Avodah Mailing List

Volume 01 : Number 043

Wednesday, September 9 1998

• Re:kal vachomer and empirical evidence vs. proof
• Chiyyuv/Chayyav
• Baal Nefesh Yachmir
• Empirical evidence v. proof
• Bechirah Chofshis and Daas Torah
• Re: Empirical Evidence vs. Proof
• Re:R Aharon's slant on science, sevara
• Re: Gomel for a child
• Re: Avodah V1 #42
• Re: Lice
• bracha l'vatala
• RE: Wedding Innovation
• Re: microscopic bugs/science and halacha/English berachot
• RE: science/empirical evidence vs. mesorah
• Re: Avodah V1 #42

The Chazon Ish makes a similar comment on treifos, and I believe we have
discussed it here before, i.e., that the principles of Torah had to be
determined by Chazal (he links this to Chazal's classification of the
middle two millenia of the 6000 years being those of Torah), and that,
therefore, what they deemed to be treif is treif for all time.

YGB

On Tue, 8 Sep 1998 Joelirich@aol.com wrote:

> In a message dated 98-09-08 18:03:12 EDT, you write:
> 
> << 
>  There is another opinion about psak as it has been established by chazal 
>  which R. YGB has expounded upon to me. (I believe this is based on the 
>  view of R. Dessler)  When the halacha was estblished by Chazal, 
>  eventhough it may not have reflected the reality of science as we know 
>  it today,  G-d wanted to establish the halacha based on the scientific 
>  knowledge of that era, for reasons known only to Him.  If Rabbi YGB is 
>  so inclined he can expand better on this thesis than I can. >>
> 
> I'd love to hear about it.
> 
> 
> 
>  I was taught that the
> > reason for ein onshin was because the onesh for a particular aveira is also
> a
> > kappara and thus when we apply a kal vachomer, while we know the chomer
> can't
> > be done , we're unsure as to the proper punishment qua kappara and therefore
> > don't punish. As with many things I was taught , I have no recollection of
> > source so take this with a grain of salt:-)
> > 
> > Shabbat shalom and a ktiva vchatima tova
> > Joel Rich
> > 
> I was taught that we don't punish from a kal vchomer because we have a
> rule that we never punish m'safek (we always try to find a zchus for a
> person except for a masis etc.) any law derived from a kal vechomer is
> never better than a safek because it can in theory be disproved. Unlike a
> pasuk where the guilty party hasno way to defend himself if he violated a
> law stated explicitly or learned out from an irrefutable drash such as
> gezara shava. However if you were to punish a person from a kal vechomer
> he'd say how do you know I'm guilty maybe someone would come along and
> refute your kal vechomer. Thus one can't be punished from a kal vechomer.
> following this logic , I made my statement that a kal vechomer is dafka
> weaker than a pasuk in regards to ein onshim min hadin. However i'm sure
> that there are other sevaras, which would make for a fine breakaway thread
> Elie Ginsparg
> 
> 
> The nodeh byehuda(mahadura tanina-chohen mishpat-siman samech) quotes both
> opinions-yours in the name of the sefer midot aharon, mine in the name of the
> smag as quoted by the maharsha in mesechta sanhedrin. those are the only 2
> opinions he cites. Elu v'elu!:-)
> 
> ktiva vchatima tova
> Joel Rich
> 

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
Cong. Bais Tefila, 3555 W. Peterson Ave., Chicago, IL, 60659
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila

On Tue, 8 Sep 1998, Avodah wrote:

> From: micha@aishdas.org (Micha Berger)
> (BTW, the linguistic relationship between chiyuv and chayav seems to be saying
> something deep. I'm not sure what.)

Am I missing something, Micha? I thought "Chayyav" was simply the abridged
form of "Chayyav Chatas," "Chayyav Kareis," etc. In other words, the
"deep" relationship is that one is guilty, known colloquially as
"Chayyav," has a Chiyyuv to do something/suffer something.
Or did I completely misunderstand you?
				Mordechai

