume (responsa 41) Rabbi Moshe Stern avers that such conduct is
	prohibited and states that employees must save up vacation days to use
	on the intermediate days whenever possible. Rabbi Neuvert, writing in
	Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata 67:(n.47) suggests a compromise position.
	He states that an employee who has a finite number of vacation days in
	the year need not save them to use on the intermediate days, but if he
	has them available during the intermediate days, he must take them.
	Rabbi Neuvert observes that if one were to accept this ruling, a
	person whose vacation days accrue at the beginning of the secular
	year must use these days for the intermediate days of Passover,
	but may then take a summer vacation with the understanding that he
	will have no choice but to work on the intermediate days of Sukkot.

29 The parameters of the exception permitting work for the sake of the
holiday includes any actions -- lighting fires, harvesting plants or turning
on lights -- needed either for yom tov, chol hamoad or the upcoming Shabbat's
food needs; O.C. 533:1-3; Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata 66:6. This exception
permits every activity needed for food preparation, provided that it could
not be done prior to moad; Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata 66:17 and note 78 of
that work.

30 Shulchan Aruch OC 544:1. The rationale for this exception is that public
works are best done at a time when many are available; see Mishnah Berurah
544:1. Most rule that amateurish work of benefit to many is permitted even if
not for the sake of the holiday and skilled work is permitted only for the sake
of the public and the needs of the holiday; Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata 65:1-4.

31 Amateurish work of any type may be done for the sake of the needs of the
holiday or the shabbat that follows; thus, for example, one may turn on a
light during chol hamoad when one needs light to read, or turn on the radio
to listen to recreational music for pleasure on that day.

32 A person who has no money to pay for the basic needs of himself or
his family (Biur Halacha 542 s.v. al yedai) may work even in otherwise
prohibited work, and it is preferable to do such work than to accept charity
(Ashel Avraham 542). It is preferable that such work be done in a private,
rather than a public, way.

For an excellent review of the principles used to determine if work is
permissible, see Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, Chol Hamoad on Agricultural Settlements,
Techumin 2:79 (5743).

33 Moad Katan 14a "veshar kol adam."

34 A form of traveling salesman.

35 Iggerot Moshe O.C. 163.

36 Tosafot s.v. shar.

37 Particularly since shaving is no longer a skilled activity, but is done
by almost all people in the privacy of their own home without any specialized
training one is very much inclined to rule that -- in cases not covered by the
rabbinic decree prohibiting shaving -- there is no "prohibited work" problem.
Indeed, even those modern authorities who are absolutely firm in their ruling
that the presence of a clean shaven society has no impact on the prohibition
to shave during the intermediate days of the festival concede that shaving
is not a prohibited form of work (except because of the rabbinic decree);
see Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, Yalkut Yosef 5:526 and Rabbi Shalom Masas "Shaving
on chol hamoad" Techumin 3:517-528

38 Rabbi Shabtai Shlomo Vigdor, Likutai Halchot al Chol Hamoad at pages 12-13.
The essential position of those who argue that shaving is a prohibited form
of work is that, in fact, shaving daily even for a clean shaven person
is not a form of beautification (yofi), since the Sages in the time of
the talmud did not think it was needed on a daily bases to look proper.
This argument appears unpersuasive to this author, as an examination of
Tosafot above indicates that the reason shaving is not a form of prohibited
work is exclusively dependent on the intent of the person who is shaving
or the effort it entails. This would strongly incline one to accept Rabbi
Feinstein's assertion that in America shaving is not a form of work, as it
is done for aesthetic reasons and with little effort.

39 There is some discussion as to what motivated this responsa by Rabbi Landau.
This is particularly interesting, as Rabbi Landau initially notes that the
reason for the publication of this teshuva will remain concealed. However,
in Nodah Beyehuda Orach Chaim 2:101, he states that the rationale for this
ruling was to insure that Jews who shaved did so from a Jewish barber.
He notes that Jewish barbers shaved people in a matter permitted by Jewish
law, but on the intermediate days of the festival, when these barbers were
closed, some Jews surreptitiously would use the services of Gentile barbers,
who shaved them with a razor. Thus, permitting a poor Jewish barber to remain
open prevented some Jews from violating a torah prohibition. (In that era
"shaving with a razor was -- tragically -- so common for many that they did
not ever consider it really prohibited;" Rabbi Akiva Eiger, Responsa 96.)

Chatam Sofer Orach Chaim 154 suggests a different rationale, that casts the
Nodah Beyehuda's ruling in a very different light. Rabbi Schreiber states:

	I will recount a tale and reveal a secret. Because of the sins of
	our generation, there are many who shave with a razor regularly, and
	if they do not shave on the intermediate days, there will be enough
	facial hair on these people that their hair can be doubled over [the
	minimum amount of hair needed to violate the biblical prohibition of
	shaving with a razor] and after yom tov these people will shave with
	a razor, and violate many biblical prohibitions; thus it was better
	to permit these people to violate the rabbinic prohibition of shaving
	on chol hamoad [than the biblical prohibition of shaving with a razor].

This author finds Rabbi Schreiber's understanding of the basis for Rabbi
Landau's ruling extremely difficult, particularly since Rabbi Landau himself
explains his reason in 2:101. It is an axiom of halachic discourse that
when a rabbinic authority publishes a responsum which provides a detailed
technical argument grounded in rishonim and achronim explaining why a
particular conduct is permissible, one must assume that this argument is
genuinely accepted as proper by the halachic authority who advanced it; to
not do so comes perilously close to violating Maharshal's (Bava Kama 38a)
comments relating to falsification of torah rules. Most likely Chatam Sofer
wrote his rationale prior to the publication of Rabbi Landau's assertion of
reason in 2:101.

40 See section III.

41 See section III.

42 See text accompanying notes 28 to 32 for a discussion of the various
times such work is permitted.

43 See also Nodah Beyehuda O.C. 2:101 and 2:99.

44 See Sedai Chemid, Chol Hamoad 8:5. To accept such a proposition would
be to posit that the responsa published posthumously by his son in Nodah
Beyehuda 2:101 -- which contain a defense of this liberality -- are inaccurate.

45 O.C. 154.

46 See Mishnah Berurah 531:2; Aruch Hashulchan 542:2; Orchot Chaim 531:1
Sha'arim Metzuyanim Behalacha 104(13) and the authorities cited in Sedai
Chemed id. There are those who agreed with Rabbi Landau's ruling, however;
see for example Olat Shmuel 72 who permits shaving for sake of the last days
of yom tov based on Rabbi Landau's analysis.

47 Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata 66:23.

48 An alternative rationale that would generally permit shaving on chol
hamoad can be found in Machatzet HaShekel 531:10 who appears to rule that
the talmudic decree prohibiting shaving is limited to the head, and is
completely inapplicable to the facial area. This perhaps can also be found
in Magan Avraham 531:12. However, both Mishnah Berurah (Biur Halacha 531
s.v. kol adam) and Kaf HaChaim (531:39-42) indicate that the analysis of
the Machatzet Hashekel is not correct.

49 Such is not the case for a bearded person, where it is extremely difficult
to tell when exactly such a person has last shaved. So too, a person who
has a beard does not need to trim his beard every day or every other day to
look nice, and thus once one shaves or trims one's beard in preparation of
the holiday any other trimming not really necessary until after the holiday.
When looking at a person who is clean shaven one can immediately tell if
that person has not shaved recently since the depth of the shadow reveals
the length of time from one's previous shave.

50 Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, "Laws of Chol Hamoad," Kol Sinai 7:2(181-192),
at pages 186-187 (5723); see also Rabbi Yitzchak Yosef quoting his father
Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Yalkut Yosef 5:516 in which nearly the same rule is
cited; see note 62 for more on the differences between these two sources.
Similar such sentiments can be found in Rabbi Shalom Masas, Tevuot Shemesh
1:55-56 and Likutai Halachot al Chol Hamoad 12-13. So too, these authorities
rule that the minority opinion of Rabbenu Tam (and to a lesser extent Nodah
Beyehuda) since it is rejected by normative halacha it may not be relied on
even in circumstances where such an opinion might be logical to follow.

In the case of nail cutting -- which is not mentioned in the talmud as
something mandated on the eve of yom tov out of respect for the holiday,
but which many rishonim strongly encouraged (see Rama 532:1) -- the halacha
accepts the approach of Rabbenu Tam and rules that one who cut his nails
in honor of the holiday may also cut their nail on the intermediate days;
Magen Avraham 532:3.

51 Quoted and cited in text accompanying note 47.

52 Rabbi Shabtai Shlomo Vigdor, Likutai Halchot al Chol Hamoad at pages 12-13.
(It is also possible that the Israeli poskim, living in a society where
it is much more common for observant Jews to grow beards feel that Israel
society is sociologically different given the much smaller percentage of clean
shaven observant men, something Rabbi Feinstein notes to be very persuasive;
see also note 6 for more on this.)

53 See Shita Mekubetzet on Moad Katan 18a. This rationale is used by the
Mishnah Berurah (531:21 and Biur Halacha s.v. kol adam) to justify shaving
in the case of a health need, which is itself only permitted because all
health needs are considered a davar ha'avad -- an item which if not acted
on now, is lost -- just like a financial loss; see also Shulchan Aruch OC
534:2 which permits the washing of an item (linen) on chol hamoad that will
be destroyed if not washed immediately.

54 Iggerot Moshe O.C. 163.

55 Ritva, Moad Katan 8b.

56 Iggerot Moshe O.C. 163. Finally, Rabbi Feinstein disagrees with the
analysis of Rabbi Landau concerning whether shaving is work, and rules
shaving is prohibited exclusively by the rabbinic decree, which he feels is
not applicable to a clean shaven person. Particularly when facial shaving
is so routine and requires no particular skill, states Rabbi Feinstein,
there is no problem of prohibited work when one shaves.