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After reading the discussion on the Mishnah Berura's use of Baal Nefesh
Machmir I got the impression that is the way the Mishneh Berura deals
with most machloksim in Halacha.  Somewhat surprised, since this did not
correspond with my own sense of the Mishneh Berura, I checked the phrase
using the shut Bar Ilan.  Baal Nefesh Yachmir appears seven times in the
Mishneh Berura and Beur Halacha combined.
If one reads the Teshuvot of Rav Mosheh, Rav Shlomo Zalmen Z.T.L. or
yebadel l'chaim Rav Ovadya Yosef it is clear that their concept of pesak
is not simply to be machmir for all shitos that are not contradictory,
but rather to be machria when possible or follow the majority view. 
Being machmir to satisfy all the shitos is a position that is admirable
and possible for a ben yeshiva but not an approach for a posek of the
broader community. 
Sincerely,
 Yosef Blau

In explaining the possible discrepancy between a p'sak and scientific
observations, (e.g., reproduction of lice as pertains to killing them on
Shabbat) Rav Fine of Scranton has explained that the science of Chazal is
based on what he terms "phenomenological science", meaning that which is
observable unaided by humans. The fact that scientific advances have been able
to determine otherwise through advances in technology is irrelevant to the
halacha. It is the perception (like the perception that the sun revolves
around the earth) which is determinative.

Although I am fearful of treading where giants have already spoken, my
understanding of bechirah chofshis is different from  that which has been
discussed. It seems to me that bechirah chofshis posits that as a human being
I have been given the freedom to make choices. In other words, the realm of
bechirah operates when I know the proper halacha to follow.  At that point, I
have the power to choose to follow the halacha or not, to sin or not.  It is
the knowledge of what Hashem requires of me that then empowers me to make a
choice.  Not knowing or operating under a mistaken belief of what is correct
or incorrect conduct may give me some liability (a korban, for example) does
not implicate bechirah chofshis.
	Daas Torah, it seems to me, operates in the area where the halacha has not
dictated conduct.  This is a totally different concept of freedom, not freedom
to choose proper conduct in accordance with or in opposition to halacha, but
freedom to act or make choices where the halacha does not mandate a course of
action.  As an example, the halacha does not mandate what color my tallis bag
should be.  The question, therefore, should be that in those areas should the
talmid be relying on his rebbe, or can he make those decisions on his own.

When I learnt Chulin in Rav Dovid Lifshitz zt"l's shiur, Rav Dovid explained
the kashrus of maggots found in meat using a thought similar to one expounded
here a few times already.

What is treif is an insect that is nir'eh la'ayin.

There are two causes for a treif maggot: 1- the egg, 2- the meat the larva ate
to reach visible size.

Rav Dovid holds that just as a bug that is too small be seen has no mamashus
ligabei kashrus, neither does the maggot egg. Therefore, there is only one
goreim that has mamashus -- the meat.

The idea that halachah limits itself to observable reality lends itself well
to the hashkafah of R' Chaim Vilozhiner (Derech HaChaim 1:6, 1:21) and others
(for example, it's implied in the Vilna Ga'on's title to the first chapter of
Even Sh'leima, "The Source of all Service of G-d: Shattering the Evil
Personality Traits") that the function of mitzvos is to make a roshem on the
one performing them.

Since microscopic objects, although knowable intellectually, can never be
experienced existentially, their impact on the person following halachah is
minimal. It would therefore make sense that halachah ignores their existance.


When I repeated this idea on soc.culture.jewish, Eliot Schimoff responded that
Rav Kook was machmir with regard to such insects. R Kook holds that we rely on
current science. However, this is only lihachmir. One can't be meikil because
the sevarah for an issur relied on bad science because sevaros given in Chazal
are usually one of many. Even without the scientific reasoning, another
motivation for the issur may exist. (I invite Eliot to correct any errors on
my part and fill in details.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287    Help free Yehuda Katz, held by Syria 5917 days!
micha@aishdas.org                         (11-Jun-82 - 9-Sep-98)
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.
http://www.aishdas.org -- Orthodox Judaism: Torah, Avodah, Chessed

          >>>There are those that say that Chazal were not wrong even in matters
           of
          science ( As does R. Aaron Soloveichik) and therefore we are wrong and
          lice do not reproduce sexually. <<<

R' Aharon does not say science is wrong and Chazal are right.  See R'
Aharon's book "Logic of the Heart/Logic of the Mind" in the essay on Torah
UMada where he reads Chazal as consistant with science.  The gemera means
that killing a bug which reproduces in an environemt of 'ipush'=decay is
not a violation of Shabbos; the gemara does not deny the bug reproduces.
Regardless of whether such a reading conforms with the intent of Chazal or
represents a reinterpretation, it shows a sensitivity to halacha conforming
with objective scientific data.

>>>I don't beleive that the Gemmorah PREFERS svara to psukim. <<<

Lamah li kra-sevara hu!

-CB

P.S. You still owe me at least one source where the gemera utilizes a pasuk
despite having a sevara.

PPS I apologize for 'implicating' Elie when my response was directed at HM.

Shulchan Orech Orach Chaim Mishna berura discuss gomel for a child and concludes we do not say gomel for a child.  Interesting is the din that we say gomel for a rebbi. 

<<
The point that I think the Gemorrah in Pesachim is making is a Hashkafic 
one, i.e., when given the choice between our own senses and what the 
Torah tells us, we are required to follow the Torah.
>>

Isn't this already the intent of the pasuk "Lo sasur...yamin u-s'mol"

<<
Very often the Gemmorah will go through the proccess of a Kal VeChomer proof
and then quote a pasuk. that is because a Pasuk has the Ultimate authority
over a 
Kal VeChomer even when it is irrefutable.
>>

This might be based on the machlokes as to what is the status of something
learned from the 13 middos of R. Yishmael.  Is it a d'Oraisa or Divrei Sofrim
or some other status.  If the 13 middos make a d'Oraisa, how then would it
differ from a pasuk?  

Chazal often took p'sukim totally out of context to learn halachos ( ayin
tachas ayin is the most obvious example ).  So a pasuk, at pshat level is not
always the "ultimate" authority.  And once we use drash, we have moved to the
area of interpretation by Chazal, and then a kal vachomer would have the same
level of authority.

<<
I have heard that R. Aaron Soloveichik has an interesting perspective on 
the halacha of Killing a "louse' on shabbos.  When science discovered 
that lice reproduce sexually than the "Pachad Yitzchak", (an Italian 
Acharon, I believe,) said that it is now assur to kill lice on shabbos 
Deoraiso, eventhough the mishna in Shabbos says it isn't.  R. Aaron said 
that if the Pachad Yitzchak were alive today, he would put him in 
Cherem!  So, here we have a case where our senses tell us that the 
halacha should be different then what Chazal tell us but chazal are to 
be followed as they have the correct mesorah, being closer to Mamid Har 
Sinai. (In reality we are choshesh for the daas hamacmir,in this case 
both shitos.)
>>

I beg to differ.  I think that R. Aharon was saying exactly the opposite: that
there is NO need to be choshesh for the Pachad Yitzchak's opinion, that it is
totally erroneous.  This argues against the thinking that has been presented
until now that we lump together as many non-contradictory shitos as possible.
Rav Aharon is saying we follow one opinion, and can safely reject the other,
regardless of whether they are contradictory or complimentary.

Eliyahu Teitz

<<
There are those that say that Chazal were not wrong even in matters of 
science ( As does R. Aaron Soloveichik) and therefore we are wrong and 
lice do not reproduce sexually.  I am extremely hard pressed to believe 
this.  I would rather say that their knowledge was limited by the extent 
of their resources.  This does not lessen their stature in any way shape 
or or form.   
>>

I did not understand R. Aharon in this manner at all.  I understood his
rejection of the Pachad Yitzchak's position as a rejection of opinions against
mesora, not a rejection of modern science.

Rav Bechhofer wrote
>When relating this episode to my Daf Yomi Shiur, one of the chaverim noted
>that he had been at a wedding - ostensibly Orthodox - where the "real"
>brochos were interspersed with blessings in English by women. That is, it
>seems, even worse, as some of the brochos are not poseich b'baruch
>because of semucha l'chaveirta, which, one, of course, loses in this
>manner.
 A question about brakha semucha l'chaveirta. (I am currently at work without
sources) I thought that the principle determined whether a bracha needed to
poteich b'baruch.  However, I didn't think there was an issur of hefsek in such
a case (any sources?). Thus, the mishna (berachot) views before ahava rabba as
being bein haperakim, and therefore being a lesser problem for hefsek.
Furthermore, I thought we have another principle - that if a brakha is smucha in
its main context, and then it is said elsewhere, it doesn't now require to start
with a baruch.  Therefore, it seems that the brakha does not need to be actually
smucha l'chaverta when said.