The force of Rabbi Feinstein's reasoning appears very persuasive to this
writer. Washing one's garments on chol hamoad is prohibited by talmudic
decree for the same reason that haircutting is prohibited -- to insure that
one enter the holiday with clean clothes; Shulchan Aruch OC 534:1-2. However,
Rabbi Feinstein notes, the Talmud permits one to wash one's garment on chol
hamoad if it is the only one a person has (and he cleaned it in anticipation of
the holiday). Such a person is a special case, since all will see that this
person is unique, as he is washing his one and only shirt while wearing his
undergarments; see Mishnah Berurah 534:9-10. A person who is clean-shaven
and in a clean shaven society is exactly analogous, as all will see that
his situation is different from his bearded colleagues. It will be clear
that he shaved prior to yom tov and is none-the-less still unkempt.

57 An approach similar to Rabbi Feinstein's can be found in Rabbi Yekuteil
Greenwald's Kol Bo al Avelut 2:131. The position of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach is unclear. Rabbi Neuvert, in Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata
66:23(n.107) states that Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach is uncertain about
"a king who shaves every day if Rabbi Landau would permit such a person
to shave since Rabbi Landau only permitted shaving through a poor Jew who
does not have what to eat". Although his words are unclear, it is quite
possible to understand Rabbi Auerbach as being in agreement with Rabbi
Feinstein that one who shaves every day may shave on chol ha-moad too, and
the only problem is one of the technical issue of prohibited "work," which
Rabbi Auerbach suggests can be solved without any difficulty in the case
of a king. Indeed, other have related to this author that Rabbi Auerbach
indicated that Rabbi Feinstein's responsum was persuasive on this issue.
This understanding of Rabbi Auerbach also explains the sequence of ideas
discussed in the Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata, where the approaches of both
Rabbis Feinstein and Auerbach are presented after the phrase ___ ___, which
in the Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata means "for an alternative view, see."

58 As with many of the rulings of Rabbi Soloveitchik, this one was never
placed in writing by him. These rulings are recorded in Rabbi Yitzchak Pacha,
"Shaving on the Intermediate Days," Techumin 2:116, 133 (note *) (5741) and
Rabbi Shmuel Sprecher, "Shaving on the Intermediate Days," Noam 21:252-253
(5738).

59 See the reasoning cited in note 56.

60 Nephesh HaRav 189-190.

61 For an approach similar to Rabbi Soloveitchik's see Rabbi Moshe Malka,
Mikva Hamayim 2:20

In this author's opinion, additional support for the rulings of both Rabbis
Feinstein and Soloveitchik can be found in the dispute between the Beit Yosef
and Bach, discussed in note 11, as to whether shaving is a biblical prohibition
on the intermediate days, or not. The essential argument of Beit Yosef is
that the normative halacha should generally be strict and accept the ruling
of Abayah that private forms of duress (such as searching for a lost object)
are not grounds to permit shaving or haircutting on the intermediate days
according to halacha, since this is a case of possible biblical prohibition
and silence by the Talmud as to which opinion to accept should be resolved
in favor of strictness. However, once one comes to the conclusion that
in modern day America shaving is never a biblical prohibition (see section
III of this article which shows that most accept that argument), it might
be plausible to accept that the ruling of Bach that the halacha should be
lenient in Abayah's case of doubt, which is now about a rabbinic prohibition.
In such a case, all those who were duressed -- publicly or privately --
may shave (although not get a haircut, as that is still an action done in
our society by a professional, unlike shaving).

62 See Rabbi Shabtai Shlomo Vigdor, Likutai Halchot al Chol Hamoad at pages
12-13. It is worth noting that many of those who reject the approach of
Rabbis Feinstein and Soloveitchik do not reply to their talmudic arguments,
but instead rely on the tradition not to shave on chol hamoad; see for example,
the differences between Rabbi Yosef own words in Kol Torah 7:2 at 187 which
ends (after summarizing the approach of Rabbi Feinstein) with the following
remarks: "Even though, in truth it is difficult to correct those who are
lenient, none-the-less, fearers of heaven should be careful for the opinions
of those later authorities who are strict, and will be rewarded by heaven
for that conduct." Rabbi Yitzchak Yosef, writing in Yalkut Yosef 5:516 at
note 61, after quoting his father, adds "see also the opinion of Rabbi Shalom
Masas . . . who collects many sources from gemera as well as early and late
poskim who accept the ruling of Shulchan Aruch who prohibits shaving, and
rejects with considerable force one who wants to be lenient. This approach
is normative." See also Shemirat Shabbat Kehilchata 67:n.107. Indeed,
Rabbi Feinstein -- but perhaps not Rabbi Soloveitchik -- recognized this
tradition as sufficient grounds to decline to permit this conduct lechatchila.

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