Furthermore, even if there was an issur of hefsek, it would seem to apply only
to the person(s) saying the berachot, not others.  At most weddings someone
announces between the sheva berakhot which rav will be saying the next bracha.
 Why is this any different?

While the problem of brakha l'vatala is troublesome, and we are leery about new
minhagim, let me ask:  Assume that there was no issue of brakha l'vatala, (say
that they said the brakha without shem or malchut) or of feminism and
nonOrthodox origin. What is the  halachic problem with having interspersed
readings (not brakhot) between the sheva brakhot?  How different is this from
inserting piyutim?  
let me give another scenario.If, at a wedding where most of the crowd was non
Orthodox and had little idea of what was going on, the  rav would have, after
the hazzan or another rav said each bracha, given a translation and explanation
in English (without shem or malchut), would you also consider that to be assur?

Meir Shinnar

R. YGB writes:

>I was at a wedding recently - under an Orthodox Mesader Kiddushin - where
>after the traditional sheva brochos were recited, six women were called up
>to read the texts of the last six brochos in English (not the HaGaffen).

>However, since I believe we hold that one is yotzei a bracha done
>with proper translation of shem and malchus in English is a valid bracha -
>then all these "blessings" are bona fide berachos l'batala.

>When relating this episode to my Daf Yomi Shiur, one of the chaverim noted
>that he had been at a wedding - ostensibly Orthodox - where the "real"
>brochos were interspersed with blessings in English by women. That is, it
>seems, even worse, as some of the brochos are not poseich b'baruch
>because of semucha l'chaveirta, which, one, of course, loses in this
>manner.

While I personally remain content with the wedding ceremony in its
traditional form, I have one or two questions about your analysis of
these innovative ones.   You point out that the English berakhot are
probably valid berakhot and therefore would be berakhot le-vatalah.

Upon reflection, however, I am wondering if that is so. Certainly if the
same individual recited a berakhah in English and Hebrew, the second
would be le-vatalah.  But what if two different people recite the same
berakha under the huppah?  The question turns on the precise status of
the sheva berakhot recited under the huppah.  If they are birkot shevah,
is it clear that each may be recited only once?  If so, why?

Second, with regard to the interspersing of English and Hebrew berakhot,
if, as we agree, the English berakhot are valid berakhot, then why would
they create a problem of semukhah le-havertah?

Kol tuv,

Eli Clark

>>>Since microscopic objects, although knowable intellectually, can never
be experienced existentially...It would therefore make sense that halachah
ignores their existance.<<<

The fact that halacha only takes into account data that is visible to the
naked eye is established by the Tif. Yisrael end of ch 3 in A"Z (regarding
scales on fish visible only through a microscope), Aruch HaShulachan Hil
Tolaim, and other places.  The halacha does not say bacteria do not exist;
it simply says that because of the small size it is inconsequential.  This
is not the same as the vermin case where the halacha is predicated on the
false premis of spontaneous generation.

>>>One can't be meikil because the sevarah for an issur relied on bad
science because sevaros given in Chazal are usually one of many.<<<

I believe this idea is advanced by the GRA, but I have to hunt down a mareh
makom.  I imagine this approach has nuances as well to account for nishtana
hateva, etc.

-CB

P.S. The only existential existance of a bug that I know of is Kafka's
"Metamorphosis". : - )

Listmembers who belonged to bais tefila will remember that some of the
issues relating to the tension between our mesorah and current
scientific consensus have already been discussed.  I shall try to avoid
repetitiveness. 

Harry writes:
>There are those that say that Chazal were not wrong even in matters of
>science ( As does R. Aaron Soloveichik) and therefore we are wrong and
>lice do not reproduce sexually.

This position seems to conflict with an explicit Gemara in which the
rabbanan say that their understanding of astronomy was inferior to that
of the non-Jews.

>There is another opinion about psak as it has been established by chazal
>which R. YGB has expounded upon to me. (I believe this is based on the
>view of R. Dessler)  When the halacha was estblished by Chazal,
>eventhough it may not have reflected the reality of science as we know
>it today,  G-d wanted to establish the halacha based on the scientific
>knowledge of that era, for reasons known only to Him.  If Rabbi YGB is
>so inclined he can expand better on this thesis than I can.

Everyone who is inclined to go directly to the source should consult
Mikhtav me-Eliyahu IV, p. 355.

Of course, besides R. Dessler, many gedolim have rejected the
conclusions of science in the face of an explicit Mesorah to the
contrary, including R. Yaakov Reischer (regarding astronomy and the
heliocentric theory), R. Yonatan Eyebeschuetz (in his famous debate with
the Hakham Tzevi regarding terefah), R. Yitzhak Weisz (regarding fetus
viability), R. Eliezer Waldenberg (regarding paternity blood testing),
Mahari ben Lev (regarding medical diagnoses), and Rivash (regarding
pregnancy).  See also the Maharal's view of Jewish vs. non-Jewish
astronomy (Netivot Olam, Netiv ha-Torah, ch. 14).

On the question of empirical evidence versus mesorah, everyone should
read the famous teshuvah of the Rashba (I, no. 98) in which he rejects
eyewitness testimony regarding the viability of a terefah.  The
Maharshal disputes his view (Yam shel Shelomoh, Elu Terefot, 80).
Another strong proponent of relying on empirical proof is Tosafot Yom
Tov, Kilayim 5:5.

One can guess where the Rambam stood.  For those who dislike guessing,
see Hil. Kiddush ha-Hodesh 17:24 (Frenkel edition corrects the corrupted
text).  See also the teshuvah of the Maharit (II, Even ha-Ezer, no. 14)
regarding the reliability of doctors.

Besides the sources themselves, I think there is a philosophical problem
that people living to day may have which did not exist centuries ago.
It is one thing for the Rivash to discount medical advice at a time when
doctors had little or no knowedge of anatomy, microbal life, etc.  But
today most of us are willing to rely on modern science when we travel in
an airplane, submit to medical treatment, and so on.  It seems
inconsistent to trust one's life to modern science, but unhesitatingly
reject its conclusions in the realm of Halakhah.  Dores anyone know if
R. Dessler ever travelled in a train, plane or automobile?

Kol tuv,

Eli Clark



































>
> Ktiva vchatima tova
> Joel Rich

 ------------------------------

Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1998 18:27:32 EDT
From: Joelirich@aol.com
Subject: Re:kal vachomer and empirical evidence vs. proof

In a message dated 98-09-08 18:03:12 EDT, you write:

<<
 There is another opinion about psak as it has been established by
chazal
 which R. YGB has expounded upon to me. (I believe this is based on the
 view of R. Dessler)  When the halacha was estblished by Chazal,
 eventhough it may not have reflected the reality of science as we know
 it today,  G-d wanted to establish the halacha based on the scientific
 knowledge of that era, for reasons known only to Him.  If Rabbi YGB is
 so inclined he can expand better on this thesis than I can. >>

I'd love to hear about it.



 I was taught that the
> reason for ein onshin was because the onesh for a particular aveira is also
a
> kappara and thus when we apply a kal vachomer, while we know the chomer
can't
> be done , we're unsure as to the proper punishment qua kappara and therefore
> don't punish. As with many things I was taught , I have no recollection of
> source so take this with a grain of salt:-)
>
> Shabbat shalom and a ktiva vchatima tova
> Joel Rich
>
I was taught that we don't punish from a kal vchomer because we have a
rule that we never punish m'safek (we always try to find a zchus for a
person except for a masis etc.) any law derived from a kal vechomer is
never better than a safek because it can in theory be disproved. Unlike
a
pasuk where the guilty party hasno way to defend himself if he violated
a
law stated explicitly or learned out from an irrefutable drash such as
gezara shava. However if you were to punish a person from a kal vechomer
he'd say how do you know I'm guilty maybe someone would come along and
refute your kal vechomer. Thus one can't be punished from a kal
vechomer.
following this logic , I made my statement that a kal vechomer is dafka
weaker than a pasuk in regards to ein onshim min hadin. However i'm sure
that there are other sevaras, which would make for a fine breakaway
thread
Elie Ginsparg


The nodeh byehuda(mahadura tanina-chohen mishpat-siman samech) quotes
both
opinions-yours in the name of the sefer midot aharon, mine in the name
of the
smag as quoted by the maharsha in mesechta sanhedrin. those are the only
2
opinions he cites. Elu v'elu!:-)

ktiva vchatima tova
Joel Rich

 ------------------------------

Date: Tue, 08 Sep 1998 17:30:45 -0400
From: Harry Maryles <C-Maryles@neiu.edu>
Subject: Re: sevara vs. pasuk, empirical evidence vs. proof

cbrown@bestware.com wrote:
>
> ELIE:Our senses CAN be fooled but are not neccesarily fooled..i.e.when
> given the choice between our own sesnses and what the Torah tells us, we
> are required to follow the Torah. Very often the Gemmorah will go through
> the proccess of a Kal VeChomer proof and then quote a pasuk...<<<
>            ME:1)Why does the gemara prefer sevara, the logic of our puny
>           human brain that can be tricked, to pesukim?  When we are given a
>           choice shouldn't the preference be for pesukim (as you write)?
>           2) Can you give me a mareh makon to a sugya that looks for a
>           gezeirat hakatuv when it has a good kal v'chomer.  3)  Regarding
>           R' Aharon Soloveitchik's statement - It is hard to fathom being
>           machmir for the opinion of someone who you would put in cheirem!
>            ELIE:>>>An example of our senses observing a fact and paskening
>           as though we weren't observing it...<<<
>            ME:Do you mean to say our senses are wrong, or the mesorah
>           outweighs emprical proof?  The former is a rejection of science,
>           the latter creates an uncomfortable schism between what we
>           believe scientifically to be true and what we adopt as religious
>           doctrine.  Which do you prefer, or do you have a different way
>           out?
>
>            -CB


First of all I would like to correct your refference to me as "Elie".
Eventhough I am flattered by it.  Elie is my son-in-law. I signed my
original post in my usual manner of just using my initials, HM. It is
easy to make that mistake since we both have the same e-mail address.

As to the issues you brought up:

I don't beleive that the Gemmorah PREFERS svara to psukim.  It is just
more often applied because of the need to utilze rational thinking when
we DON'T have psukim.  Whenever possible the Gemmorah will prefer psukim
to prove a halacha over svara.  As for finding a source in the Gemorrah,
where the gemmorah goes through the kal vechomer proccess only to find
pesukim in the end.  I can't do so off the cuff.  I can only tell you
that in going through Shas via daf yomi, I come accross it fairly often.

As for the following the Das Hamachmir that R. Soloveichik puts in
Cherem, A) he did'nt (He only would have) and B) as I said in another
post I think he was exaggerating to make a point about not changing the
psak in Chazal.

To answer your last question,  see the post to Joel Rich on this
subject.

HM (not Elie)

 ------------------------------

Date: Tue, 8 Sep 1998 17:47:59 -0500
From: "M.  Gaffen " <msgaff@iname.com>
Subject: Fw: SELICHOS

 - --
Date: Tuesday, September 08, 1998 5:40 PM
Subject: RE: SELICHOS


>>>Date: Mon, 7 Sep 1998 17:31:15 -0400
>>From: Mendel <Moled@compuserve.com>
>>Subject: RE: SELICHOS
>>
>>My question is how CAN one say the PizMon
>>BaMotzoi MeNuCha (MotZoi Shabbos) on Sunday morning?
>>
>I've said slichos Sunday morning.  We just skip the words  *BaMotzoi
>MeNuCha*
>Ksivah U'Hasimah Tovah
>Moshe Gaffen
>

 ------------------------------

End of Avodah V1 #42
********************


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 > 
> Chazal often took p'sukim totally out of context to learn halachos ( ayin
> tachas ayin is the most obvious example ).  So a pasuk, at pshat level is not
> always the "ultimate" authority.  And once we use drash, we have moved to the
> area of interpretation by Chazal, and then a kal vachomer would have the same
> level of authority.

can you explain the idea of "interpretation by Chazal" , I believe that
many laws were told by G-d to Moshe. Specifically the law of ayin tachas
ayin or any other law in which there is no dispute in the gemara (the only
dispute is how we find the remez in the Torah) is possibly an example of a
law told to Moshe by Hashem. Furthermore a kal vachomer has less
authority by the given rules of drashos ie. ein onshim or dayo.
Furthermore many drashos are considered as if they are written in the
pasuk Ie Gezara shava. Do you imply that a law learned from a Gezara shava
isn't min ha Torah. I'm just not clear on what you meant. I know the Rambam
has specific terms fro laws learned through drashos or explicitly in the
pasuk but do you imply that there is any qualitative difference between a
explicit pasuk and the drasha of eyen tachas eyen referring to money. If
you think there might be a difference I'd like to know the source.
Elie Ginsparg

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